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defendant) . Rouse v. State, 290 Ga.App. 740, 660 S.E.2d 476 (April 3, 2008). No ineffective assistance where trial counsel filed and won motion in limine pre-trial, then failed to object to evidence violating the ruling (here, improper bolstering). “[H]aving successfully filed a motion in limine, trial counsel did not need to object to the evidence when it was introduced at trial. See Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 69, 73(5) fn. 17 (608 S.E.2d 602) (2005); Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Daniel, 244 Ga. 284, 286(1) (260 S.E.2d 20) (1979) (following a motion in limine, ‘failure to object at trial when the evidence is introduced by the other party cannot constitute a waiver. Requiring another objection indeed may further highlight the inflammatory evidence, as well as unduly burden the trial court, which has already ruled on the issue’).” Gibson v. State, 283 Ga. 377, 659 S.E.2d 372 (March 31, 2008). “Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object and move for a mistrial during closing argument when the prosecutor said that the jury had an ‘opportunity to define what is acceptable in [the] community.’ Read in context, the prosecutor appropriately urged the jury to speak on behalf of the community and rid it of robbers and murderers. Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 801, 804(8) (471 S.E.2d 191) (1996); Shaw v. State, 265 Ga.App. 451, 453-454(4) (594 S.E.2d 393) (2004).” Accord, Spencer v. State , 287 Ga. 434, 696 S.E.2d 617 (June 28, 2010) (“This is your community and these are your streets, and you can say yes to this or you can say no to this.”). Cantrell v. State, 290 Ga.App. 651, 660 S.E.2d 468 (March 28, 2008). Counsel’s performance was deficient for failure to object to improper argument from prosecutor. Arguing that jurors should find the police officer witnesses credible, counsel made extended reference to the recent funeral of a local officer, killed in the line of duty. “It was the injection of extrinsic prejudicial matters which is the issue here, and trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing constituted deficient representation. Rather than arguing the issue of police credibility, the prosecutor showcased his attendance at the funeral of an officer killed in the line of duty – a tragic and emotionally charged event that had no relation to the evidence admitted or the case at hand. Under these circumstances, the argument was improper and trial counsel was deficient.” Defense counsel expressed no strategic reason for failure to object, and acknowledged at motion for new trial hearing that he should have objected. “The wide range of discussion permitted in closing argument … ‘does have its limitations, the first and foremost of which is the longstanding prohibition against the injection into the argument of extrinsic and prejudicial matters which have no basis in the evidence.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bell v. State, 263 Ga. 776, 777 (439 S.E.2d 480) (1994).” No prejudice shown, however, given overwhelming evidence of guilt. Three judges concur/dissent, would find prejudice based on conflicts in evidence and prior hung jury on same charge. Dissent (Barnes): “the prosecutor clearly did not consider the evidence against Cantrell so overwhelming that he should forego what he admittedly knew was an improper argument likely to inflame the passions of the jury. Such intentional misconduct should not be rewarded.” Cobb v. State, 283 Ga. 388, 658 S.E.2d 750 (March 17, 2008). Defendant’s murder conviction reversed; defendant received ineffective assistance when trial counsel failed to object to inadmissible hearsay. Majority finds that the evidence (tying defendant to the type of gun used in the murder) was “critical” to the conviction, given that the only eyewitness’s “credibility was a serious issue at trial,” and defendant’s “first two trials resulted in hung juries.” Three justices dissent, would hold that the hearsay testimony in question was harmless. See also Grindle (July 27, 2009), above (ineffective assistance requiring reversal based on failure to object to admission of non-testifying co-defendant’s custodial statement inculpating defendant) . Forde v. State, 289 Ga.App. 805, 658 S.E.2d 410 (February 28, 2008). Statement of child molestation victim, given when she was 16 years old, was improperly admitted under Child Hearsay Statute, which applies only to children aged 14 years and less. Counsel’s failure to object “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” but no prejudice to defendant because cumulative of victim’s trial testimony. Johnson v. State, 290 Ga.App. 255, 659 S.E.2d 638 (February 21, 2008). “Trial counsel testified that his decisions regarding whether to make objections were strategic. Certainly, ‘[d]eclining to object to testimony can be considered reasonable trial strategy, and trial tactics and strategy are not susceptible to attacks of ineffective assistance. Nichols [ v. State, 288 Ga.App. 118, 122(3)(b) (653 S.E.2d 300) (2007)]” Accord, Thomas v. State , 291 Ga.App. 795, 662 S.E.2d 849 (June 4, 2008) (counsel didn’t object because evidence was consistent with his theory of case). Smith v. State, 283 Ga. 237, 657 S.E.2d 523 (January 28, 2008). “ Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he made a strategic decision to attack the credibility of the State’s expert by using the expert’s conflict