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meeting with a probation officer after the sentence is imposed. It is clear, therefore, that [Stulb] had entered upon the service of his sentence prior to the trial court’s attempts to increase the sentence. The second sentence was, therefore void.’ Edge v. State, 194 Ga.App. 466, 467 (391 S.E.2d 18) (1990).” See also Ivey (March 24, 2006), below; Edmondson (May 25, 2007), above. Accord, Reese v. State , 296 Ga.App. 186, 674 S.E.2d 68 (February 18, 2009). Ivey v. State, 278 Ga.App. 463, 629 S.E.2d 127 (March 24, 2006). “ An oral declaration of sentence is not binding on the court unless the defendant has begun to serve it: ‘A sentence which has been reduced to writing and signed by the judge may not be increased after the defendant has begun to serve that sentence. [Cit.] This limitation on the court's sentencing authority stems from the double jeopardy provisions of our constitutions. [Cit.] An oral declaration as to what the sentence shall be is not the sentence of the court; the sentence signed by the judge is. [Cit.] However, the oral declaration of the sentence may not be increased after the defendant has begun to serve it. [Cit.]’ Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183, 185(4) (281 S.E.2d 604) (1981). In Curry, the Supreme Court held that ‘the oral declaration as to what the sentence would be was within the breast of the court and could be increased at any time before it was formally entered by the judge or before service of the sentence was commenced.’ Id. In Harp v. State, 228 Ga.App. 473, 474-475 (491 S.E.2d 923) (1997), we held that an oral sentence could not be increased after the defendant paid the fine provided in that sentence. But here, there is no proof that Ivey began to serve his sentence between the time that the judge pronounced the oral sentence and a few moments later when he set the oral sentence aside.” Defendant was already in custody because he had forfeited bond; his status had not changed. Contrast with cases where “[t]his Court has found that a defendant has begun to serve a sentence by meeting with a probation officer, Fowler v. State, 188 Ga.App. 873(7) (374 S.E.2d 805) (1988), by filling out probation paperwork, Edge v. State, 194 Ga.App. 466, 467 (391 S.E.2d 18) (1990), and paying a fine, Harp, 228 Ga.App. at 474-475. There is no evidence of any such affirmative step in this case.” See also State v. Stulb , 296 Ga.App. 510, 675 S.E.2d 253 (March 9, 2009). Jenkins v. State, 246 Ga.App. 38, 539 S.E.2d 542 (September 18, 2000). Rape, child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no error in sentencing. “Although the trial court’s oral announcement of the sentence failed to include sentences on the incest count and one of the counts of aggravated sodomy, the written sentence includes the sentence imposed on all charges. There was no error. The written sentence, not the oral declaration of the sentence, is the sentence of the court. Paul v. State, 170 Ga.App. 746(3), 318 S.E.2d 200 (1984). As no evidence shows that Jenkins started serving the sentence before the written sentence was entered, there is no error. Id.” QQ. PAROLE Humphrey v. State, 297 Ga. 349, 773 S.E.2d 760 (June 15, 2015). Following negotiated plea and sentence of guilty but mentally ill to murder, trial court erred by denying motion to vacate void sentence. 1. When defendant was by law eligible for parole after 14 years, superior court had no power to prohibit parole sooner than 25 years, even with defendant’s consent. “It is true that Humphrey consented to his sentence, including the provision that he would be ineligible for parole for the first 25 years of that sentence. But when a court imposes a criminal punishment that the law does not allow, the sentence is not just an error, it is void. See Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610, 611(1) (409 S.E.2d 517) (1991) (‘A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.’ (Citation omitted.)). And as we have indicated in a number of cases, the consent of the parties cannot validate a void sentence. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 293 Ga. 705, 706(1) (749 S.E.2d 660) (2013) (‘[A] defendant who knowingly enters into a plea agreement and accepts the benefit of that bargain does not waive or ‘bargain away’ the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence.’ (Citations omitted.)); Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 5, 8(2) (749 S.E.2d 672) (2013) (‘A defendant who knowingly enters into a plea agreement does not waive the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence.’ (Citation omitted.)); von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 573(2) (748 S.E.2d 446) (2013) (‘[A] sentence which is not allowed by law is void, and its illegality may not be waived.’ (Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.)); Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 487(2)(c) (746 S.E.2d 109) (2013) (‘Void convictions and illegal sentences have never been subject to general waiver rules.’).” 2. Attempt to limit parole violates separation of powers. “ By imposing such a sentence, a court intrudes upon the constitutional prerogative of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles to extend clemency to persons under sentence. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. II(a) (‘[T]he State Board of Pardons and Paroles shall be vested with the power of executive clemency, including the powers to grant reprieves, pardons, and paroles....’),” citing “ Terry v. Hamrick, 284 Ga. 24, 25(2) (663 S.E.2d 256) (2008). And whatever the prosecuting attorneys and defendant in a criminal case might agree to, they cannot simply by agreement confer upon the judicial branch an extraconstitutional power to limit the constitutional prerogatives of another branch of the government. See Perez v. State, 254 Ga.App. 872, 873(1) (564 S.E.2d 208) (2002) (‘The authority to grant parole or other relief from the sentence imposed by the trial court rests with the State Board of Pardons & Paroles, not the district attorney's office .’ (Citation omitted.)). To the extent that we held otherwise in Baker v. State, 284 Ga. 280, 281(2) (663 S.E.2d 261) (2008), we overrule that decision.” 3. Suggests, however, that