☢ test - Í

Burchette v. State, 274 Ga.App. 873, 874 (619 S.E.2d 323) (2005). See Lewis v. State, 217 Ga.App. 758, 759 (458 S.E.2d 861) (1995). Here, the trial court previously had entered final judgment on the felony statutory rape conviction and had sentenced Stulb accordingly. Having done so, the trial court could not unwind the clock and modify the final judgment of conviction and sentence in order to grant first offender treatment. See Burchette, 274 Ga.App. at 874; Lewis, 217 Ga.App. at 759.” Wilford v. State, 265 Ga.App. 153, 592 S.E.2d 923 (January 13, 2004), affirmed , 278 Ga. 718, 606 S.E.2d 252 (November 22, 2004). Defendant procured first offender sentencing by misrepresenting to the trial court his criminal record. State moved to set aside illegal sentence upon discovering that defendant was not eligible for first offender treatment. Trial court granted state’s motion, significantly increasing defendant’s sentence. Court of Appeals affirms the new sentence; “the Georgia First Offender Act … specifically authorizes the sentencing court to ‘enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided by law’ if the court determines that a defendant was not eligible for sentencing under the First Offender Act. OCGA § 42-8-60(b). Further, our law recognizes that ‘“resentencing a prisoner to correct an illegal sentence does not implicate double jeopardy rights, even if the prisoner has already served part of his term.”’ [Cits.]…. Wilford can claim no expectation of finality in a sentence he procured by actively and repeatedly lying to the court.” 2. SCRIVENER’S ERROR Manley v. State, 287 Ga.App. 358, 651 S.E.2d 453 (August 10, 2007). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw plea. Defendant’s sentence was not “illegal,” entitling her to withdraw plea, where clerk erroneously wrote it down as “20 years” instead of “10 years.” “When the trial court orally pronounced Manley’s sentence, it clearly stated that Manley was sentenced to 10 years – not 20 – for theft by taking. Thus, it was a mere scrivener’s error on the sentencing sheet. And when there is a scrivener’s error, the remedy is … for the trial court to correct the error. [Cits.]” 3. TIMING ISSUES See subheading MODIFICATION, below 4. VOID SENTENCE See POST-CONVICTION RELIEF – VOID JUDGMENT, MOTION TO VACATE, above 5. VOID SENTENCE CORRECTED BY COURT Strickland v. State, 301 Ga.App. 272, 687 S.E.2d 221 (November 20, 2009). No error in re-sentencing and no double jeopardy where sentence was corrected to comply with statutory minimum sentence. Trial court here initially failed to sentence defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence upon her conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine, failing to impose the required $200,000 fine required by OCGA § 16-13-31(f)(1). “‘[O]nce a defendant begins serving his sentence, that sentence can only be increased through resentencing where (a) such resentencing is allowed by law, and (b) the defendant has no reasonable expectation in the finality of the original sentence.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 273 Ga.App. 42, 46(6) (614 S.E.2d 146) (2005). Otherwise, ‘the resentencing constitutes a double punishment that runs afoul of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy [Cit.]’ Id. ‘[I]f[,] [however,] the sentence imposed was a void sentence, then a new and valid sentence can be imposed ... at any time.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gonzalez v. State, 201 Ga.App. 437, 438 (411 S.E.2d 345) (1991).” “Strickland had no reasonable expectation in the finality” of a sentence that didn’t meet mandatory minimums. “‘As the original sentence imposed upon [Strickland] was void and as [her] case was still pending until a lawful sentence could be imposed upon [her], [Strickland's] claim of double jeopardy fails [Cits.]’ Bryant v. State, 229 Ga.App. 534, 536(1) (494 S.E.2d 353) (1997).” Burruss v. State, 242 Ga.App. 241, 529 S.E.2d 375 (February 3, 2000). After defendant’s guilty plea to obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, trial court properly corrected sentence to reflect that it would be served “without parole” pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7(c). “‘“[I]f the sentence imposed was a void sentence, then a new and valid sentence can be imposed ... at any time.” (Punctuation and citations omitted.) McCranie v. State, 157 Ga.App. 110, 111, 276 S.E.2d 263 (1981).’ Gonzalez v. State, 201 Ga.App. 437, 438, 411 S.E.2d 345 (1991).” N. COSTS Barraco v. State, 252 Ga.App. 25, 555 S.E.2d 244 (October 12, 2001). Following defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor marijuana possession, trial court erred in calculating statutory surcharges on both the fine and court costs. Held, by its plain language, the surcharge for peace officer, prosecutor and indigent defense funding provided in OCGA § 15-21-73 is to be calculated based on the amount of the fine; the fine “shall be construed to include costs.” Thus here, where the court assessed a $1000 fine and $250 court costs, the surcharge should have been calculated against the $1000 fine only.