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and such a strategy, though unsuccessful, is not deficient performance.” Stroud v. State, 284 Ga.App. 604, 644 S.E.2d 467 (March 28, 2007). Failing to object to prosecutor’s improper closing argument was deficient, but not harmful: referring to the child molestation victims, prosecutor remarked, “‘If you find [Stroud] not guilty, you are saying they made [the allegations] up for nothing.... That doesn’t make sense. It just does not make any kind of sense that they put themselves through this for nothing. But that’s what [Stroud] wants you to believe. That's what the defense wants you to believe, and that's what your legal system does, our wonderful legal system, of which, I guess, I am a part. I will humiliate the victims but protect the abusers, and then sit around and judge every little detail about the victims’ lives. I am not proud to be an attorney right now, but it’s what I do.’” “[C]losing argument in the nature of negative characterizations of the criminal justice system ‘is not any reasonable and permissible inference to be drawn from the evidence adduced at trial and [is] disproved.... We find it unnecessary and undesirable for prosecutors to resort to such characterizations. … We strongly condemn the remarks cited in this case.” Phillips v. State, 284 Ga.App. 224, 644 S.E.2d 153 (March 14, 2007). Trial counsel’s decision not to object to witnesses’ improper references to defendant’s first trial, so as not to “attract more attention from the jury” was a strategic decision, not deficient representation. Accord, Haygood v. State , 289 Ga.App. 187, 656 S.E.2d 541 (January 16, 2008). McClain v. State, 284 Ga.App. 187, 643 S.E.2d 273 (February 28, 2007). “The fact that a defendant invokes the right to remain silent cannot be used against him at trial. Bruce v. State, 268 Ga.App. 677, 683(2) (603 S.E.2d 33) (2004). However, ‘not every comment directed toward a defendant’s silence will result in an automatic reversal.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Newton v. State, 226 Ga.App. 501, 502(1) (486 S.E.2d 715) (1997). Here, the record reflects that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to object on this ground because he ‘did not wish to give any more weight to that line of questioning.’ Trial counsel’s strategic decision does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Moss v. State, 278 Ga.App. 362(2)(b), 629 S.E.2d 5 (2006).” Feaster v. State, 283 Ga.App. 417, 641 S.E.2d 635 (February 2, 2007). Luggage taken from victim by defendant during armed robbery wa returned to victim upon defendant’s apprehension. Defendant contends his trial counsel should have objected to testimony concerning the luggage, as it was not preserved for his possible use at trial. “‘Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.’ Brantley v. State, 199 Ga.App. 623, 623-624(1) (405 S.E.2d 533) (1991) (citation and punctuation omitted). On motion for new trial, Feaster made no showing of bad faith on the part of the police and thus no showing of any denial of due process of law. Consequently, Feaster has failed to show that any such objection to testimony concerning the luggage would have been successful.” Warbington v. State, 281 Ga. 464, 640 S.E.2d 11 (January 8, 2007). No ineffective assistance where counsel chose not to object to closing argument so as not to draw attention to it. “Warbington’s trial attorney strategically chose not to object to the statements in issue because he did not want to emphasize them and he did not believe they were influencing the jury. Warbington’s attorney’s strategic decision does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Moss v. State, 278 Ga.App. 362(2)(b) (629 S.E.2d 5) (2006).” Accord, Haygood v. State , 289 Ga.App. 187, 656 S.E.2d 541 (January 16, 2008). Mattis v. State, 282 Ga.App. 49, 637 S.E.2d 787 (October 20, 2006). No ineffective assistance for failure to object to “victim impact evidence” at guilt/innocence phase of trial where defendant himself planned to testify that he struck victim “rather severely.” “Accordingly, trial counsel decided that testimony as to the extent of Melton’s injuries was not important, and trial counsel did not want to emphasize Melton’s testimony by objecting at that time. ‘The matter of when and how to raise objections is generally a matter of trial strategy.’ (Citation omitted.) Gibson v. State, 272 Ga. 801, 804(4) (537 S.E.2d 72) (2000). We cannot say that trial counsel’s failure to object was professionally unreasonable. See Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. at 36(3)(c) (trial counsel’s decision not to object to prosecutor’s comments was not professionally unreasonable where trial counsel did not think the comments were particularly damaging under the circumstances).” Accord, Wright v. State , 319 Ga.App. 723, 738 S.E.2d 310 (February 11, 2013) (decision whether to object to improper argument is matter of trial strategy). Ellis v. State, 282 Ga.App. 17, 637 S.E.2d 729 (October 2, 2006). No ineffective assistance for failing to object to witnesses not on witness list: “the record shows that all of the witnesses’ names were included in investigative reports given to Ellis. One witness was included in the second additional list under her maiden name, and trial counsel actually