☢ test - Í

6. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES – GENERALLY Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239 (March 25, 2011). Murder conviction and death penalty affirmed. “ Georgia's statutory aggravating circumstances do not fail to adequately narrow the class of cases eligible for the death penalty, and they do not otherwise promote the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859) (1976); Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 336-337(4) (687 S.E.2d 438) (2009).” Tate v. State, 287 Ga. 364, 695 S.E.2d 591 (June 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder, kidnapping and related offenses, and death sentence, affirmed; evidence supported capital sentence. Suggests, without deciding, that the rule against “mutually supporting aggravating circumstances” may no longer be viable; but pretermits that question by finding that other aggravating circumstances support the death sentences, anyway. Here, defendant and his brothers killed mother and her young daughter, each murder serving as an aggravating circumstance for the other. Accord, Martin v. State , 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015) (continues to recognize rule against mutually supporting aggravating circumstances , but, like Tate , finds at least one other statutory aggravating circumstance). Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (October 2, 2006). Jury could consider statutory aggravating circumstance of kidnapping with bodily injury even though State had nolle prossed that charge prior to trial. “[T]he offense was sufficiently part of the same criminal transaction to permit the jury to find the statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed while Walker was engaged in the commission of kidnapping with bodily injury. OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2); see Lee v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 803(8) (514 S.E.2d 1) (1999) (holding that offense of kidnapping with bodily injury was sufficiently part of same criminal transaction to be considered as, and found to be, a (b)(2) aggravating circumstance of murder even though trial court directed a verdict of acquittal of kidnapping with bodily injury based upon improper venue).” Jones v. State, 279 Ga. 854, 622 S.E.2d 1 (November 7, 2005). 1. “In sentencing [defendant] to life without parole for the murder of [victim], the jury found that the commission of the armed robbery of the keys and the burglary of the apartment were aggravating circumstances. [Defendant] contends that, having served as aggravating factors as to the sentence for murder, the armed robbery and burglary cannot also support the imposition of separate convictions and sentences. … [A]ggravating circumstances are not offenses for purposes of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. Therefore, the fact that the jury found that the armed robbery and burglary were aggravating factors in sentencing [defendant] for the murder of [victim] does not preclude separate convictions for committing those offenses.” 2. “[T]orture and aggravated battery are not necessarily synonymous. ‘Torture occurs when the victim is subjected to serious physical abuse before death. [Cit.].... Torture also occurs when the victim is subjected to an aggravated battery....’ (Emphasis supplied.) Hance v. State, [245 Ga. 856, 861(3), 268 S.E.2d 339 (1980)].” Henry v. State, 278 Ga. 617, 604 S.E.2d 826 (November 8, 2004). “Henry … contends that it is unconstitutional for a trial court, rather than a jury, to impose the death penalty. As a matter of constitutional law, all defendants are ‘entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment.’ Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). But the right to have a jury determine whether aggravating circumstances exist so as to authorize a death sentence is subject to the same principles of waiver as apply in any other criminal case. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (June 24, 2004); Hill v. Head, 277 Ga. 255, 258(II)(A)(2), 587 S.E.2d 613 (2003). Here, Henry waived his right to a jury trial as to his sentence and, in accordance with OCGA § 17-10-32, the trial court was authorized to conduct the bench trial to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed.” Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 512 S.E.2d 896 (March 1, 1999). During sentencing phase of defendant’s death penalty trial, “[t]he trial court did not err by sending a written copy of the alleged statutory aggravating circumstances out with the jury during its deliberations, as required by OCGA § 17-10-30(c). See Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 569(13), 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979), overruled on other grounds Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23, 25-26(2), 426 S.E.2d 895 (1993).” 7. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES – NON-STATUTORY Nance v. State, 280 Ga. 125, 623 S.E.2d 470 (December 1, 2005). “Contrary to Nance’s assertion, there is no requirement that non-statutory aggravating evidence be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘While statutory aggravating circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury is not required to “evaluate each and every evidentiary vignette pursuant to the reasonable doubt standard.”[Cit.].’ Ward v. State, 262 Ga. 293(29) (417 S.E.2d 130)