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interviewed two other witnesses.” No prejudice shown. Mintz v. State, 281 Ga.App. 155, 635 S.E.2d 417 (August 17, 2006). No evidence of prejudice to defendant where trial counsel allowed evidence of sentences on prior offenses into evidence “since the sentencing information that Mintz challenges reflects significantly reduced sentences for DUI. Specifically, the record shows that one of the DUIs was reduced to reckless driving and a $625 fine. Mintz was sentenced to probation and house confinement in the other. Given the foregoing, we find no reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been different had the jury not heard the sentencing information of which Mintz complains. On the contrary, such information quite possibly benefitted him. Further, while the record shows that the prosecutor commented on the foregoing sentencing information in his closing argument, we conclude, as the trial court did, that the prosecutor’s comment was harmless in that it made no argument as to Mintz’s propensity for future dangerousness. Compare Collier v. State, 266 Ga.App. 345, 355(2)(b) (596 S.E.2d 795) (2004) (wherein we reversed for pervasive prosecutorial argument going to propensity in the guilt-innocence phase of trial). Under these circumstances, evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s actions resulted in no prejudice to Mintz. [Cit.]” Hardeman v. State, 281 Ga. 220, 635 S.E.2d 698 (July 13, 2006). Defense counsel was deficient for failing to object to trial court’s improper abridgment of closing argument (should have been two hours in defendant’s capital murder case, not just one). No harm shown, however, although “[a] trial court’s erroneous denial of the right afforded by OCGA § 17-8-73 gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the defense was harmed. Hayes v. State, 268 Ga. 809, 813(7), 493 S.E.2d 169 (1997).” No presumption of harm here, as this is not one of the class of cases described in State v. Heath, 277 Ga. 337, 588 S.E.2d 738 (2003). Kania v. State, 280 Ga.App. 356, 634 S.E.2d 146 (July 10, 2006). 1. “Kania asserts that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to preserve the appellate record, and in particular in failing to object to certain hearsay testimony. But Kania’s attorney testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that his decision not to raise numerous objections, including objections to hearsay, was a tactical one. Because he believed that most of the evidence was consistent with Kania’s defense, he chose to follow a strategy of allowing the jury to focus on that defense, rather than a strategy of disrupting the flow of the testimony with numerous technical objections. Further, he stated that he was ‘not a big fan of objecting to hearsay anyway. If you catch it too late and then stand up, then they get to hear it two or three times.’ It is well settled that ‘[t]rial tactics and strategy, however mistaken they may appear with hindsight, are almost never adequate grounds for finding trial counsel ineffective unless they are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.’ (Citation omitted.) Terrell v. State, 276 Ga.App. 102, 104(2) (622 S.E.2d 434) (2005). Kania failed to overcome the presumption that his counsel’s strategy of presenting the defense without interrupting the flow of evidence with numerous objections, including objections to hearsay, was reasonable trial strategy and thus he failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.” Accord, Walls v. State , 283 Ga.App. 560, 642 S.E.2d 195 (February 12, 2007); Williams v. State , 282 Ga. 561, 651 S.E.2d 674 (September 24, 2007). 2. “Kania … contends that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to object to the State’s closing argument, in which the prosecutor incorrectly stated that the burden of proof was on the defendant. But Kania’s attorney testified that he did not object because he knew the trial court would instruct the jury that the attorney’s argument was not evidence, and then would tell the jury that the state had the burden of proof. He stated, ‘I thought the judge telling them exactly the opposite was a lot better than me standing up and talking ... when juries are very, in my experience, attentive to what the judges say. They get the hang of the lawyers after a while and sometimes tune us out, and I think they’re much more attentive to what judges say.’ And, in fact, the trial judge instructed the jury that the state had the burden of proof and that the burden never shifted to the defendant. Once again, the attorney’s failure to object was a question of trial strategy and does not form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Moss v. State, 278 Ga.App. 362, 366(2)(b) (629 S.E.2d 5) (2006).” Accord, Ferrell v. State , 312 Ga.App. 122, 717 S.E.2d 705 (October 18, 2011) (“trial counsel testified that she did not object to the admission of [the] text messages as a matter of trial strategy because she believed they supported Ferrell's defense. … A failure to object to the introduction of evidence that does not significantly prejudice the defendant does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly if there is a tactical reason [not] to object. Slade v. State, 270 Ga. 305, 307(2) (509 S.E.2d 618) (1998).”). Johnson v. State, 280 Ga.App. 341, 634 S.E.2d 134 (July 10, 2006). Defense counsel’s decision not to object to use of the word “victim” was not ineffective assistance; “defense counsel testified that his theory was to show the prosecution was on a witch hunt against Johnson and not objecting to the State’s witnesses use of the word ‘victim’ reinforced his strategy of showing the State was ‘paranoid.’ Consequently, this was a matter of tactics and strategy, and whether wise or unwise did not constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel. [Cit.]”