☢ test - Í

make improper use of pre-sentence report. “It is true that while a trial court is authorized to consider presentence investigation reports for the purpose of deciding whether to suspend or probate all or part of the defendant's sentence, it cannot use the reports to determine the length of sentence. Williams v. State, 165 Ga.App. 553, 554(3), 301 S.E.2d 908 (1983). But the record here does not support Fortson's assertion that the court used the report for this improper purpose. The recommendation that the court impose the maximum 20–year sentence originated with the State. The transcript of the presentence hearing shows that the prosecuting attorney had not even read the report and based his sentencing recommendation on the evidence presented at trial. Compare Sinkfield v. State, 262 Ga. 239(2), 416 S.E.2d 288 (1992). Although the report added a suggestion that the 20–year sentence be served without possibility of parole, Fortson's sentence was not subject to such a condition and the court properly disregarded the recommendation. Because the transcript does not affirmatively show that the court used the presentence report for the unlawful purpose of increasing the sentence, no cause for reversal is shown. Green v. State, 193 Ga.App. 464, 388 S.E.2d 57 (1989).” Williams v. State, 271 Ga. 686, 523 S.E.2d 857 (November 15, 1999). Following convictions for robbery and related offenses, trial court properly denied motion to correct sentences. “[A] trial court's failure to hold a presentence hearing in a non-death penalty case, such as the present one, does not render a sentence void.” Citing Bentley v. Willis , 247 Ga. 461, 463, 276 S.E.2d 639 (1981), where “this Court noted that there was ‘no constitutional or statutory requirement that sentence not be imposed until after such report is prepared and considered,’ [and] we held that ‘[e]ven if such report were required, such requirement could be waived by the defendant as was done here.’” Accord, Bolick v. State , 244 Ga.App. 567, 536 S.E.2d 242 (June 22, 2000) (no error in denying request for pre-sentence investigation as conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury required mandatory life sentence); Jackson v. State , 269 Ga.App. 477, 604 S.E.2d 576 (September 7, 2004); Cochran v. State , 279 Ga. 51, 609 S.E.2d 353 (February 21, 2005) (No error in failing to hold sentencing hearing where defendant was sentenced to mandatory minimum – here, life sentence for felony murder). State v. Lucious, 271 Ga. 361, 518 S.E.2d 677 (June 14, 1999). Murder and related convictions affirmed in part, reversed in part. Supreme Court unanimously finds that “the [1994 Georgia Criminal Procedure Discovery Act, OCGA § 17- 16-1 et seq.] is inapplicable to presentence hearings in both capital or non-capital cases remains governed by OCGA § 17-10-2, which was not among the various discovery statutes related to felony cases specifically repealed or amended by the enactment of the Act.” TT. PROBATION See major heading PROBATION, above UU. PROBATION DETENTION CENTER Price v. State, 320 Ga.App. 85, 738 S.E.2d 289 (February 7, 2013). Defendant’s sentence for invasion of privacy upheld. Defendant was sentenced to five years’ confinement, including two years in a Probation Detention Center, with the rest probated. “Former OCGA § 42–8–35.4, applicable to Price's sentence in 2010, provided: ‘(a) In addition to any other terms and conditions of probation provided for in this article, the trial judge may require that a defendant convicted of a felony and sentenced to a period of not less than one year on probation ... shall complete satisfactorily, as a condition of that probation, a program of confinement in a probation detention center. Probationers so sentenced will be required to serve the period of confinement specified in the court order.’ [fn: We note that the legislature amended this Code section in 2012 to provide that a program of confinement not exceed 180 days. ] Because Price was convicted of a felony, see OCGA § 16–11–69, and sentenced to five years of confinement, all of which was probated, Price's condition of probation requiring him to complete a detention center program for 48 months was authorized by former OCGA § 42–8–35.4. See Johnson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 425, 427(2), 641 S.E.2d 655 (2007) (condition of probation requiring defendant to serve 20 to 24 months in probation detention center authorized by OCGA § 42–8–35.4).” Mason v. State, 310 Ga.App. 118, 712 S.E.2d 76 (May 31, 2011). Sentence for first-degree child cruelty was not void. Trial court granted defendant conditional discharge and sentenced defendant to serve part of his sentence in a probation detention center. Defendant contends that the sentence was void because, under OCGA § 42–8–35.4(a), “our courts may require confinement at a probation detention center for two categories of individuals: (1) ‘defendant[s] convicted of a felony’; and (2) designated misdemeanants.” Defendant contends that his first offender plea doesn’t constitute a “conviction,” but pursuant to OCGA § 42–8–65(c), “persons who have been sentenced to a term of confinement under OCGA § 42–8–60(a)(2) ‘shall be deemed to have been convicted of the offense during such term of confinement for all purposes except that records thereof shall be treated as any other records of first offenders under this article and except that such presumption shall not continue after completion of such person's confinement sentence.’”