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are ‘behaved toward’ or ‘handled’ by prison staff. “Furthermore, the Code specifically provides that lethal injection does not constitute the practice of medicine. See OCGA § 17–10–38(c).” 3. Board has discretion to determine what rules are needed. “OCGA § 42–2–11(b) further provides as follows: ‘The board is authorized to adopt, establish, and promulgate rules and regulations governing the transaction of the business of the penal system of the state by the department and the commissioner and the administration of the affairs of the penal system in the different penal institutions coming under its authority and supervision and shall make the institutions as self-supporting as possible.’ Under these general grants of authority, the Board would have the authority to make rules governing lethal injection procedures. However, because the Board has made no such rule, the question we must address is whether it had a legal duty to do so under these general provisions. … [T]he Code specifically provides as follows regarding the rulemaking of the Board of Corrections: ‘All rules and regulations enacted by the board under the authority of this chapter must be reasonable. ’ OCGA § 42–2–12 (emphasis supplied). We understand this reasonableness requirement regarding such rules to include decisions regarding what rules not to adopt, particularly where, as here, the grant of authority to adopt such rules is a general delegation on unlimited subject matters.” Board’s decision not to create a rule deciding the injection formula, but to instead allow the decision to be made by the Commissioner, as chief administrative officer of the department, is not unreasonable. “Due to litigation challenging existing methods of execution and due to other factors, both judicial and non-judicial, that have affected the availability of certain drugs, the Commissioner has recently found it necessary or wise to make repeated changes to the lethal injection procedures employed by the Department. We conclude that it was not unreasonable for the Board to entrust the specific topics involved in the management of executions to the Commissioner under the statutory and constitutional mandates that already apply to him rather than to give him detailed and rigid directives through rules.” 4. Commissioner has discretion to decide whether to recommend rules to the Board. “For the same reasons set forth above regarding the Board, the Commissioner could reasonably conclude that the management of the details of executions, including specifically the choice of the drug or drugs that are appropriate at any given time in light of the judicially-scrutinized and fast-changing issues involved, was suited to ongoing management decisions by the Commissioner in furtherance of his statutorily-imposed duty to manage all aspects of executions and that a rule from the Board to govern execution procedures was unnecessary. Thus, the Commissioner had no legal duty under the Board's existing rules to propose a rule to the Board regarding the management of executions.” His written directive, changing the formula for the lethal injection, was sufficient. 15. DEATH PENALTY, MENTAL RETARDATION/MENTAL ILLNESS Seminal cases: Atkins v. Virginia (June 20, 2002), and Hall v. Florida (May 27, 2014), both below. Hall v. Florida, 12-10882, ___ U.S. ____, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007, 2014 WL 2178332 (May 27, 2014). Reversing Florida Supreme Court; “rigid” Florida statute limiting consideration of intellectual disability for death penalty purposes to IQ score only is unconstitutional. “Florida law defines intellectual disability to require an IQ test score of 70 or less. If, from test scores, a prisoner is deemed to have an IQ above 70, all further exploration of intellectual disability is foreclosed. This rigid rule, the Court now holds, creates an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional.” “Florida seeks to execute a man because he scored a 71 instead of 70 on an IQ test. Florida is one of just a few States to have this rigid rule. Florida's rule misconstrues the Court's statements in Atkins [ v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002)] that intellectually disability is characterized by an IQ of ‘approximately 70.’ 536 U.S., at 308, n. 3. Florida's rule is in direct opposition to the views of those who design, administer, and interpret the IQ test. By failing to take into account the standard error of measurement, Florida's law not only contradicts the test's own design but also bars an essential part of a sentencing court's inquiry into adaptive functioning. Freddie Lee Hall may or may not be intellectually disabled, but the law requires that he have the opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual disability, including deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime. The death penalty is the gravest sentence our society may impose. Persons facing that most severe sanction must have a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their execution. Florida's law contravenes our Nation's commitment to dignity and its duty to teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world. The States are laboratories for experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the basic dignity the Constitution protects.” Alito, writing for Roberts, Scalia and Thomas, dissents. Stripling v. State, 289 Ga. 370, 711 S.E.2d 665 (June 13, 2011). 1. Trial court erred in holding unconstitutional portions of OCGA § 17-7-131, placing the burden on a capitol murder defendant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is mentally retarded. “We have previously addressed this very issue, and we now reiterate our prior holding that Georgia's beyond a reasonable doubt standard is not unconstitutional. See Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 260– 263(II)(B), 587 S.E.2d 613 (2003).” Benham dissents, noting that most other states require the defendant to prove retardation by a preponderance of evidence; only Georgia requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. In defendant’s