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of the sentence. [Cit.] But where the maximum penalty is life in prison, a trial court lacks discretion to probate or suspend any part of the sentence. [Cit.] It follows that when a three-time recidivist commits a fourth felony for which the maximum penalty is life in prison, the trial court lacks discretion to sentence such felon to anything other than a life sentence without possibility of parole . [Cit.]” Trial court erred by not sentencing to life without parole for aggravated sodomy with three prior felonies. Accord, McCorkle v. State , 265 Ga.App. 280, 593 S.E.2d 738 (January 26, 2004); State v. Scott , 265 Ga.App. 387, 593 S.E.2d 923 (February 2, 2004); Thompson v. State , 265 Ga.App. 696, 595 S.E.2d 377 (February 19, 2004); Bharadia v. State , 282 Ga.App. 556, 639 S.E.2d 545 (November 27, 2006); Hall v. State , 292 Ga.App. 544, 664 S.E.2d 882 (July 8, 2008); Lester (March 30, 2011), above. Stone v. State, 245 Ga.App. 728, 538 S.E.2d 791 (August 30, 2000). Following guilty plea to selling cocaine, trial court erred by imposing recidivist sentence. Prior convictions for VGCSA and felon in possession of firearm should have been “considered ‘consolidated for trial’” pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7(d). “OCGA § 17-10-7(d) provides that ‘[f]or the purpose of this Code section, conviction of two or more crimes charged on separate counts of one indictment or accusation, or in two or more indictments or accusations consolidated for trial, shall be deemed to be only one conviction.’” “Both offenses occurred on October 21, 1994, and it is undisputed that both offenses arose out of the same conduct. Stone was charged under two separate accusations, and, on October 26, 1994, he pled guilty to both offenses. We conclude that, under these facts, the two offenses were consolidated for trial.” Although charged in two separate accusations and resulting in separate sentencing orders, “had Stone opted to go to trial rather than enter a guilty plea, the State would have been required to consolidate the offenses for trial, and Stone would have been deemed to have had only one conviction for sentencing purposes. OCGA § 17-10-7(d). We see no reason to apply a different rule simply because Stone opted to plead guilty.” Distinguished, Baker v. State , 306 Ga.App. 99, 701 S.E.2d 572 (2010) (holding in Stone didn’t apply to offenses occurring on separate dates). Smiley v. State, 241 Ga.App. 712, 527 S.E.2d 585 (January 5, 2000). Defendant was properly sentenced under OCGA § 17-10-7 as a recidivist for cocaine possession, based on his previous conviction for possession with intent to distribute. Based on Gilbert v. State, 208 Ga.App. 258, 260(1), 430 S.E.2d 391 (1993) (trafficking “constitutes a second violation of possession with intent to distribute cocaine under OCGA § 16-13-30(b), triggering the mandatory life sentence required by OCGA § 16-13-30(d). … Accord Brundage v. State, 231 Ga.App. 478, 480(4), 499 S.E.2d 408 (1998); Cody v. State, 222 Ga.App. 468, 471(4), 474 S.E.2d 669 (1996).” Harden v. State, 239 Ga.App. 700, 521 S.E.2d 829 (August 24, 1999). Pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7, trial court properly sentenced defendant to maximum 30 year sentence (five to serve) on defendant’s first conviction for selling cocaine. OCGA § 17-10-7 requires maximum sentence for a repeat felon; defendant had a prior conviction for armed robbery, but not for VGCSA, so recidivist provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30(d) did not apply. Compare Blackwood (April 23, 1999), below (where applicable, recidivist provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30(d) apply, not OCGA § 17-10-7)). Blackwood v. State, 237 Ga.App. 896, 516 S.E.2d 787 (April 23, 1999). On defendant’s convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, trial court properly sentenced defendant “under both OCGA §§ 16-13-30(d) and 17-10- 7(c).” While OCGA § 16-13-30(d) explicitly makes 17-10-7(a) not applicable to these cases, nothing prevents 17-10-7(c) from applying. “The statute clearly states that only the provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to a sentence imposed for a second such offense and also specifically provides that the remaining provisions of Code § 17-10-7 shall apply for any subsequent offense.” Compare Harden (August 24, 1999), above (OCGA § 17-10-7 applies where defendant is repeat felon, but not repeat drug violator). Thompson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 466, 517 S.E.2d 339 (April 1, 1999). Physical precedent only. 1. Prior convictions relied on for recidivist sentencing were not required to be set out in the indictment; OCGA § 17-10-2 only requires “that the accused receive notice of the state’s intention to seek recidivist punishment and of the identity of the prior convictions. [Cits.]” 2. “Thompson contends he was sentenced as a recidivist in violation of his rights to due process and equal protection under the federal and state constitutions, because the burglary and criminal damage to property convictions resulted from pleas entered on the same date and concurrent sentences were imposed. OCGA § 17-10-7(d) provides that for purposes of recidivist sentencing under that Code section, conviction of two or more crimes charged in two or more indictments or accusations ‘consolidated for trial’ shall be deemed to be only one conviction. Id. Burglary and criminal damage to property convictions were committed against different victims on the same date. Both convictions were the result of separate indictments. A separate order of sentence was entered on each indictment. ‘Under these circumstances, the fact that the sentences were entered on the same day and that the sentences on the [one charge] ran concurrent with the [other] sentence does not require the conclusion that the [two] prior convictions