☢ test - Í

of his sentence. Appellant admits that it was his error that he was not prepared for the hearing. Moreover, Appellant has ‘“failed to identify specific witnesses or evidence to be offered on mitigation”’ and thus has ‘“failed to demonstrate any harm from the denial of the continuance.” [Cit.]’ Hooker v. State, 278 Ga.App. 382, 388(6) (629 S.E.2d 74) (2006). See also Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630, 637–638(8) (300 S.E.2d 640) (1983); Schwindler v. State, 254 Ga.App. 579, 590(16) (563 S.E.2d 154) (2002). Therefore, Appellant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for continuance.” Smith v. State, 309 Ga.App. 241, 709 S.E.2d 823 (March 17, 2011). Conviction for aggravated assault affirmed; no error where trial court failed to conduct pre-sentence investigation. Although defendant contends his counsel wasn’t prepared for sentencing, and hadn’t interviewed potential witnesses in mitigation, counsel announced that he was ready. “Smith does not contend that his sentence does not comply with the sentence limits set out in OCGA § 16-5-21(b) for a conviction for aggravated assault. Nor does he specifically identify any evidence that he contends he was prevented from presenting at the sentencing hearing. He made no proffer, for example, of what his daughter would have said had she been allowed to testify. And Smith cites no authority to support his argument that the trial court's actions somehow violated the law. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Smith's motion for new trial on this ground.” Walker v. State, 296 Ga.App. 763, 675 S.E.2d 496 (March 3, 2009). Having pled guilty to robbery and related offenses, defendant had no right to a pre-sentence investigation report prior to sentencing. Geyer v. State, 289 Ga.App. 492, 657 S.E.2d 878 (February 5, 2008). “ If a pre-sentence report contains any matter adverse to the defendant and likely to influence the decision to suspend or probate the sentence, it should be revealed to defense counsel by the trial judge in advance of the pre-sentence hearing. Green v. State, 193 Ga.App. 464 (388 S.E.2d 57) (1989). Although a pre-sentencing report cannot be used in aggravation in determining sentence, where the transcript does not affirmatively show that the trial court used the pre-sentence report for the unlawful purpose of increasing the sentence, rather than for the lawful purpose of determining whether to grant probation, no cause for reversal is shown. See id. Geyer’s attorney asked the trial court to sentence Geyer to probation. The trial judge’s comments regarding the statements are consistent with his decision not to give Geyer a fully probated sentence, and we cannot conclude that he improperly used the report to extend the length of Geyer’s sentence, particularly when the sentence imposed was only 13 out of a possible 40 years in confinement. Id. at 464-465. The trial court was authorized to use the information for the lawful purpose of determining whether to grant probation. Id. at 465.” Accord, Rucker v. State , 304 Ga.App. 184, 695 S.E.2d 711 (May 25, 2010). Blue v. State, 275 Ga.App. 671, 621 S.E.2d 616 (September 29, 2005). Trial court properly refused to allow defendant to make argument at sentencing hearing after defense counsel had already done so. “[OCGA § 17-10-2] … provides that ‘the defendant or the defendant’s counsel’ shall present argument to the trial judge regarding punishment” (emphasis added by Court of Appeals). Accord, Habersham v. State , 289 Ga.App. 718, 658 S.E.2d 253 (February 22, 2008); Pepe- Frazier v. State , 331 Ga.App. 263, 770 S.E.2d 654 (March 18, 2015). Lynn v. State, 270 Ga.App. 867, 608 S.E.2d 542 (December 10, 2004). “‘Trial courts are permitted to consider presentence reports when deciding whether to suspend or probate all or part of a sentence, although such reports cannot be used to determine the length of a sentence.’ (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Strange v. State, 244 Ga.App. 635, 637- 638(2), 535 S.E.2d 315 (2000).” Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 604 S.E.2d 483 (October 25, 2004). “[A] trial court’s jurisdiction to modify a sentence extends beyond its statutory limitation [cit.] only when the sentence is void. [Cit.] ‘A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.’ Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610, 611 (409 S.E.2d 517) (1991)…. Assertions taking issue with the procedure employed in imposing a valid sentence [as here, complaining that no pre-sentence hearing was held ] or questioning the fairness of an imposed sentence do not allege a sentence is void and therefore are not a means for post-appeal, post [OCGA] § 17-10-1(f) sentence modification.” Gilbert v. State, 245 Ga.App. 544, 538 S.E.2d 104 (August 4, 2000). No error in sentencing defendant according to his plea deal with State following guilty pleas to child molestation and related charges; no presentence hearing required. “OCGA § 17-10-2(a) does not reach sentencing following guilty pleas, its terms applying only in those cases in which sentence is imposed after a jury trial, a bench trial or probation revocation proceedings for a first offender.” Fortson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 304, 529 S.E.2d 429 (February 9, 2000). Burglary conviction affirmed; trial court didn’t