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testimony that the defendant was remorseful, it is overruled. ] ” Harmless, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; 1. “[i]n the sentencing phase, the admission of non-statutory aggravating evidence about several previous burglaries and other offenses committed by Pace was not error. Jefferson v. State, 256 Ga. 821(8), 353 S.E.2d 468 (1987) (evidence of prior crimes, even if non-adjudicated, is admissible in the sentencing phase). The State presented reliable evidence about these offenses and there is no requirement that other crime evidence in the sentencing phase be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Ross v. State, 254 Ga. 22(5)(d), 326 S.E.2d 194 (1985).” 2. “Life imprisonment without parole was not a sentencing option at Pace's trial. OCGA § 17-10-16(a). Therefore, it was not error for the trial court to prevent Pace from asking questions about parole during voir dire, Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777(3), 450 S.E.2d 680 (1994), and to deny argument or the presentation of evidence about Pace's parole eligibility. See Jenkins [ v. State , 269 Ga. 282, 293-294(21), 498 S.E.2d 502 (1998)].” Pruitt v. State, 270 Ga. 745, 514 S.E.2d 639 (March 19, 1999). No error where trial court denied defendant’s motion for psychological examination during trial. “At the beginning of the sentencing phase, Pruitt’s counsel requested a psychological examination for their client. They stated that Pruitt was acting irrationally, but the trial court determined that the sole basis for this claim was that Pruitt told his counsel after conviction that he preferred a death sentence and would not testify in mitigation. Upon questioning by the trial court, Pruitt stated that he understood his decision, and knew his right to testify and present mitigation evidence. The trial court noted there had never been any indication that Pruitt was incompetent or had mental problems, and it found that Pruitt’s decision was made knowingly and intelligently. After having been informed, a competent defendant, and not his counsel, makes the ultimate decision about whether to testify or present mitigation evidence. Morrison v. State, 258 Ga. 683, 686(3), 373 S.E.2d 506 (1988). We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the motion for a psychological examination during the trial. [fn]” Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 514 S.E.2d 426 (March 15, 1999). At sentencing phase of defendant’s capital felony trial, trial court properly allowed State to present evidence from police officer and jailor about defendant’s lack of remorse and bad behavior while custody awaiting trial. “The prosecutor asked each of these witnesses if they would believe anything Sears said under oath and they both replied, ‘No.’ During the penalty phase, ‘[a]ny lawful evidence which tends to show the motive of the defendant, his lack of remorse, his general moral character, and his predisposition to commit other crimes is admissible in aggravation, subject to the notice provisions of [OCGA § 17-10-2].’ Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 873, 268 S.E.2d 316 (1980). This aggravating evidence may also include a defendant’s conduct after incarceration. See id. Since the record reflects that the state provided Sears with pretrial notice of intent to produce this evidence in aggravation, we conclude that the evidence was admissible.” Jackson v. State, 270 Ga. 494, 512 S.E.2d 241 (February 8, 1999). “During the sentencing phase of the trial, Jackson proffered expert testimony as to the length of time Jackson would spend in prison before he would be eligible for parole (if he were to receive a simple life sentence). The trial court did not err in sustaining the state’s objection to this testimony. Evidence regarding future parole eligibility is inadmissible. Philpot v. State, 268 Ga. 168, 169(2), 486 S.E.2d 158 (1997). Nor can it be said that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury that ‘the fact that a defendant may be eligible for parole during the term of his [life] sentence does not mean that he will be paroled.’ Id. The court correctly charged the jury that life imprisonment means a defendant will be imprisoned for the rest of his life, but he will be eligible for parole. Nothing in the court’s charge could have misled the jury into thinking that Jackson would be paroled automatically if he only received a life sentence.” 14. DEATH PENALTY, IMPLEMENTATION Hill v. Owens, 292 Ga. 380, 738 S.E.2d 56 (February 4, 2013). Superior court denied death row inmate Hill injunctive relief against execution procedure; Board of Corrections wasn’t required to comply with Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when modifying execution procedure. 1. Board of Corrections is subject to APA pursuant to OCGA § 42-2- 11(g) (providing for the applicability of the APA). Although the APA itself “specifically states that the ‘Board of Corrections and its penal institutions’ are not ‘agencies’ within the meaning of the Act,” OCGA § 50–13–2(1), § 42-2-11 governs “because that statute is more specific than and was enacted later than the general exemption from the APA of the Board and the prison system provided for in OCGA § 50–13–2(1).” 2. But lethal injection formula need not be established by Board rule. OCGA § 42-12-11(c)(1) requires the Board to “adopt rules governing the assignment, housing, working, feeding, clothing, treatment, discipline, rehabilitation, training, and hospitalization of all inmates coming under its custody.” “Treatment” here means “medical aid,” not the broader meaning argued by Hill – how inmates