☢ test - Í

563(2) (530 S.E.2d 255) (2000). See also Hightower [ v. State, 210 Ga.App. 216 (436 S.E.2d 31) (1993)].’” Shindorf v. State, 303 Ga.App. 553, 694 S.E.2d 177 (April 7, 2010). Service of recidivist sentencing notice four days before trial was sufficient. “Shindorf contends that, because he had opted into reciprocal discovery, the state was required to serve him with the notice of intent ten days before trial. According to OCGA § 17-16-4(a)(5), however, the trial court may permit the state to provide notice to the defendant at any time prior to trial. Specifically, the Code section reads: ‘[t]he prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or at such time as the court orders but in no event later than the beginning of the trial, provide the defendant with notice of any evidence in aggravation of punishment that the state intends to introduce in sentencing.’ In the case at bar, the trial court found as a fact that notice was given on Thursday before trial started. As the state provided the notice four days before trial, it was timely. See McClam v. State, 291 Ga.App. 697, 698(1), 662 S.E.2d 790 (2008).” Daniels v. State, 296 Ga.App. 795, 676 S.E.2d 13 (March 20, 2009). Recidivist notice, served prior to swearing jury, was timely. Accord, Howard v. State , 297 Ga.App. 316, 677 S.E.2d 375 (April 3, 2009); Shindorf (April 7, 2010), above; Ross (January 26, 2012), above; Taylor v. State , 327 Ga.App. 882, 761 S.E.2d 426 (July 7, 2014) (recidivist notice, served on second day of trial but before jury sworn, was timely). Ivey v. State, 278 Ga.App. 463, 629 S.E.2d 127 (March 24, 2006). “[P]re-trial notice of intent to use a prior conviction was sufficient even though a certified copy of the conviction was not tendered until the sentencing hearing,” citing Day v. State , 188 Ga.App. 648, 650-651(8), 374 S.E.2d 87 (1988). Webb v. State, 270 Ga.App. 817, 608 S.E.2d 241 (November 16, 2004). Trial court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to recognize state’s notice of intent to seek life sentence, given after jury selection and with a letter directly demanding that defendant “withdraw his desire to go to a jury trial or face a life sentence,” offering not to present his prior convictions if defendant pled guilty. “The court concluded that sentencing Webb to life imprisonment would be improper, given the State’s actions, stating that ‘sentencing prerogatives’ would be placed ‘in the State’s power when it decided whether it was going to choose to advance a life sentence without parole or not by serving notice. I don’t believe the State can do what the Court itself cannot do. That is punish a man for going to jury trial. But by your letter, after the selection of the jury, it appears clear that that is what he is being punished for on his desire to go to jury trial.’” “A trial court cannot impose an excessive sentence simply because a defendant has chosen to exercise his or her constitutional right to a jury trial. Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.6(B); Johnson v. State, 224 Ga.App. 568, 570(2) (481 S.E.2d 268) (1997). And of course, the State cannot accomplish what the trial court itself cannot accomplish. But here, given the timing of its notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment and its letter to Webb's counsel, it appears that the State may have attempted to circumscribe the sentencing ability of the court. Recognizing this, the court properly exercised its discretion to set aside the State's untimely – and unfair – notice. Because the record effectively contains no notice of intent to seek life imprisonment, a sentence of life imprisonment was not authorized under OCGA § 16-6-4(b).” Does not directly hold that notice given after jury selection is untimely. Note that recidivist sentencing under this code section, OCGA § 16-6- 4(b), requires prior notice of intent to seek life sentence; absent such notice, maximum sentence is 30 years. Young v. State, 245 Ga.App. 684, 538 S.E.2d 760 (August 28, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions, and recidivist sentence, affirmed. State’s notice of intent to seek recidivist sentencing was adequate. “The disclosure certificate includes Young's GCIC criminal history, including convictions for armed robbery, and states that all convictions will be used in aggravation of punishment pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-2. Young knew at the time of trial that he would receive life without parole if found guilty of the charges as his counsel explained this to him during the discussion of the plea offer. In evaluating the sufficiency of notice this court places substance over form: ‘[T]he important requirement was that the defendant be given an unmistakable advance warning that the prior convictions will be used against him at sentencing so that he will have enough time to rebut or explain any conviction record.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Freeman, 198 Ga.App. 553, 556(3), 402 S.E.2d 529 (1991).” Davis v. State, 244 Ga.App. 715, 536 S.E.2d 603 (June 29, 2000). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; recidivist sentencing notice provided “the day before his trial began” was adequate. “‘This Court has previously held that notice received prior to the jury's being sworn is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the statute.’ Jenkins v. State, 235 Ga.App. 547, 549(3)(a), 510 S.E.2d 87 (1998) (notice given 80 minutes before start of trial sufficient).” Mullinax v. State, 242 Ga.App. 561, 530 S.E.2d 255 (March 1, 2000). Theft by receiving conviction affirmed; oral notice of intent to use prior convictions in aggravation of sentence was adequate. “Mullinax argues this indicates that the