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prosecutor made this argument despite the absence of any evidence showing that Scott was aware that a warrant had issued for his arrest. Moreover, the evidence against Scott was not overwhelming. There was no physical evidence linking him to the crimes, and the State's case rested almost entirely on the testimony of the two eyewitnesses. Their testimony, however, was not uncontroverted, as both Scott and his co-defendant presented alibi witnesses. And the testimony of eyewitness Blair was impeached extensively.” Arellano v. State, 304 Ga.App. 838, 698 S.E.2d 362 (July 7, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking affirmed; trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to officer testimony commenting on defendant’s post-arrest silence, but no prejudice shown. Three times on direct testimony, officer mentioned that defendant refused to talk or give a written statement. Counsel confirmed at hearing on motion for new trial that her failure to object wasn’t strategic. No prejudice, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Westmoreland v. State, 287 Ga. 688, 699 S.E.2d 13 (June 28, 2010). Defendants’ felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel strategically elected not to object to prosecutor’s closing argument because it “came at the conclusion of closing argument, and counsel made the tactical decision not to object because he did not want ‘a controversy over that last statement to be the absolute last thing the jury heard.’ See Holmes v. State, 273 Ga. 644(5)(c) (543 S.E.2d 688) (2001) (where objection may highlight point made by prosecutor, failure to object may be valid strategic decision); Milner v. State, 271 Ga. 578(2) (522 S.E.2d 654) (1999) (failure to object to closing argument to avoid highlighting unfavorable evidence was reasonable trial strategy). Where, as here, defense counsel ‘reasonably chose silence ... we will not use hindsight to second-guess that decision on appeal.’ Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 886(2)(b) (572 S.E.2d 612) (2002).” Accord, Relaford v. State , 306 Ga.App. 549, 702 S.E.2d 776 (October 22, 2010) (“not objecting to every improper statement made by the prosecutor during closing argument is often a sound tactic.”); Smith (November 12, 2010), above; Smith v. State , 296 Ga. 731, 770 S.E.2d 610 (March 16, 2015) (counsel “strategically decided not to object, choosing instead to comment on the prosecution's ‘theatrics’ in his own closing as a way to turn the prosecutor's remarks to appellant's advantage.”). Ward v. State, 304 Ga.App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (June 21, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, burglary, and related offenses reversed; defendant received ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to improper hearsay in recording of accomplice’s out-of-court statement to police, as well as officer’s “statement that [accomplice] Neighbors did a good thing by being honest.” “[G]iven trial counsel's strategy of attempting to show that Neighbors had in fact become not truthful when she implicated Ward, the evidence was directly damaging to the defense.” “trial counsel's strategy of attempting to show that Neighbors had in fact become not truthful when she implicated Ward, the evidence was directly damaging to the defense.” Fullwood v. State, 304 Ga.App. 341, 696 S.E.2d 367 (June 7, 2010). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; where defendant testified on direct that he had acted in self-defense, but “had not gone to the police because he was scared,” prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine him on the subject, citing “ Mitchell v. State, 242 Ga.App. 177, 181(4)(a) (529 S.E.2d 169) (2000) (no ineffectiveness where defendant opened the door to prosecutor's cross-examination concerning his silence). See also Gaston v. State, 257 Ga.App. 480, 484(3) (571 S.E.2d 477) (2002) (rejecting claim of improper comment on silence where defense opened the door).” Accord, Doyle v. State , 291 Ga. 729, 733 S.E.2d 290 (October 15, 2012). Towry v. State, 304 Ga.App. 139, 695 S.E.2d 683 (May 20, 2010). Defendant’s child molestation conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel objected to therapist’s testimony “that in her opinion the molestation in this case had occurred,” but didn’t move to strike the testimony. “Trial counsel's decision not to make any further motions was reasonable in this case. Trial counsel articulated the basis for why the child therapist's testimony was improper when he made his objection, and so the jury heard an explanation for why it should not give weight to the testimony. Trial counsel could have reasonably concluded that any further objection at that point risked simply reinforcing the child therapist's testimony in the mind of the jury. Consequently, trial counsel's decision not to further object fell within the realm of trial tactics and strategy and does not support an ineffective assistance claim. See Dyer [ v. State, 278 Ga. 656, 660(7) (604 S.E.2d 756) (2004)]. See also Goldey v. State, 289 Ga.App. 198, 199-200(2)(a) (656 S.E.2d 549) (2008) (trial counsel's ‘decision not to object as part of a trial strategy of not magnifying the importance of certain testimony was not ineffective assistance’) (footnote omitted).” Smith v. State, 304 Ga.App. 155, 695 S.E.2d 679 (May 20, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and robbery by intimidation affirmed; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel failed to object to admission of co-