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interests. Raymond v. State, 298 Ga.App. 549, 551 (680 S.E.2d 598) (2009) (an appellate court will not second-guess counsel's strategic decisions ‘[a]bsent a strong showing that counsel's actions were not reasonable’). Here, counsel testified that he chose not to request a hearing under OCGA § 24-3-16 because he had never seen a victim's statement declared inadmissible and because he did not want the delay resulting from such a request to give the State additional time to prepare its case. The trial court did not clearly err when it rejected Robinson's attack on this decision.” Hines v. State, 307 Ga.App. 807, 706 S.E.2d 156 (February 11, 2011). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to testimony regarding DNA testing. GBI crime lab assistant manager Pickens testified to her own opinions based on testing done by a) an independent lab and b) a GBI scientist, who didn’t testify but whose conclusions matched the manager’s. “Pickens’s testimony was admissible. Although the testing reports prepared by others may not have been admissible given that the author of the reports did not testify, [cit.] it may be that trial counsel determined that the reports themselves were, in essence, cumulative of Pickens's testimony.” Ware v. State, 307 Ga.App. 782, 706 S.E.2d 143 (February 10, 2011). Robbery conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance despite failure to object to testimony from arresting officer that defendant resembled robber in bank photo, in apparent violation of Grimes v. State , 291 Ga.App. 585, 662 S.E.2d 346 (2008). “The jury was presented evidence that, nine days after the robbery, both the robbed teller and the teller who had been working adjacent to her identified from a photographic lineup Ware's photo as that of the man who had committed the crime. Furthermore, in this case, the robbed teller made an in-court identification of Ware as the perpetrator. In addition, jurors were shown video footage of the robber committing the crime, as well as still photographs of the robber's face; and the record confirms that Ware was present in the courtroom during his trial. [fn: Cf. Grimes, supra at 592-593(2) (apart from inadmissible identification testimony, evidence that defendant was man depicted in robbery photographs was not strong, where, among other things, one such identification witness was significantly impeached, no victim made an in-court identification of defendant, and an eye-witness to one of the robberies testified that ‘it doesn't look like [the defendant] ... the build was not like that’). ] Under these circumstances, we conclude that Ware failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that an objection or motion for mistrial related to the cited testimony by the detective would have changed the outcome of his trial.” Smith v. State, 288 Ga. 348, 703 S.E.2d 629 (November 8, 2010). Defendants’ felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to object to prosecutor’s outrageous closing argument. Prosecutor dimmed the lights, brought out a birthday cake, lit candles and sang ‘Happy Birthday’ to the child victim. “Because it was reasonable for [attorney] Arora to pursue a strategy that would allow the potentially inappropriate antics of the prosecutor to backfire against her, we find no merit to Joseph's claim that Arora provided ineffective assistance in this regard. See Braithwaite [ v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 885(2)(b) (572 S.E.2d 612) (2002)]. In this connection, it cannot be said that Arora was incorrect in his belief that the jurors may have been turned off by the closing argument, as the jury found Joseph not guilty on several of the charges against him, including two of the felony murder charges, one of the first degree cruelty to children charges, and the malice murder charge.” Hunstein and Benham dissent: “I disagree with the majority that defense counsel's failure to object was based on reasonable strategy and that no prejudice has been shown as a result of the assistant district attorney's theatrical stunt.” Scott v. State, 305 Ga.App. 710, 700 S.E.2d 694 (August 27, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and related offenses reversed; “trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's argument that the jury should view Scott's pre-arrest silence as evidence of his guilt.” “During closing argument, the prosecutor noted the evidence showing that after the arrest warrant issued in June 2004, police had notified Scott's family and girlfriend that they were looking for him. Despite this fact, Scott failed to turn himself in. The prosecutor went on to argue that the jury should view this conduct as evidence of Scott's guilt, stating: ‘He was on the run. The good book sums up that behavior. The wicked man flees though no man pursues where the righteous stand bold as lions. If he [Scott] hadn't done anything, why would he run for three months? Why? Why not go in and give police a statement?’ The prosecutor later reiterated his argument that ‘the wicked man flees but the righteous stand bold as lions.’ Defense counsel offered no objection to these arguments.” “The Georgia Supreme Court recently reiterated the rule that the State is strictly prohibited from commenting upon a defendant's silence, because ‘in the situation of a criminal defendant, this failure to speak or act will most often be judged as evidence of the admission of criminal responsibility.’ Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 71 (673 S.E.2d 854) (2009).” Counsel’s failure to object was based on his belief that the argument was not objectionable, not on strategy. Prejudice shown: “The State's violation of Scott's constitutional right to remain silent was neither incidental nor inadvertent. Rather, twice during closing the State deliberately and unequivocally argued that the jury should use Scott's silence against him and view his failure to come forward and speak with police as evidence of his guilt. Notably, the