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counsel was deficient in failing to object.” No prejudice shown, however, due to weight of evidence against defendant. Beck v. State, 292 Ga.App. 472, 665 S.E.2d 701 (June 23, 2008). No ineffective assistance where trial counsel strategically chose not to object to Confrontation Clause violation. “At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel testified at length as to his reasons for not objecting to this recorded conversation on Confrontation Clause grounds. The State had announced that it did not intend to bring the CI to testify at trial. Of utmost strategic importance, trial counsel did not ‘want to do anything that would cause’ the State to bring the CI to trial and have him testify. If the defense were able to exclude the recorded conversation because the CI was not present at trial to testify, then the State would have had great motivation to produce that witness at trial, who could have confirmed in person the details of the drug transaction to the jury. Because the quality of the audio recording was poor, trial counsel carefully avoided making any objections to the recording that would corner or otherwise provoke the State into producing the CI as a witness, for trial counsel believed that such testimony would have been devastating and that Beck stood a much better chance of prevailing if all the State introduced was the sketchy audio recording. This was a calculated strategy to keep the CI out of the courtroom.” Accord, Henry v. State , 316 Ga.App. 132, 729 S.E.2d 429 (June 7, 2012). Birkbeck v. State, 292 Ga.App. 424, 665 S.E.2d 354 (June 18, 2008). “ It is well settled that a witness, even an expert witness, in a child molestation case may not express her opinion on the ultimate issue in the case – i.e., whether the child was molested. Odom v. State, 243 Ga.App. 227, 227-228(1) (531 S.E.2d 207) (2000); Putnam v. State, 231 Ga.App. 190, 191(2) (498 S.E.2d 340) (1998). Accordingly, we assume for the purpose of this appeal that defense counsel’s failure to object to [psychologist] Medlin’s testimony that she diagnosed H.L. with ‘sexual abuse as a child, as the victim alleged’ constituted deficient performance.” Trial counsel here testified at hearing on motion for new trial, that the decision was not strategic – “rather, counsel simply did not ‘see [the testimony] as commenting on the ultimate issue of fact.’” No ineffective assistance, however, as “[t]he challenged testimony represented a mere nine words in the course of Medlin’s lengthy testimony, which also included her repeated entirely proper statements that H.L.’s behavior was consistent with a history of sexual abuse.” Grimes v. State, 291 Ga.App. 585, 662 S.E.2d 346 (May 20, 2008). Defendant received ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to detective’s testimony to his own opinion that the person shown in bank surveillance camera photos was defendant – evidence inadmissible under Carter v. State, 266 Ga.App. 691, 692-693(2) (598 S.E.2d 76) (2004) (whole court). At hearing on motion for new trial, counsel testified that he didn’t object because he thought the evidence was admissible. Defendant’s defense centered on misidentification. Accord, Wadlington v. State , 302 Ga.App. 559, 692 S.E.2d 28 (March 2, 2010). Gray v. State, 291 Ga.App. 573, 662 S.E.2d 339 (May 19, 2008). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. Even if opinion evidence was improperly admitted, no ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to it. “At the new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he did not object to Sweat’s testimony because by that point in the trial, he had observed the jurors and concluded from their facial expressions that he had a ‘hostile’ jury, and he did not want to inflame them by ‘jumping up every two seconds and making an objection.’ Instead, trial counsel testified that he decided to wait until closing argument and point out the inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony. The ‘decision of whether to interpose certain objections is a matter of trial strategy and tactics.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Boyt v. State, 286 Ga.App. 460, 463(2)(b) (649 S.E.2d 589) (2007) (failure to object to investigator’s opinion testimony allegedly concerning ultimate issues of fact deemed reasonable trial strategy).” Accord, Abernathy v. State , 299 Ga.App. 897, 685 S.E.2d 734 (September 1, 2009) (strategic decision to allow in victim’s prior statement, to point out inconsistencies with trial testimony); Brown v. State , 307 Ga.App. 797, 706 S.E.2d 170 (February 11, 2011) (strategic decision not to object to prosecutor’s leading questions which were not harmful; no objection to showup procedure because victim’s testimony was weak and unsure); Brunson v. State , 322 Ga.App. 302, 744 S.E.2d 801 (June 17, 2013) (not ineffective where “trial counsel explained that she did not object to the state's line of questioning about Brunson's prior statement because the statement actually supported the defense theory that there was no criminal intent.”); Wallace v. State , 296 Ga. 388, 768 S.E.2d 480 (January 20, 2015) (“when and how to raise foundation objections is generally a matter of trial strategy”). Bell v. State, 291 Ga.App. 169, 661 S.E.2d 207 (April 4, 2008). “[T]rial counsel performed deficiently when he failed to object to hearsay testimony from a police officer that the confidential informant (who did not testify at trial) told the officer at the time of the controlled buy that Bell had a large amount of illegal drugs on his person. Weems v. State, 269 Ga. 577, 578-579 (501 S.E.2d 806) (1998); Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31, 36-37 (549 S.E.2d 107) (2001).” No prejudice, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. See also Grindle (July 27, 2009), above (ineffective assistance requiring reversal based on failure to object to admission of non-testifying co-defendant’s custodial statement inculpating