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Butler committed the crime for which he was convicted and sentenced.” Benham dissents. Accord, Massa v. State , 287 Ga.App. 494, 651 S.E.2d 806 (September 11, 2007). Campbell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 331, 631 S.E.2d 388 (April 28, 2006). “Campbell’s three prior felony convictions, and his subsequent conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as a result of one or more of those felonies, are still separate felonies that may be used as such in imposing recidivist punishment for the commission of yet another felony.” Disapproved “[t]o the extent [it] can be read as requiring a judge to impose the maximum sentence allowed when sentencing pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7(c),” State v. Slaughter , 289 Ga. 344, 711 S.E.2d 651 (2011). Morgan v. State, 277 Ga.App. 670, 627 S.E.2d 413 (February 20, 2006). No prohibition against using prior habitual violator convictions as similar transactions in guilt-innocence phase, then to impose recidivist sentencing. “Prior habitual violator convictions may be used as a basis for recidivist punishment under OCGA § 17-10-7. [Cit.] Nothing in the habitual violator statute prohibits prior convictions used in the guilt-innocence phase of trial from being used again at sentencing. See OCGA § 40-5-58; see also Carswell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 833, 835(3), 589 S.E.2d 605 (2003) (nothing in aggravated assault statute precludes use of prior conviction for both impeachment and sentencing). In addition, the purpose of the habitual violator statute is not to define and punish recidivists but to protect the citizens of this state from dangerous, negligent and incompetent drivers. [Cit.] By contrast, § 17-10-7 is specifically designed to enhance punishment for repeat offenders. We find no basis upon which to preclude the use of a habitual violator conviction at both the guilt-innocence phase of trial and at sentencing. Cf. King v. State, 169 Ga.App. 444-445, 313 S.E.2d 144 (1984) (prior felony conviction required to prove convicted felon was in possession of a firearm cannot also be used in same prosecution to enhance sentence under OCGA § 17-10-7). The trial court did not err in considering the September 30, 1996 conviction at sentencing. [Cit.]” Accord, Newsome v. State , 289 Ga.App. 590, 657 S.E.2d 540 (January 23, 2008); Cook v. State , 305 Ga.App. 516, 699 S.E.2d 831 (August 4, 2010). See also Hillman v. Johnson , 297 Ga. 609, 774 S.E.2d 615 (June 29, 2015) ( King limited to offenses where the prior felony is used both as an element of the new offense and to impose mandatory recidivist sentencing ). Butler v. State, 277 Ga.App. 57, 625 S.E.2d 458 (December 6, 2005). 1. Proper to use two separate convictions for sale of cocaine for recidivist sentencing purposes, based on separate sales on different days, although both sentences were entered by the same judge on the same day and had concurrent sentences. 2. Defendant “contends that the court erred in ‘stacking two recidivist sentencing provisions’ by first sentencing Butler to life in prison under former OCGA § 16-13- 30(d), which at the time of Butler’s crime and sentencing required a life sentence for repeat offenders of OCGA § 16-13- 30(b), see Maddox v. State, 227 Ga.App. 602, 605(5) (490 S.E.2d 174) (1997), and by then sentencing Butler to life without parole under OCGA § 17-10-7(c), which required that upon conviction of a fourth felony, a defendant shall not be eligible for parole. Under similar circumstances, Mims v. State, 225 Ga.App. 331, 332(2) (484 S.E.2d 37) (1997), approved a life-without-parole sentence, and we discern no reason to hold otherwise here. See Johnson v. State 259 Ga.App. 452, 456(3)(b) (576 S.E.2d 911) (2003) (‘[b]ecause [defendant’s] conviction on Count 1 of the indictment was his second conviction for violating OCGA § 16-13-30(b), ‘the trial court was not prohibited from sentencing him under both OCGA §§ 16-13-30(d) and 17-10-7(c)”’).” Affirmed, Butler v. State , 281 Ga. 310, 637 S.E.2d 688 (November 20, 2006) (see above). State v. Chambers, 275 Ga.App. 666, 621 S.E.2d 588 (September 28, 2005). Defendant had multiple prior burglary convictions and multiple other felony convictions when convicted in trial court for burglary. Trial court sentenced defendant under general recidivist statute; State appeals, contending trial court must instead sentence under the stricter burglary recidivist statute, which prohibits suspending any part of the sentence (as trial court did here). Held, “[t]he existence of prior felony convictions in addition to those for burglary ‘removes the case from the exclusive provisions of OCGA § 16-7-1(b) and allows for the application of the repeat offender statute for sentencing purposes.’ Stephens, supra, 259 Ga.App. 564, 565, 578 S.E.2d 179 (2003). The trial court properly sentenced Chambers as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7(a). For this reason, the court also had the discretion under that same statute to probate or suspend a portion of Chambers’s sentence.” Hester v. State, 274 Ga.App. 276, 617 S.E.2d 232 (July 11, 2005). Following conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, trial court properly denied motion to correct sentence; defendant was properly sentenced as recidivist. “OCGA § 17-10-7(d) provides that for purposes of recidivist sentencing, ‘conviction of two or more crimes charged on separate counts of one indictment or accusation, or in two or more indictments or accusations consolidated for trial, shall be deemed to be only one conviction.’” This provision was not violated by consideration of defendant’s two convictions, both of which were entered on the same day, where defendant’s first offender status was revoked and