☢ test - Í

(1995) (victim’s five-year-old child was walked through her blood and left screaming in truck in view of the murder scene, with blood on her shoes, while defendant “sat at a neighbor’s home drinking beer.” “In that case we considered whether the defendant’s conduct toward his child in the course of killing the victims, knowing but not intending that his actions would cause the child severe mental distress, is alone sufficient to prove the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance of depravity mind to support a sentence of death. We concluded that the defendant’s ‘gross disregard for the virtually certain and profound impact of his actions on his five-year-old child amply supports the jury’s finding that the murder of [the child’s mother] was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman in that it involved depravity of mind.’ Id. at 603(2).” Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488 (October 25, 2004). “‘Depravity of mind may be found where the victim is subjected to serious psychological abuse before death, or to mutilation, serious disfigurement, or sexual abuse after death.’ Phillips [v. State, 250 Ga. 336, 340, 297 S.E.2d 217 (1982)]. The mere apprehension of death, immediately before the fatal wounds are inflicted by the defendant, does not constitute the psychological abuse sufficient to show depravity of mind. Id. at 341. However, the ‘[a]ge and physical characteristics of the victim may also support a finding of depravity of mind. [Cit.] We have upheld a finding of § (b)(7) where the victim was very old or very young.’ Id. at 340, n. 3. See Rhode [ v. State, 274 Ga. 377 384-385(16), 552 S.E.2d 855 (2001)] (a finding of depravity of mind supported by evidence of aiding and abetting the prolonged murder of an 11-year-old child); McMichen v. State, 265 Ga. 598(2) (458 S.E.2d 833) (1995) (depravity of mind shown by infliction of mental distress on 5-year-old girl who defendant left near her murdered mother’s body); Thomas v. State, 247 Ga. 233 (275 S.E.2d 318) (1981). Considering the foregoing cases, we conclude that the trial court did not err by deciding that there existed sufficient evidence for the jury to find ‘depravity of mind’ in the arson-murder of a conscious 3-year-old child. See id. ” Tarver v. State, 278 Ga. 358, 602 S.E.2d 627 (September 13, 2004). 1. “The jury … found the existence of the OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(7) aggravating circumstance as follows: ‘the murder of [victim] was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman in that it involved depravity of mind.’ … As to the second component, the jury in this case was charged that they may find the existence of the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance only if they were to find that the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman ‘in that it involved depravity of mind.’ And they determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the (b)(7) circumstance as charged was proven. In West v. State, 252 Ga. 156, 161 (appendix) (313 S.E.2d 67) (1984), this Court proposed a jury instruction defining ‘depravity of mind,’ as follows: ‘depravity of mind is a reflection of an utterly corrupt, perverted or immoral state of mind. In determining whether or not the offense of murder in this case involved depravity of mind on the part of the defendant, you may consider the age and physical characteristics of the victim and you may consider the actions of the defendant prior to and after the commission of the murder. In order to find that the offense of murder involved depravity of mind, you must find that the defendant, as the result of his utter corruption, perversion or immorality, committed aggravated battery or torture upon a living person, or subjected the body of a deceased victim to mutilation, or serious disfigurement or sexual abuse. Tarver did not request a jury instruction defining depravity of mind, and none was given. ‘[I]nstructions clarifying the statutory language of the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance need not be given absent a request for such clarifying instructions (except for the phrase “aggravated battery”).’ West, supra at 160. Under the circumstances, Tarver was not entitled to such an instruction.” In Tarver’s case, the State relied solely upon depravity of mind as the basis for the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance; neither torture nor an aggravated battery to the victim were asserted. In fact, the only evidence before the Court shows that the initial gunshot, which would be fatal within minutes, was fired during a struggle. The remaining gunshots, while wantonly vile and inhuman, cannot be said to reflect ‘a consciousness materially more “depraved” than that of any person guilty of murder.’ Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432 (100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398) (1980). Accordingly, we hold that the depravity of mind (b)(7) aggravating circumstance was not supported by the evidence.” 2. Tarver did not request a jury instruction defining depravity of mind, and none was given. ‘[I]nstructions clarifying the statutory language of the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance need not be given absent a request for such clarifying instructions (except for the phrase “aggravated battery”).’ West, supra at 160. Under the circumstances, Tarver was not entitled to such an instruction.” Lee v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 513 S.E.2d 1 (March 1, 1999). “The evidence was sufficient to support the OCGA § 17-10- 30(b)(7) aggravating circumstance that the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved an aggravated battery to the victim. OCGA § 17-10-35(c)(2); Jackson v. Virginia, [cit.]. Insofar as aggravated battery under the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance is concerned, only facts showing that the aggravated battery occurred before death, and was separate from the act causing instantaneous death, will support a finding of aggravated battery. Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 588, 594(3)(c), 340 S.E.2d 862 (1986); Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856, 861-862(3), 268 S.E.2d 339 (1980). Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence shows that Lee shot the victim in the face and threw her in the back of the pickup truck, where she lingered for about an hour until he killed her in Charlton County.”