☢ test - Í

Jacobs v. State, 299 Ga.App. 368, 683 S.E.2d 64 (July 24, 2009). Aggravated assault convictions at bench trial affirmed. No ineffective assistance in failing to object to leading questions by prosecutor if “the evidence is otherwise admissible and likely to be presented anyway, …especially in a bench trial, given that the judge is able to separate ‘the wheat from the chaff.’” Patterson v. State, 285 Ga. 597, 679 S.E.2d 716 (June 29, 2009). Majority finds that failure to object to prosecutor’s closing argument – commenting on defendant’s silence and demand for counsel – at trial conducted before decision in Reynolds v. State, 285 Ga. 70 (673 S.E.2d 854) (2009) was not ineffective assistance as a matter of law. Trial here was conducted in 1987. Two (Hunstein, writing for Sears) dissent: “I would recognize that the prosecutor's use against Patterson of the exercise of his constitutional rights involved such egregious misconduct as to deny Patterson a fundamentally fair trial in violation of his right to due process of law under the Georgia Constitution, which uncontrovertedly predates appellant's trial in 1987. See generally Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-619 (96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91) (1976) (fundamentally unfair and deprivation of due process to afford suspect constitutional right and yet allow implications of exercise of that right to be used against him).” Kessinger v. State, 298 Ga. App. 479, 680 S.E.2d 546 (June 23, 2009). No ineffective assistance based on strategic failure to object to argument (here, argument by co-defendant’s counsel, about Kessinger’s prior record) based on facts not in evidence, so as not to draw attention to it. Scott v. State, 298 Ga.App. 376, 680 S.E.2d 482 (June 16, 2009). No ineffective assistance where defense counsel strategically failed to object to certain testimony: “When the State asked the officer why he arrested both Scott and Spooner, he testified that Spooner possessed the drugs, but he ‘knew from the way [Scott] was acting at the [police station] and on the side of the road, I knew the cocaine wasn't hers. I knew it was his. But I had to arrest both of them. [Scott] refused to give me a written statement at the [police station].’ At the new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he believed the officer's testimony was allowable, and in any event, explained that he had not wanted to draw attention to the officer's comment because he felt that it showed ‘his bias as a police officer, assuming somebody's guilty.’ ‘As a general rule, matters of reasonable tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.’ Citations and punctuation omitted.) Dyer v. State, 295 Ga.App. 495, 498(1) (672 S.E.2d 462) (2009). As counsel made a strategic decision in this regard, his failure to object to Officer Starnes' comments did not constitute ineffective assistance.” Accord, Sears v. State , 292 Ga. 64, 734 S.E.2d 345 (November 19, 2012); Brown v. State , 321 Ga.App. 765, 743 S.E.2d 452 (May 16, 2013) (decision not to object to improper testimony, to avoid drawing jury’s attention to it, was strategic, not deficient). Anderson v. State, 285 Ga. 496, 678 S.E.2d 84 (June 8, 2009). No ineffective assistance for failure to object to witness’s testimony expressing an opinion about what she thought happened in the incident in question. “Reasonable decisions as to whether to raise a specific objection are ordinarily matters of trial strategy and provide no ground for reversal. Dickerson v. State, 275 Ga.App. 695, 700(3) (621 S.E.2d 831) (2005).” Binns v. State, 296 Ga.App. 537, 675 S.E.2d 265 (March 10, 2009). No ineffective assistance where defense counsel failed to object to officer’s references to defendant’s refusal to give a statement. Even assuming that this amounted to deficient performance by counsel, no prejudice shown: “The comments were not made during the state's questioning of Binns but rather when both the state and defense counsel questioned [Officer] Walker about Binns's physical condition and whether it affected his ability to sign booking forms after his arrest. In neither instance did the questions relate to Binns's post arrest silence. Therefore, we cannot conclude that but for counsel's failure to object to these comments, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Walker v. State, 296 Ga.App. 531, 675 S.E.2d 270 (March 10, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for child molestation reversed; trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to witness’s testimony that, upon hearing victim’s outcry, witness responded “as follows: ‘And I'm looking at her and I know her. I'm like now this child is telling me the truth.’” Distinguishing “cases where we have affirmed convictions despite this type of improper testimony [because] there has been other evidence of guilt, Cline v. State, 224 Ga.App. 235, 236-237(2) (480 S.E.2d 269) (1997) (testimony that victim was credible was improper but no reversal required because defendant admitted he touched victim's vaginal area), or other testimony which minimized the effect of the improper testimony, Stamey v. State, 194 Ga.App. 305, 306(1)(a) (390 S.E.2d 409) (1990) (social worker's testimony that victim was telling the truth was superfluous but harmless where social worker also recited ‘to exhaustion’ the criteria for determining the truthfulness of pre-adolescents,