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sentence imposed two years after plea entry, based upon second conviction entered that same day. “OCGA § 17- 10-7(d) …. prevents individual consideration of separate charges contained in the same indictment or tried in the same criminal proceeding. It does not prevent separate consideration of the 1977 and 1979 convictions in this case, which were indicted and tried separately – in fact, almost two years apart.” Smith v. State, 273 Ga.App. 107, 614 S.E.2d 219 (April 27, 2005). Defendant was convicted of attempted burglary and sentenced under the general recidivist provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7. He appeals, arguing “that the sentencing scheme for repeat burglary offenders in OCGA § 16-7-1(b) governs his sentence. Smith, however, was not convicted of burglary. The jury found him guilty of criminal attempt, an offense subject to sentencing under OCGA § 16-4-6, rather than OCGA § 16-7-1. We thus fail to see how OCGA § 16-7-1(b) controls his sentence. Furthermore, even if Smith had been convicted of burglary in this case, his argument would fail. The record shows that Smith had not only been convicted of two previous burglaries, but two other felonies as well. For purposes of sentencing, therefore, he is more than a repeat burglary offender. He is a four-time felony offender subject to the general recidivist sentencing scheme in OCGA § 17- 10-7. [Cit.] Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing Smith.” Harper v. State, 270 Ga.App. 376, 606 S.E.2d 599 (November 8, 2004). Following drug convictions, trial court’s recidivist sentence was not improper. Pleas entered on the same day before the same judge, but on separate indictments and arising from separate incidents, weren’t consolidated for purposes of recidivist statute, OCGA § 17-10-7(d). “[T]he court necessarily sentenced Harper pursuant to subsection (c) of OCGA § 17-10-7 since the five prior felony convictions could only be treated as separate convictions. OCGA § 17-10-7(d) provides: ‘For the purpose of this Code section, conviction of two or more crimes charged on separate counts of one indictment or accusation, or in two or more indictments or accusations consolidated for trial, shall be deemed to be only one conviction.’ The five prior felony convictions here were actually five sets of crimes consisting of thefts and burglaries of five different victims on five different days, with each set separately indicted and with separate sentencing orders entered on each. [Cit.] Even though there is no court order consolidating these five sets of crimes for a single trial, Harper argues that since he pled guilty to all of the crimes on the same day before the same judge, who imposed concurrent sentences, they were in fact consolidated for trial for purposes of OCGA § 17-10-7(d). Robinson v. State [232 Ga.App. 280(2), 501 S.E.2d 536 (1998)] rejected this argument, explaining: ‘Defendant maintains that since the two indictments were pled out at the same time, before the same judge, and resulted in the same sentence to run concurrently, the offenses should be viewed as consolidated and treated as only one offense. However, the factors relied upon by defendant do not establish that the cases were ‘consolidated for trial’ as contemplated by OCGA § 17-10-7. As there were separate indictments and separate sentencing orders were entered as to each indictment, the record indicates that there was no consolidation.’ See Philmore v. State, 263 Ga. 67, 70(6), 428 S.E.2d 329 (1993) (three prior convictions not consolidated where there were separate indictments and separate sentencing orders); Head v. State , 253 Ga.App. 757, 759(3), 560 S.E.2d 536 (2002) (eleven prior convictions to which defendant pled guilty on same day were not consolidated where ‘a separate order of sentence was entered on each separate accusation or indictment’); Moore v. State , 251 Ga.App. 295, 296-297(1), 554 S.E.2d 204 (2001) (two prior crimes, indicted separately and sentenced in separate orders, were against different victims and occurred on different days; the fact that defendant pled guilty to them on the same day with concurrent sentences being entered that day did not make them consolidated for trial).” Accord, McSears v. State , 292 Ga.App. 804, 665 S.E.2d 890 (July 17, 2008) (“‘the fact that the sentences were entered on the same day and that the sentences ran concurrent does not require the conclusion that the two prior convictions had been “consolidated for trial” within the meaning of [OCGA § 17-10-7(d)]’”); Crutchfield v. State , 295 Ga.App. 490, 672 S.E.2d 467 (January 12, 2009) (not consolidated: separate offenses, separate indictments, sentenced same day, separate sentencing instruments, consescutive sentences); Baker v. State , 306 Ga.App. 99, 701 S.E.2d 572 (September 16, 2010); Becoats v. State , 318 Ga.App. 262, 733 S.E.2d 795 (October 30, 2012); Thompson v. State , 332 Ga.App. 204, 770 S.E.2d 364 (March 30, 2015). Wheeler v. State, 270 Ga.App. 363, 606 S.E.2d 612 (November 8, 2004). “Without the opportunity to inspect a certified copy of the Florida conviction, we are unable to determine whether Wheeler was properly sentenced under OCGA § 17- 10-7(a). At this preliminary stage, we note only that (1) the Florida sentence was apparently for probation alone, meaning that Wheeler was not ‘sentenced to confinement in a penal institution,’ as the statute requires; (2) the State produced no evidence that the acts giving rise to the Florida conviction for grand theft would have sufficed to obtain a Georgia felony conviction; and (3) a first offender’s guilty or nolo contendere plea does not alone constitute a conviction for sentencing purposes. See OCGA § 17-10-7(a); Woodson [ v. State, 242 Ga.App. 67, 70(4), 530 S.E.2d 2 (2000)] (copies of out-of- state convictions insufficient to prove defendant’s status as recidivist felon under Georgia law); Davis v. State, 273 Ga. 14, 15-16, 537 S.E.2d 663 (2000) (where first-offense probation fulfilled or not revoked, offense cannot be used for purposes of recidivist sentencing); Scott v. State, 216 Ga.App. 692, 694-95(4), 455 S.E.2d 609 (1995) (prior guilty plea