☢ test - Í

from which the jury could determine credibility for itself). In this case, Walker denied that he touched [victim] J.W. and there was no evidence, other than J.W.'s testimony, that the crime occurred. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of this trial on Count 8 (child molestation) involving J.W. would not have been different. Therefore, we reverse Walker's conviction on this count.” Accord, Blackmon v. State , A15A1834, ___ Ga.App. ___, 785 S.E.2d 59, 2016 WL 1138776 (March 24, 2016) (Physical precedent only; rape and child molestation convictions reversed on similar grounds, citing Walker ). Cash v. State, 294 Ga.App. 741, 669 S.E.2d 731 (November 20, 2008). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated child molestation reversed; defendant received ineffective assistance based on improper admission of victim’s prior consistent statement. Statement was admitted as Child Hearsay, but that statute is limited to statements of persons under age 14, not 15-year old victim here. “‘ We have often said that the erroneous admission of hearsay is harmless error where legally admissible evidence of the same fact is introduced at trial. See, e.g., Felder v. State, 270 Ga. 641(8) (514 S.E.2d 416) (1999). However, that rationale is inapplicable when the hearsay is the prior consistent statement of a testifying witness whose veracity has not been attacked. This is so because the very nature of a prior consistent statement is that it is repetitive of that to which the witness has already testified. Instead when the hearsay is a witness's prior consistent statement, the erroneous admission of the witness's hearsay statement is reversible error if it appears likely that the hearsay contributed to the guilty verdict.’ (Punctuation and citation omitted.) [ Baugh v. State, 276 Ga. 736, 739 (585 S.E.2d 616) (2003)].” Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 647, 670 S.E.2d 421 (November 17, 2008). Counsel was deficient for failing to object to prosecutor’s questions raising defendant’s pre-arrest silence, but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Port v. State, 295 Ga.App. 109, 671 S.E.2d 200 (November 14, 2008). Trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to evidence previously ruled out by trial court’s ruling in limine, but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 599, 669 S.E.2d 98 (November 3, 2008). “[T]his Court has held on several occasions that, generally speaking, it is not improper for the prosecutor to comment in closing argument on a non-testifying defendant's appearance and facial expressions. Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 774, 604 S.E.2d 804 (2004); Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439, 449, 469 S.E.2d 129, overruled on other grounds sub nom. Greene v. Georgia, 519 U.S. 145, 117 S.Ct. 578, 136 L.Ed.2d 507 (1996); Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80, 88-89, 402 S.E.2d 41 (1991); Johnson v. State, 256 Ga. 588, 590, 351 S.E.2d 202 (1987).” Thus, no ineffective assistance for failure to object to such comment. Hall v. Brannan, 284 Ga. 716, 670 S.E.2d 87 (November 3, 2008). Habeas court erred in finding ineffective assistance from counsel’s failure to object to admission of video showing defendant’s murder of victim, including “Brannan's fleeing, and sounds of [victim’s] dying breaths. Although the recording is deeply disturbing, it was admissible evidence of Brannan's actions and of the death of the victim. See Cohen v. State, 275 Ga. 528, 530-531(3) (570 S.E.2d 301) (2002) (holding that ‘the gruesome or inflammatory aspect of the pictorial evidence,’ which included a video recording, ‘stemmed entirely from [the defendant's] own acts’ and was admissible).” Accord, Poole v. State , 291 Ga. 848, 734 S.E.2d 1 (November 5, 2012) (“There is no deficient performance when an attorney fails to object to admissible evidence.”) Lupoe v. State, 284 Ga. 576, 669 S.E.2d 133 (November 3, 2008). “‘The failure to pursue a futile objection does not amount to ineffective assistance.’ (Citation omitted.) Ventura v. State, 284 Ga. 215, 218(4) (663 S.E.2d 149) (2008).” Johnson v. State, 293 Ga.App. 728, 667 S.E.2d 637 (August 28, 2008). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and kidnapping reversed; defendant received ineffective assistance when counsel failed to object to prosecutor’s questions, to defendant and his mother on cross, highlighting defendant’s failure to contact the authorities when he “knew the police were looking for him.” “[T]he transcript of the motion for new trial hearing shows that trial counsel testified that failure to object to these improper questions arose not from strategy, but from his mistaken belief that they were not objectionable.” Lampley v. State, 284 Ga. 37, 663 S.E.2d 184 (June 30, 2008). Argument was improper comment on defendant’s pre- trial silence: “‘ Does he go back to see if [the victim] ... [i]s okay? Does he call the police and say: there has been an incident here. This guy had my car. He wouldn’t give it back to me, and this is what I had to do. I chased him down and I tried to get my car and it got out of hand. No. He doesn’t do any of that.’ This argument does constitute an improper comment on Lampley’s silence or failure to come forward in violation of Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625(5) (409 S.E.2d 839) (1991), overruled on other grounds, see Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6(5) (515 S.E.2d 155) (1999), and thus Lampley’s