☢ test - Í

of interest against him during cross-examination. Such a strategy was reasonable, especially considering the fact that trial counsel’s own defense expert had not placed counsel in a position to directly attack the medical evidence being presented by the State. Trial counsel was not ineffective for deciding to attack the expert’s credibility on cross- examination instead of moving to have the expert excluded from testifying. See McDaniel v. State, 279 Ga. 801(2)(c) (621 S.E.2d 424) (2005).” Accord, Johnson v. State , 314 Ga.App. 560, 724 S.E.2d 859 (March 2, 2012) (decision to cross- examine rather than object is strategic, not ineffective, in most cases). Al-Attawy v. State, 289 Ga.App. 570, 657 S.E.2d 552 (January 25, 2008). No ineffective assistance shown despite counsel’s failure to object to psychologist’s testimony improperly bolstering child molestation victim’s credibility, where counsel was not examined at motion for new trial hearing to determine whether omission was strategic. “ Not objecting to testimony but instead subjecting it to cross-examination may be part of a reasonable trial strategy, See Evans v. State, 288 Ga.App. 103, 109(3)(c) (653 S.E.2d 520) (2007); Griffin v. State, 281 Ga.App. 249, 251(3) (635 S.E.2d 853) (2006); Williams v. State, 261 Ga.App. 176, 180(3) (582 S.E.2d 141) (2003), and the record reveals that Al-Attawy’s trial counsel’s cross-examination led the psychologist to qualify her prior bolstering testimony. Al-Attawy has not offered any evidence to show that this performance was not part of a conscious and deliberate strategy or that such strategy was unreasonable. [Cits.]” Accord, Alexis v. State , 313 Ga.App. 283, 721 S.E.2d 205 (December 8, 2011); Hall v. State , 313 Ga.App. 670, 722 S.E.2d 392 (January 25, 2012); Hartsfield v. State , 294 Ga. 883, 757 S.E.2d 90 (March 28, 2014) (“it was a sound defense strategy to minimize objections in an effort to show the jury that the defense had nothing to hide and to instead focus on discrediting Detective Wallace's testimony in counsel's closing argument.”). Boyt v. State, 286 Ga.App. 460, 649 S.E.2d 589 (July 10, 2007). Counsel’s strategic decision not to object to testimony about victim’s prior consistent statements was not unreasonable, although in hindsight it may appear to have backfired. “[T]rial counsel testified at the new trial hearing that he chose not to object to these statements as part of his trial strategy to demonstrate the inconsistencies in the stories presented by the victim at different times, as well as to show the contrast between the victim’s version of events and Boyt’s. He also testified that he discussed the trial strategy with Boyt on more than one occasion before the trial began.” Accord, Hargrove v. State , 289 Ga.App. 363, 657 S.E.2d 282 (January 29, 2008); King v. State , 290 Ga.App. 118, 658 S.E.2d 883 (March 7, 2008); Damerow v. State , 310 Ga.App. 530, 714 S.E.2d 82 (July 6, 2011) (not ineffective to deal with improper bolstering by cross-examination rather than by objection). Felder v. State, 286 Ga.App. 271, 648 S.E.2d 753 (July 3, 2007). Defendant was convicted of bribery where, as a jailer, he took money to provide a handcuff key to inmate R.H. “Felder argues that counsel failed to object to the State’s improper bolstering of its witness when the State elicited testimony that R.H., the inmate who had obtained the key from Felder, had testified for the State in another felony case in which it had obtained a conviction. During the motion for new trial hearing, however, counsel specifically testified that he believed the evidence that R.H. had previously assisted the State damaged R.H.’s credibility and was a ‘gift’ that benefited Felder. According to counsel, he wanted to portray R.H. as a ‘professional witness’ for the State. Counsel hoped that the jury would ‘see through’ the State’s claim that R.H. did not receive any benefit or favorable treatment by testifying against Felder. Counsel explained that, if ‘[the jury] perceived [R.H.] as being in the State’s pocket, I don’t see how that would hurt my client.’ The record supports a finding that this was a reasonable strategic decision that did not amount to ineffective assistance. Grier v. State, [273 Ga. 363, 365(4), 541 S.E.2d 369 (2001)].” Bly v. State, 286 Ga.App. 43, 648 S.E.2d 446 (June 20, 2007), reversed on other grounds, 283 Ga. 453, 660 S.E.2d 713 (April 21, 2008). Prosecutor’s question to officer implicating defendant’s decision to remain silent upon arrest was improper, but harmless error in light of “overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.” “[O]fficer … testified that in a police interview, Bly invoked his right to an attorney upon being advised of his Miranda rights. To refute Bly’s defense that he struck at Officer Hawk’s arm in self-defense (out of fear that the arm was aimed for his crotch), the State then asked, ‘He didn't say anything about any arm being put on his leg, or anything like that?’ The officer responded, ‘No, sir.’ The State followed up, ‘He just didn’t want to talk to you. He wanted an attorney?,’ to which the officer responded, ‘Yes.’ The State made no further references to Bly’s silence, whether in argument or in the cross-examination of Bly.” Defense counsel’s failure to object to this “error of constitutional dimension” was deficient, but no prejudice shown, especially considering that prosecution did not dwell on the point or refer to it in argument. Beck v. State, 285 Ga.App. 764, 647 S.E.2d 408 (June 8, 2007). Counsel’s decision not to object to hearsay testimony “offered by an officer as to what [the informant] told him … was a strategic decision” where counsel decided to let it in because he felt the hearsay supported his entrapment defense. “The trial court did find an entrapment charge appropriate,