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(1992) (emphasis in original). The trial court in this case properly instructed the jury it must find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more statutory aggravating circumstances in order to impose death or life imprisonment without parole, and that it could impose life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for any reason or no reason. See Ward , supra.” Terrell v. State, 271 Ga. 783, 523 S.E.2d 294 (November 1, 1999). At sentencing phase of defendant’s capital murder trial, “[e]vidence that Terrell set a fire in his jail cell while awaiting trial was properly admitted as a non-statutory aggravating circumstance. See Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715(19), 352 S.E.2d 762 (1987) (a defendant's character and his conduct while in prison are relevant to sentence). The State provided sufficient pretrial notice of its intention to present evidence about this incident in accordance with OCGA § 17-10-2.” 8. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES – NOTICE Wagner v. State, 282 Ga. 149, 646 S.E.2d 676 (June 11, 2007). 1. Notice of aggravating circumstance “that ‘[t]he offense of murder in this case was committed for the purpose of receiving money’ rather than that ‘[t]he offender’ committed the murder for the purpose of receiving money, as appears in OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(4),” was potentially defective where it was possible to construe the notice as referring to the motives of a co-defendant and not defendant. “The State could simply re-notify Wagner regarding this statutory aggravating circumstance using the language of the Code. See Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834(6)(a) (514 S.E.2d 426) (1999) (notice of additional aggravating circumstance during guilt/innocence phase jury deliberations held permissible). See also Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 161 n. 10(2) (635 S.E.2d 740) (2006) (strongly urging prosecutors to include notice of specific statutory aggravating circumstances in notice of intent to seek the death penalty, or as soon thereafter as is possible).” 2. Notice that the offense involved “depravity of mind” was not defective for failure “to state what aspects of the murder involved ‘depravity of mind.’ This Court has specified the types of evidence that may prove ‘depravity of mind,’ and it has set out a specific charge on ‘depravity of mind’ to be given upon a defendant’s request. See West v. State, 252 Ga. 156(2), 161-162 (Appendix) (313 S.E.2d 67) (1984). [T]he correct use of the language of the Code regarding ‘depravity of mind’ places Wagner on sufficient notice regarding what she should be prepared to defend against.” Tollette v. State, 280 Ga. 100, 621 S.E.2d 742 (November 7, 2005). Dicta suggests that, where defendant pled guilty and trial was conducted only on sentence, State was entitled to use evidence intended for the guilt phase in the sentencing phase without giving notice of its use specifically as a non-statutory aggravating circumstance. “[S]ee also Berryhill v. State, 249 Ga. 442, 450-451(11), 291 S.E.2d 685 (1982) (holding that pretrial notice of intent to re-use guilt phase evidence in the sentencing phase is not required).” Issue here waived because defendant failed to object at trial. Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 514 S.E.2d 426 (March 15, 1999). “The state filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty listing three OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(2) aggravating circumstances and ‘any others which may be supported by the evidence upon the trial of said case.’ In a pretrial motion, Sears objected to the catch-all phrase at the end of the state’s notice of intent and sought to compel the state to reveal all of the statutory aggravating circumstances upon which it would rely. The trial court denied the motion, but the state promised that it would notify the trial court of any additional statutory aggravating circumstances ‘if any became known.’ Subsequently, while the jury was deliberating in the guilt phase, the state notified Sears that it would seek the (b)(7) aggravating circumstance. The trial court did not err in permitting the jury to consider that aggravating circumstance. It is not incumbent upon the state to notify a defendant prior to trial of every statutory aggravating circumstance that it might seek to prove . Roberts v. State, 252 Ga. 227, 240, 314 S.E.2d 83 (1984); Bowden v. Zant, 244 Ga. 260, 263-264, 260 S.E.2d 465 (1979).” Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244, 702 S.E.2d 420 (November 22, 2010). Interim review of defendants’ capital murder prosecution; trial court correctly ruled that OCGA § 17-10-30(b)(8) (murder of a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties) does not violate equal protection because it doesn’t require knowledge on defendant’s part that victim was, in fact, a peace officer performing his duties . Prior appearance of same case determined that (b)(8) contained no such scienter requirement, see July 14, 2008, below. 1. Federal, state equal protection provisions are co-extensive. “While the defendants make their challenge under the equal protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions, ‘“[b]ecause the protection provided in the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution is coextensive with that provided in Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, we apply them as one.”’ Favorito v. Handel, 285 Ga. 795, 797(1)(b) (684 S.E.2d 257) (2009) (citation omitted).” 2. Strict scrutiny not required based on potential death penalty. “The trial court did not err, however, in refusing to apply strict scrutiny analysis in 9. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE (B)(8) – POLICE/CORRECTIONS OFFICER/FIREFIGHTER VICTIMS IN PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES