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question raised an inference regarding Mayberry's silence, the prosecution did not follow up on the question, nor did it capitalize on it in its closing argument to the jury.” Accord, Griffin v. State , 331 Ga.App. 550, 769 S.E.2d 514 (February 12, 2015) (counsel not ineffective for failure to object to “a single reference to Griffin's invocation of his rights” where “[t]he assistant district attorney did not comment on Griffin's invocation of his rights in closing argument” and the reference apparently “was not intended to reflect on [Griffin's] guilt and it was not probative on that issue.”). Kimble v. State, 301 Ga.App. 237, 687 S.E.2d 242 (November 20, 2009). Cocaine trafficking and related convictions affirmed; admission of agent’s testimony as to informant’s statements violated defendant’s confrontation rights, but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. “Agent Delatorre was permitted to offer numerous out-of-court statements of his first informant and [second informant] Jones implicating [co-defendant] Loury as a source for drugs. Further, on cross-examination, Loury's counsel elicited Agent Delatorre's testimony that, ‘I was told we were calling Roy Loury.’ We agree that Agent Delatorre's testimony regarding what Jones or his other informant told him constituted inadmissible hearsay and reject the State's argument that Agent Delatorre's testimony was admissible as original evidence explaining law enforcement's motives and conduct under OCGA § 24-3-2. See Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31, 36-37(2) (549 S.E.2d 107) (2001); Render v. State, 267 Ga. 848, 849(2) (483 S.E.2d 570) (1997). We also agree with Loury that admission of Jones' out-of-court custodial statements violated Loury's rights under the confrontation clause. See Gay v. State, 279 Ga. 180, 181-182(2) (611 S.E.2d 31) (2005).” Deficient performance in absence of strategic reason for failure to object, but no prejudice. Purvis v. State, 301 Ga.App. 648, 689 S.E.2d 53 (November 20, 2009), reversed on other grounds, 288 Ga. 865, 708 S.E.2d 283 (March 18, 2011). 1. At defendant’s trial for child molestation, no ineffective assistance for failure to seek a pretrial hearing on admissibility of victim’s out-of-court statements pursuant to Gregg v. State, 201 Ga.App. 238, 240- 241(3)(b) (411 S.E.2d 65) (1991). “[A] trial court is not required to conduct a Gregg hearing to determine the statutory requirement of ‘indicia of reliability’ before receiving child hearsay into evidence. See Brock v. State, 270 Ga.App. 250, 254(8) (605 S.E.2d 907) (2004). Rather, ‘[t]he statutory requirement is met if, after both parties have rested, the record contains evidence which would support such a finding.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 290 Ga.App. 841, 845(4)(b) (660 S.E.2d 740) (2008). Purvis has failed to show that any of the statements would have been excluded from trial had his trial counsel filed a motion under Gregg, and thus cannot prevail on this ineffective assistance claim.” 2. No ineffective assistance for “failing to object to the testimony of the school social worker about what the victim said to the school counselor,” cumulative of other properly-admitted evidence. “‘The erroneous admission of hearsay is harmless where legally admissible evidence of the same fact is introduced.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Head v. State, 254 Ga.App. 550, 551(2) (562 S.E.2d 815) (2002).” Accord, Henry v. State , 316 Ga.App. 132, 729 S.E.2d 429 (June 7, 2012); Ashmid v. State , 316 Ga.App. 550, 730 S.E.2d 37 (July 2, 2012); Williams v. State , 319 Ga.App. 888, 739 S.E.2d 4 (February 25, 2013) (counsel not ineffective “in failing to object to the police officer's hearsay testimony regarding the [child molestation] victim's description of conversations she had with her mother,”); Maurer v. State , 320 Ga.App. 585, 740 S.E.2d 318 (March 21, 2013) (no prejudice from failure to object to cumulative evidence). But see Cash v. State , 294 Ga.App. 741, 669 S.E.2d 731 (November 20, 2008) (defendant received ineffective assistance based on improper admission of victim’s prior consistent statement, an exception to the general rule finding hearsay harmless where cumulative). 3. No ineffective assistance for allowing videotaped witness statement to go out with jury when jury had no means to watch the tape. Winfield v. State, 285 Ga. 836, 684 S.E.2d 611 (October 5, 2009). No ineffective assistance where trial counsel strategically chose not to object to admission of post-autopsy photos “because he wanted to highlight to the jury the defense theory that Hyatt's injuries from the beating were not significant enough to cause his death.” Abernathy v. State, 299 Ga.App. 897, 685 S.E.2d 734 (September 1, 2009). No ineffective assistance in failure to object to hearsay where counsel “believed that [witness’s] recounting of [declarant’s] statements was admissible as part of the res gestae of the crime and because he believed that [declarant] would be testifying at some point during the trial.” Citing Christian v. State , 277 Ga. 775, 777(2) (596 S.E.2d 6) (2004) (“counsel's decision not to object to hearsay based on his belief that the statement may have been admissible as part of the res gestae was reasonable trial strategy”). Grindle v. State, 299 Ga.App. 412, 683 S.E.2d 72 (July 27, 2009). Defendant’s convictions for robbery, aggravated battery and battery reversed; defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to object to admission of non-testifying co-defendant’s custodial statement to police, inculpating defendant. The statement was not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule. Error was not harmless, as co-defendant “was the only witness to identify Grindle as the” perpetrator of the crime, although there was other circumstantial evidence.