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clearly within the scope of the (b)(10) statutory aggravating circumstance, we reiterate that the Code section is not limited to that situation. We hold today only that the (b)(10) circumstance does not extend as far as the situation presented in this case, and therefore we must set aside the (b)(10) circumstances with respect to the murders of both victims here.” Other aggravating circumstances did exist, however, so death penalty upheld. 2. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES – BAD CHARACTER Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (March 18, 2011). Capital murder conviction affirmed, but sentence reversed based on improper victim impact testimony. Testimony of victims of prior crimes of defendant properly admitted “both as evidence of Bryant's past crimes and as evidence of bad character. See Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 349(17) (687 S.E.2d 438) (2009) (explaining that the State could have called the victim of a defendant's prior crime to testify about the circumstances of the prior crime).” “See, e.g., Fugitt v. State, 256 Ga. 292, 296(1) (348 S.E.2d 451) (1986) (‘[A] defendant's character in general, and his conduct while in prison, are relevant to the question of sentence. [Cits.]’).” Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 514 S.E.2d 657 (March 19, 1999). “The trial court did not err by allowing a witness to testify for the state in the sentencing phase that Cook exposed himself to her and a friend at Lake Juliette in 1993. Evidence in aggravation may include reliable information tending to show a defendant’s general bad character. Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 281, 287(7), 368 S.E.2d 742 (1988); Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 873(4), 268 S.E.2d 316 (1980).” 3. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE (B)(6) – CAUSING/DIRECTING AGENT/EMPLOYEE TO COMMIT MURDER Tate v. State, 287 Ga. 364, 695 S.E.2d 591 (June 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder, kidnapping and related offenses, and death sentence, affirmed; evidence supported capital sentence. “The trial court, acting as the finder of fact, was authorized to find that Nicholas Tate directed his young brother to murder the child. As we have held, one ‘who directs a follower or lackey to commit murder’ is guilty of the statutory aggravating circumstance addressing persons who cause or direct another to commit murder as an agent or employee. Mize v. State, 269 Ga. 646(14) (501 S.E.2d 219) (1998) (construing OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(6)). Accordingly, we find no merit to Tate's argument that the trial court erred by finding the existence of the statutory aggravating circumstance addressing one who has directed another to murder as his or her agent or employee. See OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(6).” 4. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE (B)(2) – COMMISSION OF OTHER CAPITAL OFFENSE/AGGRAVATED BATTERY Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (March 4, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions, and death penalty, affirmed. Contrary to defendant’s argument, allowing uncompleted felonies to serve as aggravating circumstances (see Tate (June 1, 2010), below ) “constitute statutory aggravating circumstances does narrow the class of death eligible defendants and provide sufficient guidance to juries as to what constitutes an aggravating circumstance. The class includes those persons who commit murders ‘while ... engaged in the commission of another capital felony or aggravated battery, or ... while ... engaged in the commission of burglary in any degree or arson in the first degree.’ OCGA § 17–10–30(b)(2).” Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239 (March 25, 2011). Murder conviction and death penalty affirmed; evidence supported finding of statutory aggravating circumstances including aggravated battery and torture. “‘In order to constitute aggravated battery, the bodily harm to the victim must occur before death. [Cit.] Torture occurs when the victim is subjected to serious physical abuse before death. [Cit.] Serious sexual abuse may be found to constitute serious physical abuse. [Cit.] Torture also occurs when the victim is subjected to an aggravated battery as hereinabove defined.... Insofar as aggravated battery and torture are concerned, only facts occurring prior to death may be considered. The death of a victim who dies instantaneously with little or no forewarning does not involve torture or aggravated battery ( [cits.] ); i.e., only facts showing aggravated battery or torture (as hereinabove defined), which are separate from the act causing instantaneous death, will support a finding of torture or aggravated battery. The instantaneous death of a victim as a result of being killed by a shotgun, although the scene of death be gruesome (no other facts appearing), does not constitute torture, aggravated battery or depravity of mind. ( [Cit.] ) Where only facts occurring prior to death are relied upon to support a finding of torture or aggravated battery, the fact that the victim was tortured or was the victim of an aggravated battery will also support a finding of depravity of mind of the defendant; i.e., a defendant who tortures the victim or subjects the victim to an aggravated battery before killing the victim can be found to have a depraved mind.’ Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 861-862(3) (268 S.E.2d 339) (1980). See also West v. State, 252 Ga. 156, 161-162 (313 S.E.2d 67) (1984)(Appendix)(providing the pattern jury charge on torture to be given upon the defendant's request); Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80, 88-89(7) (287 S.E.2d 531) (1982); Patrick v. State, 247 Ga. 168, 169 (274 S.E.2d 570) (1981). With