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defendant may be held to his bargain. “[Defendant] also promised that he would not seek parole for 25 years. No one should misunderstand our decision as holding that his promise not to seek parole is unenforceable. When a defendant promises the State that he will not ask for parole, his promise is a personal one. It does not require a court to do anything, and it does not purport to limit the constitutional power of the Board. If Humphrey breaks his promise and applies to the Board for parole before he has served 25 years, the State may ask the Board itself or a court to enforce the promise. We express no opinion today about the availability of a remedy for the State, but our decision does not foreclose the possibility of such a remedy.” Terry v. Hamrick, 284 Ga. 24, 663 S.E.2d 256 (June 30, 2008). Trial court erred in attempting to impose conditions of parole in sentence. “The Board of Pardons and Paroles has executive power regarding the terms and conditions of paroles. See OCGA §§ 42-9-40, 42-9-44. See also Stephens v. State, 207 Ga.App. 645, 647(2) (428 S.E.2d 661) (1993). Accordingly, the trial court’s attempt to control parole conditions violates the constitutional provision regarding the separation of powers, and this portion of the sentence must be vacated. Stephens, supra.” Accord, Stephens v. State , 305 Ga.App. 339, 699 S.E.2d 558 (July 8, 2010), affirmed, 289 Ga. 758, 716 S.E.2d 154 (October 3, 2011); Pate v. State , 318 Ga.App. 526, 734 S.E.2d 255 (November 15, 2012). McConnell v. State, 281 Ga.App. 303, 635 S.E.2d 882 (August 25, 2006). Except as expressly provided by statute, sentencing court has no power to prohibit parole. “As the decision to grant parole is an executive function of the Board of Pardons & Paroles, the trial court’s authority to preclude parole in this case is based on OCGA § 17-10-7(c), which addresses sentencing for repeat felony offenders. [fn] See Dempsey v. State, 279 Ga. 546, 549(4) (615 S.E.2d 522) (2005) (vacating sentence precluding parole where trial court improperly sentenced defendant based on recidivist status); OCGA § 42-9-1 (‘functions of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles are executive in character and ... no other body is authorized to usurp or substitute its functions for the functions imposed by this chapter upon the board’); Johns v. State, 160 Ga.App. 535, 536 (287 S.E.2d 617) (1981) (‘[a]ny attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department as to what constitutes service of a period of confinement would be a nullity and constitute an exercise of power granted exclusively to the Executive’); Stephens v. State, 207 Ga.App. 645, 647(2) (428 S.E.2d 661) (1993) (quoting Johns v. State ).” Sentence prohibiting parole here was supported by evidence of defendant’s prior felony convictions. RR. PLEA BARGAIN See subheading SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION/ AGREEMENT WITH STATE, below SS. PRE-SENTENCE HEARING/PRE-SENTENCE REPORT Chester v. State, 328 Ga.App. 888, 763 S.E.2d 272 (August 28, 2014). Kidnapping and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion shown in denying continuance before conducting pre-sentence hearing. “At the hearing on his motion for new trial, over two years after the ruling complained of, Chester argued this issue. But he did not present or even identify any evidence—by proffer, by affidavit, or by live witness—which he would have offered in mitigation at sentencing. … Chester has failed to show that he was harmed by the trial court's failure to grant a continuance, and this enumeration of error is therefore without merit.” Perkins v. State, 328 Ga.App. 508, 759 S.E.2d 626 (June 24, 2014). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived any objection to use of pre-sentence report. “Perkins claims that the trial court erred by considering aggravating circumstances in a pre-sentence report because the report was not made known to him before it was submitted to the trial court for the sentencing hearing. See Geyer v. State, 289 Ga.App. 492, 493–494, 657 S.E.2d 878 (2008). The State disputes Perkins's claim, and the record is unclear. But even assuming that Perkins was not given the report before the sentencing hearing, in the absence of any objection at the hearing to use of the report, this claim was waived. Eddleman v. State, 247 Ga.App. 753, 754, 545 S.E.2d 122 (2001).” Young v. State, 290 Ga. 392, 721 S.E.2d 855 (January 23, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in holding pre-sentence hearing immediately after trial despite defendant’s request for continuance, absent showing of prejudice. “‘Whether a continuance should be granted for lack of preparation lies within the discretion of the trial court. [Cits.]’ Jackson v. Hopper, 232 Ga. 419, 420(1) (207 S.E.2d 58) (1974). ‘In this case, the trial court did not prevent [Appellant] from participating in [a presentence] hearing; the trial court merely refused to delay the hearing until such time as [Appellant] deemed appropriate.’ Gibbins v. State, 229 Ga.App. 896, 901(7) (495 S.E.2d 46) (1997). See also Jackson v. State, 266 Ga. 308, 309(3) (467 S.E.2d 495) (1996); Scott v. State, 213 Ga.App. 84, 88(5) (444 S.E.2d 96) (1994). The trial court gave Appellant the opportunity to present evidence, introduce witnesses, and argue for mitigation