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respect to an aggravated battery ‘alleged to have been committed upon the person who is also the murder victim, the same limitations ... apply to the § (b)(2) circumstance as to the § (b)(7) circumstance.’ Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 588, 594(3)(c) (340 S.E.2d 862) (1986).” Evidence here supported aggravated circumstance of aggravated battery based on “the evidence that the victim’s death was not instantaneous. … Likewise, the jury's finding of torture was supported by the evidence that the victim's death was not instantaneous, but was preceded by serious sexual abuse, as well as the serious physical abuse which constituted the aggravated batteries. See Loyd v. State, [288 Ga. 481 (4)(b), 705 S.E.2d 616 (January 10, 2011); Hall v. Terrell, [285 Ga. 448, 679 S.E.2d 17 (2009)], supra; Jones v. State, 279 Ga. 854, 860(7)(b) (622 S.E.2d 1) (2005); Hance v. State, supra. The authorized findings of aggravated battery and torture also support a finding of depravity of mind. See Loyd v. State, supra; Perkins v. State, [269 Ga. 791, 796(6) (505 S.E.2d 16) (1998)]; Hance v. State, supra at 862(3). Furthermore, the shocking and vicious nature of the victim's murder by stomping and kicking authorized the jury to find that the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman.” Loyd v. State, 288 Ga. 481, 705 S.E.2d 616 (January 10, 2011). At bench sentencing trial following guilty plea to capital murder, trial court properly found existence of aggravating circumstance (b)(2), commission of another capital felony, to wit: kidnapping with bodily injury – even if the bodily injury in question was the fatal wound to victim. “See Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 368(11) (283 S.E.2d 238) (1981) (holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury).” Tate v. State, 287 Ga. 364, 695 S.E.2d 591 (June 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder, kidnapping and related offenses, and death sentence, affirmed; evidence supported capital sentence. 1. “[A] murder may be found to have been committed while the murderer was ‘engaged in the commission’ of an armed robbery even if the attempted armed robbery fails or is otherwise abandoned. OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2). See Amadeo v. State, 243 Ga. 627, 631 (255 S.E.2d 718) (1979) (construing OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2)).” Accord, Brockman v. State , 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (March 4, 2013). 2. “There is no merit to Tate's argument that the one armed robbery cannot serve as a statutory aggravating circumstance for both of the murders. See Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717(43)(a) (386 S.E.2d 316) (1989).” 5. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE (B)(7) – TORTURE, DEPRAVITY OF MIND, AGGRAVATED BATTERY Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; verdict form improperly presented the (b)(7) aggravating factor (“ a murder that is ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.’”), listing its two separate parts on separate lines without the connecting phrase “in that,” so that it appeared to be “two separate statutory aggravating circumstances”; but harmless error given that the jury was empowered to impose a death sentence on finding just one aggravating circumstance. Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012). Murder convictions affirmed, although death sentences reversed on other grounds; jury charge and verdict form on (b)(7) aggravating factor were erroneous. “‘This statutory aggravating circumstance consists of two major components, the second of which has three subparts, as follows: (I) The offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman (II) in that it involved (A) aggravated batter[y] to the victim, (B) torture to the victim, or (C) depravity of mind of the defendant.’ Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 860, 268 S.E.2d 339 (1980).” Charge and verdict form failed to make plain that jury must agree unanimously on one of the subparts of (II). “As in several prior cases, the jury's sentencing verdict here referred to ‘torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.’ (Emphasis added.) Because these three subparts were listed in the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive and were not separated on the verdict form to require a finding by the jury as to the individual subparts, it cannot be determined whether the jury agreed unanimously on any one of the three subparts. See, e.g., Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 366, 647 S.E.2d 70 (2007). This defect in the verdict form provided to and used by the jury was compounded by the following erroneous charge by the trial court: ‘Your verdict should also reflect your finding, if you so find, that the murder involved at least one of the following: torture, depravity of mind[,] or aggravated battery of the victim.’ Absent from this charge was the further charge, contained both in the pattern charges that applied at the time of Ellington's trial and in the pattern charges that will likely apply if he is retried as to sentencing, which directs the jury to ‘specify which of these was involved in the murder.’ Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, § 2.15.30 (2012). This omission should be rectified if this case is retried as to sentencing.” Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239 (March 25, 2011). Murder conviction and death penalty affirmed; evidence supported finding of statutory aggravating circumstances including aggravated battery and torture. “‘In order to constitute aggravated battery, the bodily harm to the victim must occur before death. [Cit.] Torture occurs when the victim is