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18. DEATH PENALTY, PLEADING Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 784, 653 S.E.2d 456 (October 29, 2007). Apprendi [ v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435) (2000))] line of cases does not require pleading of statutory aggravating circumstances in indictment; the statutory aggravating circumstances are not “elements” of “death eligible murder.” “[U]nder Georgia law statutory aggravating circumstances are sentencing factors rather than ‘elements’ of death eligible murder.” Accord, Arrington v. State , 286 Ga. 335, 687 S.E.2d 438 (November 9, 2009); Stinski v. State , 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488 (October 25, 2004). Statutory aggravating factors supporting death sentences need not be alleged in indictment. Based on Terrell v. State , 276 Ga. 34, 572 S.E.2d 595 (2002). Accord, Lewis v. State , 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778 (September 19, 2005); Walker v. State , 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (October 2, 2006); Thomason v. State , 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (November 6, 2006). 19. DEATH PENALTY, PRIOR CONVICTIONS Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (March 18, 2011). Capital murder conviction affirmed, but sentence reversed based on improper victim impact testimony. Testimony of victims of prior crimes of defendant properly admitted “both as evidence of Bryant's past crimes and as evidence of bad character. See Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 349(17) (687 S.E.2d 438) (2009) (explaining that the State could have called the victim of a defendant's prior crime to testify about the circumstances of the prior crime).” Nance v. State, 280 Ga. 125, 623 S.E.2d 470 (December 1, 2005). “When a certified copy of a prior conviction is admitted in a capital sentencing trial, the sentence received by the defendant is admissible as part the conviction. See Davis v. State, 241 Ga. 376(6) (247 S.E.2d 45) (1978).” 20. DEATH PENALTY, PROPORTIONALITY Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (March 4, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions, and death penalty, affirmed; death sentence wasn’t disproportionate or inappropriate. 1. “ The crux of Brockman's argument is that the death penalty is not appropriate punishment in his case because he did not complete the armed robbery. However, it is not uncommon for an armed robber's priorities to shift from completing the robbery to escaping from the scene once he has murdered the victim. The jury was authorized to conclude from the evidence presented at trial that Brockman acted accordingly. Nothing diminishes his culpability in the murder and the appropriateness of the death sentence in his case.” 2. Fact that death penalty was not sought in other cases of felony murder based on armed robbery doesn’t make sentence disproportionate. “[T] he appropriate inquiry is whether ‘“the reaction of the sentencer to the evidence before it ... is substantially out of line with reactions of prior sentencers....”’ Davis [ v. Turpin, 273 Ga. 244, 245(2) (539 S.E.2d 129) (2000)] (citation omitted). See Gissendaner [ v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 717(19)(a) (532 S.E.2d 677) (2000)] (‘[O]ur review concerns whether the death penalty “is excessive per se” ... and not whether there ever have been sentences less than death imposed for similar crimes’).” 3. Death penalty wasn’t disproportionate, in light of other cases where death penalty imposed for “an unprovoked killing of a robbery victim in which the defendant received a death sentence. ‘[Brockman]'s death sentence is not excessive or disproportionate, simply because he was convicted of felony murder rather than malice murder.’ (Emphasis in original.) Blankenship v. State, 258 Ga. 43, 47(13) (365 S.E.2d 265) (1988).” Rice v. State, 292 Ga. 191, 733 S.E.2d 755 (October 29, 2012). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; death penalty wasn’t disproportionate, based on other cases which “show[ ] a jury's willingness to impose a death sentence for the commission of multiple murders, whether committed in one or more than one transaction. See OCGA § 17–10–35(e).” Defendant murdered a woman and her teenage son. Accord, Accord, Martin v. State , 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015) (defendant murdered girlfriend’s child and her grandparents). Barrett v. State, 292 Ga. 160, 733 S.E.2d 304 (October 15, 2012). Convictions for malice murder and related offenses, and associated death penalty, affirmed. Death penalty wasn’t disproportionate despite other cases cited by defendant where death penalty wasn’t imposed. “‘This Court views a particular crime against the backdrop of all similar cases in Georgia in determining if a given sentence is excessive per se or substantially out of line.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 717(19)(a) (532 S.E.2d 677) (2000). See Terrell v. State, 276 Ga. 34, 46 (572 S.E.2d 595) (2002) (Fletcher, C.J., concurring) (stating that this Court ‘does not determine whether the death sentence under review represents a large or small percentage of sentences in factually comparable cases’ but, instead, examines the sentence ‘to ensure that it is not an anomaly or aberration’).” Defendant here “relentlessly” beat, kicked and pistol-