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had been “consolidated for trial” within the meaning of OCGA § 17-10-7(c). [Cits.]’ Philmore v. State, 263 Ga. 67, 70(6), 428 S.E.2d 329 (1993); see Clarke v. State, 167 Ga.App. 402, 403, 306 S.E.2d 702 (1983); Moore v. State, 169 Ga.App. 24, 27(7), 311 S.E.2d 226 (1983).” Lynn v. State, 236 Ga.App. 600, 512 S.E.2d 695 (February 22, 1999). Amendments to OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(1) in 1997 allow all prior shoplifting convictions of a defendant to be considered in imposing felony punishment for a subsequent shoplifting conviction. “Before OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(1) was amended in 1997, only prior misdemeanor shoplifting convictions could be considered in seeking felony for a fourth shoplifting conviction. See generally Fuller v. State, 230 Ga.App. 219, 221(3), 496 S.E.2d 303 (1998). The 1997 statutory amendment to OCGA § 16-8-14(b)(1)(C), provided that, ‘[u]pon conviction of a fourth or subsequent offense for shoplifting, where the prior [shoplifting] convictions are either felonies or misdemeanors, or any combination of felonies and misdemeanors ..., the defendant commits a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years; and the first year of such sentence shall not be suspended, probated, deferred, or withheld.’ (Emphasis supplied.)” Defendant here argues, unsuccessfully, that only felony convictions after the effective date of the amendments could be used to enhance sentence. “[W]e have no difficulty in concluding that the General Assembly intended that as to convictions of shoplifting occurring after the effective date of the 1997 amendment, any prior shoplifting conviction shall be considered in determining if the defendant has committed felony shoplifting.” Byrd v. State, 236 Ga.App. 485, 512 S.E.2d 372 (February 16, 1999). 1. “Byrd contends OCGA § 17-10-6.1, which dictates the punishment for serious violent offenders, in conjunction with OCGA § 17-10-7, the sentencing statute applicable to recidivist armed robbers, violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII of the Georgia Constitution. This issue has already been decided adversely to Byrd in Ortiz v. State, 266 Ga. 752, 753(2), 470 S.E.2d 874 (1996). Thus, this enumeration lacks merit.” 2. “Byrd next contends that OCGA § 17-10-6.1 violates the separation of powers doctrine of Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III of the Georgia Constitution. However, this issue is controlled adversely to Byrd by Campbell v. State, 268 Ga. 44, 45(2), 485 S.E.2d 185 (1997).” Mikell v. State, 270 Ga. 467, 510 S.E.2d 523 (January 11, 1999). Reverses 231 Ga.App. 85, 498 S.E.2d 2d 531 (1998). Defendant was convicted for his second offense of selling drugs near a public housing project. Held, trial court erred in finding that it was required to enter maximum sentence under general recidivist sentencing statute, OCGA § 17-10-7(a). “OCGA § 16-13-32.5(c)(2) contains a separate provision setting forth the mandatory range of punishment for ‘a second or subsequent conviction under OCGA § 16-13-32.5(b). Thus, while the legislature directed that a second offender must be sentenced under subsection (c)(2), it also vested the sentencing court with discretion in determining the length of the sentence within the specified statutory range.” Later-enacted specific provision prevails over general recidivist provision. Citing Jenkins v. State , 265 Ga. 539, 458 S.E.2d 477 (1995). 2. NOTICE Ross v. State, 313 Ga.App. 695, 722 S.E.2d 411 (January 26, 2012). Convictions for sale of cocaine and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failure to object to State’s notice of intent to seek recidivist sentencing, given to defense counsel “on the first day of trial before the jury was picked.” OCGA § 17–16–4(a)(5) calls for such notice to be given “no later than ten days prior to trial, or at such time as the court orders but in no event later than the beginning of the trial. ” “‘The important requirement is that the defendant be given an unmistakable advance warning that the prior convictions will be used against him at sentencing so that he will have enough time to rebut or explain any conviction record.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Evans v. State, 290 Ga.App. 746, 748(2) (660 S.E.2d 841) (2008). Given that trial counsel was aware of Ross' criminal record, that he received the state's notice prior to the start of the trial, that he was not surprised by its contents, and that Ross has made no showing that his prior convictions could have been rebutted or explained had counsel raised an objection to the timeliness of that notice, we find no ineffective assistance of counsel. See generally Gonzales v. State, 286 Ga.App. 821, 828(3)(d) (650 S.E.2d 401) (2007).” Moore v. State, 304 Ga.App. 198, 695 S.E.2d 717 (May 26, 2010). Defendant’s recidivist sentence remanded for reconsideration of whether “Moore received an unmistakable advance warning that his prior convictions would be used to enhance his sentencing, thereby giving him enough time to rebut or explain his conviction record.” “‘[T]he defendant [must] be given an unmistakable advance warning that the prior convictions will be used against him at sentencing so that he will have enough time to rebut or explain any conviction record.’ (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Evans [ v. State, 290 Ga.App. 746, 748(2) (660 S.E.2d 841) (2008)]. We have held that the state's notice of its intent to use prior convictions ‘must be clear and not cloudy.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mullinax v. State, 242 Ga.App. 561,