☢ test - Í

351(1), 461 S.E.2d 548 (1995); compare Pritchett v. State, 267 Ga.App. 303, 304(1), 599 S.E.2d 291 (2004) (where defendant convicted of possession of cocaine is sentenced as a recidivist, trial court has discretion to probate sentence); Jackson v. State, 158 Ga.App. 530, 532(3), 281 S.E.2d 252 (1981) (where defendant convicted of burglary is sentenced as a recidivist, trial court has discretion to probate sentence). Singleton's contentions regarding the unconstitutionality of OCGA § 17-10-7 as so applied have been decided adversely to him. See Ortiz v. State, 266 Ga. 752, 753(2), 470 S.E.2d 874 (1996).” Land v. State, 291 Ga.App. 617, 662 S.E.2d 368 (May 21, 2008). “It is true that a prior conviction must be final before it can be considered for purposes of imposing recidivist sentencing. See Mitchell v. State, 202 Ga.App. 100, 101(2) (413 S.E.2d 517) (1991). A conviction is deemed final for purposes of imposing recidivist punishment when the defendant has been adjudicated guilty and has been sentenced, and when no appeal on the prior charges remains pending. See Sutton v. State, 263 Ga.App. 188, 190(1), fn. 5 (587 S.E.2d 379) (2003); Dunn v. State, 208 Ga.App. 197, 198(4) (430 S.E.2d 50) (1993).” Here, defendant’s prior conviction was “final” although he was still on probation, distinguishing Davis v. State, 273 Ga. 14 (537 S.E.2d 663) (2000) (conviction not final where defendant given first offender status, not revoked). Walker v. Hale, 283 Ga. 131, 657 S.E.2d 227 (February 11, 2008). 1. Habeas court erred when it “found that the trial court ‘used up’ the evidence of Hale’s prior conviction to support the charge that he was a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, the underlying felony in [the felony murder count] of the indictment, thereby precluding the court from using the same prior conviction to sentence him as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7(b)(2).” Defendant’s argument based on King v. State, 169 Ga.App. 444 (313 S.E.2d 144) (1984), which “held that the allegation and evidence of a prior felony conviction, necessary for conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm under OCGA § 16-11-131, could not also be used to punish a defendant as a repeat offender under OCGA § 17-10-7(a). Id. at 445. King and its progeny stand for the limited proposition that the felony used to convict a defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon cannot also be used to enhance the defendant's punishment as a repeat offender under OCGA § 17-10- 7(a). [Cits.]” “This court has not been called upon to consider the validity of the King rule against dual use of a prior conviction both as an element of an offense and for sentence enhancement, and we find it unnecessary to do so here. The record in this case demonstrates that the charge against Hale of felony murder with the underlying felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was vacated by operation of law and no conviction on that charge was entered.” King limited to offenses where the prior felony is an element of the new offense, Hillman v. Johnson , 297 Ga. 609, 774 S.E.2d 615 (June 29, 2015). 2. Proof of defendant’s prior conviction for second degree malice murder in West Virginia required that defendant, upon conviction for malice murder here, be sentenced to life without parole. “Although the language of the indictment does not directly track the language found in Georgia's murder statute, OCGA § 16-5-1, it is sufficient to show that the same offense, if committed in this State, would constitute a serious violent felony as defined in OCGA § 17- 10-6.1(a). Accordingly, upon conviction in this case of the charge of malice murder, another serious violent felony, the court had no choice but to impose a sentence of life without parole under OCGA § 17-10-7(b)(2). See Smith v. State, 241 Ga.App. 770, 771 (527 S.E.2d 608) (2000) (Florida indictment sufficient to prove defendant was convicted of offenses in Florida which would have each been serious violent felony if committed in Georgia).” Accord, Raymond (June 25, 2009), above (where defendant acquitted of possession of firearm by convicted felon, State was free to use same felonies to support recidivist sentence). Legan v. State, 289 Ga.App. 244, 656 S.E.2d 879 (January 18, 2008). Trial court properly treated “robbery with a dangerous weapon” under North Carolina law as the equivalent of armed robbery, a serious violent felony, for purposes of sentencing under OCGA § 17-10-7(b)(2). Goldberg v. State, 282 Ga. 542, 651 S.E.2d 667 (September 24, 2007). Defendant was convicted of his third lifetime burglary, his fifth lifetime felony. Defendant contended that he should be sentenced pursuant to OCGA § 16-7-1(b) (third burglary carries sentence of 5-20 years). Trial court instead sentenced pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7, the general recidivist statute (court must impose maximum sentence on second or subsequent felony, subject to probation/suspension; not eligible for parole on fourth or subsequent felony). Held, Court of Appeals (280 Ga.App. 600, 634 S.E.2d 419 (2006)) properly affirmed trial court’s ruling. Although defendant argues that the more specific statute should prevail over the general, Supreme Court holds that “the General Assembly has expressly indicated its intent that OCGA § 17-10-7 and other recidivist sentencing provisions, such as OCGA § 16-7-1(b), be construed harmoniously. Accordingly, they are not conflicting provisions, and each must be interpreted so as to avoid any ambiguity between them.” Where the defendant has other felony convictions besides burglaries, the general recidivist provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7 are “supplemental” to the specific burglary provisions of OCGA § 16-7-1(b). “Because Goldberg was ‘more’ than just a habitual burglar, he was subject, as a habitual felon, to the ‘supplemental’ provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7.