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defendant’s guilty plea to same offense. “Smith's attorney testified at the motion for new trial hearing that the defense theory was one of mere presence at the crime scene. Consistent with that theory, counsel did not object to the introduction of Poe's guilty plea because he thought it would actually help the defense by showing Poe to be the lone perpetrator of the robberies. As Smith's lawyer explained, ‘I was hoping that he would be acquitted of all the charges based on a theory that they had the bad guy that had done everything and Mr. Smith was merely present.’ That certainly was a legitimate defense, see Neal v. State, 160 Ga.App. 834, 837(3) (288 S.E.2d 241) (1982) (noting the logic of a defense attempt to introduce co-defendant's guilty plea to support theory that co-defendant was the guilty party and defendant was innocent bystander), and ‘[c]ounsel's decision as to which theory of defense to pursue is a matter of strategy and tactics; and, as a general rule, matters of tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.’ (Citation omitted.) Celestin v. State, 296 Ga.App. 727, 731(2) (675 S.E.2d 480) (2009).” Accord, Zeger v. State , 306 Ga.App. 474, 702 S.E.2d 474 (October 14, 2010). Henderson v. State, 303 Ga.App. 898, 695 S.E.2d 334 (May 6, 2010). In defendant’s prosecution for armed robbery and related offenses, no ineffective assistance where trial counsel failed to object to officer’s erroneous answer alluding to non-existent “other” witness statements, then immediately corrected himself. “Henderson contends that the officer's initial response, ‘other than the witness statements,’ was hearsay and falsely suggested that Henderson was identified by someone other than the victim. He alleges ineffectiveness in Henderson's failure to object. But Henderson's trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that he believed the officer simply misspoke and corrected himself, because no eyewitness other than the victim testified at trial and no witness statement was ever introduced. Asked if his decision not to object was a trial strategy, he added, ‘I thought he had corrected himself, and there was no need to draw attention to it.’” Cabrera v. State, 303 Ga.App. 646, 694 S.E.2d 720 (April 12, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine reversed; defendant received ineffective assistance when counsel failed to object to numerous leading questions posed by prosecutor to co-defendant who pled guilty to the offense, or to transcript of co- defendant’s guilty plea hearing. Co-defendant refused to answer the questions. “Based on the well-established law that the State cannot introduce a co-indictee's statement through leading questions when the co-indictee refuses to testify, we must conclude that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object. Lingerfelt v. State, 235 Ga. 139, 140, 218 S.E.2d 752 (1975). To the extent she may have failed to object based upon trial strategy, we find that it was ‘not a reasonable decision a competent attorney would have made under the same circumstances.’ Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 518, 591 S.E.2d 824 (2004).” “In this case, the numerous questions posed by the State were so powerfully incriminating that we cannot presume that the jury followed the trial court's instruction against treating the questions posed by the lawyers as evidence. Compare Wilcox v. State, 297 Ga.App. 201, 204-205(2), 677 S.E.2d 142 (2009) (based upon trial court's limiting instruction, defendant could not demonstrate prejudice from trial counsel's failure to object to prosecutor's reference to the co-defendant's guilty plea during opening statement).” McCowan v. State, 302 Ga.App. 555, 691 S.E.2d 360 (March 1, 2010). At defendant’s trial for child molestation and related offenses, no ineffective assistance where trial counsel elicited and allowed hearsay from victim’s mother. “[T]he record demonstrates that McCowan's counsel pursued a strategy at trial of trying to show that neither the victim nor her brother knew McCowan prior to the offense and may have misidentified him as the perpetrator. [fn] Under the circumstances, the trial court was authorized to conclude that defense counsel's failure to object to hearsay statements of the victim's brother was part of a reasonable trial strategy. Boyt v. State, 286 Ga.App. 460, 463-464(2)(c) (649 S.E.2d 589) (2007) (trial court authorized to find that trial counsel's failure to object to hearsay statements was part of reasonable trial strategy to discredit victim's version of events).” Mayberry v. State, 301 Ga.App. 503, 687 S.E.2d 893 (November 23, 2009). 1. At defendant’s trial for kidnapping with injury, aggravated sodomy, and related offenses, no ineffective assistance where defense counsel didn’t make a best evidence objection as to sexually violent song lyrics found in defendant’s car “because he cannot show prejudice. He failed to prove that if his attorney had made the objection, the State could not have introduced the original lyrics.” Accord, Smith v. State , 317 Ga.App. 801, 732 S.E.2d 840 (October 4, 2012); Crankshaw v. State , A15A1975, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 886819 (March 9, 2016) (no showing that State couldn’t have overcome best evidence objection to “an email, business cards, and a text message”). 2. At defendant’s trial for kidnapping with injury, aggravated sodomy, and related offenses, no ineffective assistance where defense counsel didn’t object to prosecutor’s improper question commenting on defendant’s silence ; “and when the police came to your house and arrested you, you didn't even ask them why they were there, did you, because you knew why they were there; isn't that right, Mr. Mayberry?” This “incidental” “passing reference” was not enough to change the outcome of the case; “Even if the