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previously violated by defendant was broader than the corresponding Georgia rape statute is overcome by the fact that the allegations to which defendant pled guilty established capital rape under Georgia law. Also, “[w]hile the definition of criminal sexual assault under [Illinois law] does not contain the element of non-consent, [fn] the ‘against her will’ element of Georgia's rape statute was supplied here by evidence that the victim was under 14 years old, which was the legal age of consent in this State at the time the assault occurred.” 11. DEATH PENALTY, APPLICABILITY TO OFFENSES OTHER THAN MURDER Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (June 25, 2008). “ This case presents the question whether the Constitution bars respondent from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in death of the victim. We hold the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for this offense. The Louisiana statute is unconstitutional.” This is “[b]ased both on [national] consensus and our own independent judgment.” As to consensus : only six states have statutes making child rape a capital offense (including Georgia, OGCA § 16-6-1, enacted 1999); no one has been executed for child rape (or adult rape) in this country since 1964. Only Louisiana has sentenced anyone to death for child rape since 1964, Kennedy and one other defendant – “the only two individuals now on death row in the United States for a nonhomicide offense.” “[W]e conclude there is a national consensus against capital punishment for the crime of child rape.” As to “our own independent judgment:” the decision recounts the eight-year old victim’s severe physical injuries. “We cannot dismiss the years of long anguish that must be endured by the victim of child rape. It does not follow, though, that capital punishment is a proportionate penalty for the crime. … Evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society counsel us to be most hesitant before interpreting the Eighth Amendment to allow the extension of the death penalty, a hesitation that has special force where no life was taken in the commission of the crime. It is an established principle that decency, in its essence, presumes respect for the individual and thus moderation or restraint in the application of capital punishment.” Majority expresses for concern for the difficulty in developing general rules and standards in application of the death penalty in this context , noting the ongoing difficulty in application of capital homicide jurisprudence. “Consistent with evolving standards of decency and the teachings of our precedents we conclude that, in determining whether the death penalty is excessive, there is a distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against individual persons, even including child rape, on the other. The latter crimes may be devastating in their harm, as here, but ‘in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,’ Coker [ v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977)] (plurality opinion), they cannot be compared to murder in their ‘severity and irrevocability.’ Ibid. ” Expresses concern over the potential number of executions that would result from execution of all child-rapists, which would be allowed under Louisiana’s approach (no other aggravating circumstances required, unlike Georgia’s statute, see OCGA § 17-10-30). “[T]he resulting imprecision and the tension between evaluating the individual circumstances and consistency of treatment have been tolerated where the victim dies. It should not be introduced into our justice system, though, where death has not occurred.” “Evolving standards of decency are difficult to reconcile with a regime that seeks to expand the death penalty to an area where standards to confine its use are indefinite and obscure.” As to purposes for death penalty – retribution: Majority expresses concern “that imposing the death penalty for child rape would not further retributive purposes. In considering whether retribution is served, among other factors we have looked to whether capital punishment ‘has the potential ... to allow the community as a whole, including the surviving family and friends of the victim, to affirm its own judgment that the culpability of the prisoner is so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed.’ Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2847, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007). In considering the death penalty for nonhomicide offenses this inquiry necessarily also must include the question whether the death penalty balances the wrong to the victim. Cf. Roper [ v. Simmons, 543 U.S., 551, 571, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)].” A capital prosecution would involve child victim as a central participant for a long term. “Society's desire to inflict the death penalty for child rape by enlisting the child victim to assist it over the course of years in asking for capital punishment forces a moral choice on the child, who is not of mature age to make that choice. The way the death penalty here involves the child victim in its enforcement can compromise a decent legal system; and this is but a subset of fundamental difficulties capital punishment can cause in the administration and enforcement of laws proscribing child rape.” And the questionable reliability of child victim testimony “means there is a ‘special risk of wrongful execution’ in some child rape cases. Atkins [ v.Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)].” Deterrence: Death penalty for child rape “may not resulting more deterrence or more effective enforcement;” rather, majority expresses concern that a) offenses will be even less likely to be reported than they already are, and b) “by in effect making the punishment for child rape and murder equivalent, a State that punishes child rape by death may remove a strong incentive for the rapist not to kill the victim.” “These considerations lead us to conclude, in our independent judgment, that the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for the rape of a child.” Majority leaves open the potential for capital punishment for crimes not directed against “individual persons. We do not address, for example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism,