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and drug kingpin activity, which are offenses against the State. As it relates to crimes against individuals, though, the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim's life was not taken.” Alito dissents, writing for Roberts, Scalia and Thomas, challenging majority’s conclusions that a national consensus exists against capital punishment for child rape, and that “that imposing the death penalty for child rape is inconsistent with ‘“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”’” Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; “The death penalty for rape is not unconstitutional when the victim is killed. Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 807, 822, 243 S.E.2d 1 (1978).” Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 514 S.E.2d 426 (March 15, 1999). Defendant could be sentenced to death upon conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury, where he took the victim out of state, then killed her. “We have previously held that a defendant may receive a death sentence for kidnapping with bodily injury when the victim is killed. Stanley v. State, 240 Ga. 341, 350, 241 S.E.2d 173 (1977). See also Tharpe v. State, 262 Ga. 110, 115, 416 S.E.2d 78 (1992) (kidnapping with bodily injury is a capital felony that may be considered as an aggravating circumstance supporting a death sentence for murder). Thus, we concluded in Potts v. State, 261 Ga. 716, 410 S.E.2d 89 (1991), that a jury could impose a death sentence when the offense of kidnapping with bodily injury was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of the capital felonies of murder and armed robbery. Id. at 726, 410 S.E.2d 89.” 12. DEATH PENALTY, CONSTITUTIONALITY Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 766 S.E.2d 1 (October 20, 2014). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; delay in processing direct appeal didn’t “violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. While this Court has never addressed a claim exactly like the one that Hulett makes, we have previously rejected similar arguments alleging an excessive delay between sentencing and execution in two cases where death row inmates' appeals had resulted in resentencing trials. See Jones v. State, 273 Ga. 231, 233(2), 539 S.E.2d 154 (2000) (finding meritless a ‘“waiting for execution is intolerably cruel” argument’); Potts v. State, 259 Ga. 96, 105(35), 376 S.E.2d 851 (1989) (same).” U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to hear this argument. “Furthermore, federal courts of appeal, including the Eleventh Circuit, have held that prolonged incarceration under a sentence of death does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Thompson v. Secretary for Dept. of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284(II) (11 th Cir., 2008) (noting ‘the total absence of Supreme Court precedent that a prolonged stay on death row violates the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment’ and ‘conclud[ing] that execution following a 31–year term of imprisonment is not in itself a constitutional violation’). But cf. Jones v. Chappell, No. CV 09–02158–CJC, 2014 WL 3567365, at * 1, * 14 (C.D.Cal., July 16, 2014) (holding that California's ‘dysfunctional’ death penalty system, in which only 13 of over 900 individuals sentenced to death since 1978 have been executed, violates the Eighth Amendment because it is ‘arbitrary’ and ‘serves no penological purpose’ and therefore vacating the death sentence of an inmate on death row for 19 years).” Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012). Murder convictions affirmed, but death sentence reversed and remanded; trial court properly determined that Georgia’s death penalty statutes are not unconstitutional for the reasons advanced by defendant. 1. “Ellington contends that Georgia's statutes do not provide sufficient guidance to juries in considering possible death sentences and that this deficiency leads to arbitrary results. However, the Georgia death penalty scheme sufficiently narrows the application of the death penalty and guides the jury's consideration of it as a possible sentence, while also affording jurors the latitude to consider all mitigating circumstances in their deliberations. See Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 75, 709 S.E.2d 239 (2011) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)); Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 336–337, 687 S.E.2d 438 (2009).” Accord, Martin v. State , 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). 2. “ Ellington's equal protection claim, which alleges that Georgia's laws lead to the discriminatory application of the death penalty, fails because he has not shown any invidious discrimination in his case. See Ledford, 289 Ga. at 75, 709 S.E.2d 239 (citing McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987)).” Accord, Martin v. State , 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). 3. “ Georgia's death penalty statutes are not unconstitutional because they allow prosecutors discretion in selecting cases in which to seek the death penalty. See Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 161, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006).” Accord, Martin v. State , 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). 4. “Georgia's death penalty statutes are not unconstitutional because they require the jury to find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt before a death sentence may be considered but provide no particular standard of proof to be applied to an individual juror's consideration of non-statutory aggravating circumstances. Unlike statutory aggravating circumstances, the finding of a non-statutory aggravating circumstance does not increase the defendant's