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Smith v. State, 272 Ga. 83, 526 S.E.2d 59 (February 14, 2000). Reversing 236 Ga.App. 548, 512 S.E.2d 19 (1999) . In DUI sentence, trial court improperly assessed airfare and hotel costs for two similar transaction witnesses from Oregon. Court of Appeals held these to be “‘costs accruing in the ... trial courts’ under OCGA section 17-11-1,” but Supreme Court disagrees: “in Walden v. State, 258 Ga. 503, 371 S.E.2d 852 (1988), this Court disagreed with a similarly broad interpretation of that phrase and held that the only costs which may be imposed on a criminal defendant are those which are specifically authorized by statute to be assessed against a defendant. … Just as there was no statutory authorization for charging a defendant with jurors' fees and bailiffs' fees in Walden, supra, there is no specific statutory authorization for assessing a criminal defendant for the lodging and airfare costs of witnesses for the State. OCGA §§ 17-11-2, 24-10-24, and 24-10-27 provide for witness fees and travel expenses, but none of those sections provides expressly for the expenses sought here. Although OCGA § 24-10-24 provides for the payment of witnesses' travel expenses at the rate of 20¢ per mile ‘by the nearest practical route,’ and OCGA § 24-10-27 provides for payment under certain circumstances to law enforcement officers of a witness fee of $20 per day, neither section provides for lodging or airfare expenses.” O. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT See CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT/EXCESSIVE FINES, above P. DEATH PENALTY See also EVIDENCE – VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE; JURIES AND JURORS – CHARGE – DEATH PENALTY; and PROCEDURE – UNIFIED APPEAL PROCEDURE, above ; and subheading AGGRAVATED SENTENCE – GENERALLY/ APPRENDI , above 1. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE (B)(10) – AVOIDING/PREVENTING ARREST/CONFINEMENT Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 766 S.E.2d 1 (October 20, 2014). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; evidence supported imposition of death penalty because “the defendant committed the murder ‘for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement.’” Evidence showed that defendant had failed to report to probation and a probation warrant was issued for his arrest. Defendant had stolen a car and guns to leave the area, but the car broke down. He then shot the two victims “so that he could take their truck, leave the area, and thus avoid his arrest for violating probation and stealing the Cavalier.” Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 694 S.E.2d 316 (March 15, 2010). At defendant’s capital murder trial, evidence didn’t support aggravating circumstance under OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(10), which “provides that the death penalty may be imposed where the evidence authorizes the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘[t]he murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or another.’ The State contended at trial that killing a witness to a crime is a means of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing lawful arrest and that the evidence showed that, once Humphreys obtained the victims' ATM cards and PINs, he murdered the victims because he knew that he would be apprehended if he left them alive. The broad reading of the (b)(10) statutory aggravating circumstance that the State advocates would permit it to apply in almost any case in which a defendant is accused of committing a murder in close connection with another crime- a very typical murder case.” “We note that our cases to date have upheld the (b)(10) circumstance only where the evidence supported a finding that the defendant was, at the time of the murder, in immediate peril of being lawfully arrested, placed in custody, or confined in a place of lawful confinement by a law enforcement officer. See Brannan v. State, 275 Ga. 70, 70, 85(28) (561 S.E.2d 414) (2002) (finding sufficient evidence to support the (b)(10) circumstance where the defendant murdered a police officer who stopped him for speeding); Holsey v. State, 271 Ga. 856, 857 n.1, 858(1) (524 S.E.2d 473) (1999) (finding sufficient evidence where the defendant fled after robbing a food store and then shot a police officer who was approaching his vehicle to arrest him); Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 688, 690(1) (512 S.E.2d 896) (1999) (finding sufficient evidence where the defendant, a known drug dealer, shot an officer who had threatened to “catch him dirty” in the back of the head while the officer was frisking another suspect); Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 851, 853(1) (507 S.E.2d 419) (1998) (finding sufficient evidence where the defendant murdered an officer to avoid a search of his bag, which he feared would reveal his pistol and lead to his arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm); Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 572 (261 S.E.2d 364) (1979) (finding sufficient evidence where the defendant killed a police officer while fleeing a ‘pat down’ after he committed a robbery), overruled on other grounds by Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23, 25(2) (426 S.E.2d 895) (1993); Willis v. State, 243 Ga. 185, 185, 191(17) (253 S.E.2d 70) (1979) (finding sufficient evidence where the defendant abducted and murdered an officer who attempted to arrest him and his companions after they committed an armed robbery). Compare Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698, 708-709, 709(22) (278 S.E.2d 398) (1981) (reversing the jury's finding of the (b)(10) circumstance where the defendant killed a police officer who had stopped him for questioning but where the State ‘did not prove a technically lawful arrest of the offender’). While such cases fall