☢ test - Í

Where, on the other hand, an accused’s prior convictions are only for burglary, OCGA § 16-7-1(b) controls and there is no reason to consider the supplemental provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7. See Norwood v. State, 249 Ga.App. 507, 508(2) (548 S.E.2d 478) (2001). In other words, OCGA § 16-7-1(b) applies in cases involving ‘only prior and current burglary convictions, [cit.] [but] no statute exists other than OCGA § 17-10-7 that speaks to sentencing based on the mixed variety of felony convictions involved here.’ Buckner v. State, 253 Ga.App. 294, 297(3) (558 S.E.2d 823) (2002).” Accord, Wester v. State , 294 Ga.App. 263, 668 S.E.2d 862 (October 27, 2008) (specific recidivist shoplifting provision prevailed over general recidivist statute where all defendant’s prior convictions were for shoplifting); Kennedy v. State , 302 Ga.App. 289, 690 S.E.2d 255 (January 26, 2010). Page v. State, 287 Ga.App. 182, 651 S.E.2d 131 (August 9, 2007). Trial court erred in concluding that “it had no discretion to probate or suspend any portion of” defendant’s recidivist sentence for burglary under OCGA § 17-10-7(c). “‘OCGA § 17-10-7(a) required the trial court to impose the maximum sentence but gave it discretion to probate or suspend part of that sentence. Subsection (c), which prohibits parole, did not take away that discretion,’ but required that upon the fourth and subsequent felony convictions, the defendant must serve the entire sentence imposed without the possibility of parole. Bradshaw v. State, 237 Ga.App. 627, 629-630(2) (516 S.E.2d 333) (1999); Banks v. State, 225 Ga.App. 754, 757(5) (484 S.E.2d 786) (1997).” Moorer v. State, 286 Ga.App. 395, 649 S.E.2d 537 (July 6, 2007). Kidnapping qualifies as a “serious violent felony” requiring life without parole on a second offense under OCGA § 17-10-7(b)(2). “There is no requirement that the kidnapping victim receive bodily injury when the sentencing is pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-6.1. See OCGA § 16-5-40(c) (‘Any person convicted under this Code section shall, in addition, be subject to the sentencing and punishment provisions of Code Sections 17-10-6.1 and 17-10-7.’)” Johnson v. State, 285 Ga.App. 590, 646 S.E.2d 760 (May 29, 2007). Remanded for re-sentencing; trial court erroneously stated that it was required to sentence defendant to the maximum sentence available as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10- 7(c). “The State presented evidence indicating that Johnson had three prior felony offenses, and sought recidivist sentencing pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7(c). That statute mandates that a defendant convicted of a fourth felony ‘must ... serve the maximum time provided in the sentence of the judge ‘ and ‘shall not be eligible for parole until the maximum sentence has been served.’ (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-10-7(c). The trial judge clearly stated that he believed he had to give the longest sentence available for the crimes charged. This enumeration is controlled by case law holding that under OCGA § 17-10-7(c), the trial court does retain discretion to sentence within the minimum and maximum sentence provided for the crime charged and that in this situation the case must be remanded for resentencing. See Blevins v. State, 270 Ga.App. 388, 394(5) (606 S.E.2d 624) (2004); Scott v. State, 248 Ga.App. 542 (545 S.E.2d 709) (2001).” Disapproved, along with Blevins and others “to the extent [it]] can be understood for the proposition that under OCGA § 17–10–7(a) and (c), a trial court retains jurisdiction to sentence a recidivist defendant to anything less than the maximum penalty,” Lester v. State , 309 Ga.App. 1, 710 S.E.2d 161 (March 30, 2011). Patrick v. State, 284 Ga.App. 472, 644 S.E.2d 309 (March 23, 2007). Unanimous whole court opinion; trial court did not err in imposing general recidivist sentencing of defendant under OCGA § 17-10-7(c) on his shoplifting offense rather than using the specific shoplifting recidivist code section, OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(1)(C). “[T]here is nothing in OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(c), which specifically governs fourth-time shoplifting offenders, that blocks the application of the general recidivist provisions set forth in OCGA § 17-10-7(c). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing Patrick under OCGA § 17-10-7.” Overrules Williams v. State , 261 Ga.App. 176, 582 S.E.2d 141 (2003), based on Butler (November 20, 2006), below. Williams v. State, 284 Ga.App. 255, 643 S.E.2d 749 (February 21, 2007). Recidivist sentencing does not violate ex post facto prohibition. “The fact that Williams’s prior conviction subjected him to increased punishment in the wake of his conviction in the case-in-chief ‘does not somehow convert the statute into an unconstitutional ex post facto law’ as applied to him. Denson v. State, 267 Ga.App. 528, 529 (600 S.E.2d 645) (2004). Instead, ‘the statute punishes only for a future offense, which punishment is rationally enhanced by the prior conviction.’ (Citation omitted.) Id.” Butler v. State, 281 Ga. 310, 637 S.E.2d 688 (November 20, 2006). Convicted of his fourth offense of selling cocaine, trial court properly determined that defendant was subject to life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30(d), and further that defendant was not eligible for parole under OCGA § 17-10-7, the general recidivist sentencing provision. “[T]he Legislature intended after July 1, 1994 that the general recidivist provisions in OCGA § 17-10-7(e) supplement all existing specific recidivist provisions, including the version of OCGA § 16-13-30(d) in effect on July 22, 1994, when