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State must provide written notice. But we have held specifically that the statute does not require written notice; all that is required is ‘clear notice.’ Graham v. State, 171 Ga.App. 242, 256(17), 319 S.E.2d 484 (1984). Although written notice is preferable, it is not required as long as the notice is clear. Moss v. State, 206 Ga.App. 310, 312(5), 425 S.E.2d 386 (1992). Given Mullinax's acknowledgment in open court that the prosecution had disclosed his prior record and discussed with defense counsel ‘where he fell in the tier of a recidivist statute,’ we conclude that he received adequate and clear notice, as required by OCGA § 17–10–2.” Moton v. State, 242 Ga.App. 397, 530 S.E.2d 31 (February 16, 2000). Convictions for selling cocaine affirmed; State gave adequate notice of intent to seek recidivist sentencing. “If a life sentence is to be imposed under OCGA § 16-13-30(d), the State must notify the accused of any conviction it intends to use in aggravation of punishment pursuant to OCGA § 17-10- 2, and a notice of intent to present similar transaction evidence, standing alone, does not fulfill the State's obligation to give notice of intent to use a prior conviction in aggravation of punishment. Armstrong v. State, 264 Ga. 237, 238(1), (2), 442 S.E.2d 759 (1994). Count 3 of the indictment is clearly captioned as a ‘RECIDIVIST COUNT,’ and expressly mentions defendant's 1990 conviction in Ben Hill Superior Court for the sale of cocaine. The State also notified defendant of its intent to use his prior conviction for the sale of cocaine ‘in aggravation of punishment’ through its response to reciprocal criminal discovery. Thus, the fact that notice was given appears clear and not cloudy in this case. Woods v. State, 224 Ga.App. 52, 57-58(10), 479 S.E.2d 414 (1996); Moss v. State, 206 Ga.App. 310, 312(5), 425 S.E.2d 386 (1992). Compare Gates v. State, 229 Ga. 796, 797(4), 194 S.E.2d 412 (1972).” Burruss v. State, 242 Ga.App. 241, 529 S.E.2d 375 (February 3, 2000). After defendant’s guilty plea to obtaining a controlled substance by fraud, trial court properly sentenced him as a recidivist pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7, despite “want of notice of the State attorney's intent to prosecute him as such under OCGA § 17-10-2(a). OCGA § 17-10-2(a) is not applicable to sentences imposed pursuant to a hearing on a guilty plea. Powell v. State, 229 Ga.App. 52(1), 494 S.E.2d 200 (1997).” Smith v. State, 241 Ga.App. 770, 527 S.E.2d 608 (January 10, 2000). Upon defendant’s conviction for armed robbery and related offenses, trial court properly sentenced him to life without parole as a serious violent felon pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7(b)(2) based on prior convictions in Florida. “Citing Peterson v. State, [212 Ga.App. 147, 441 S.E.2d 481 (1994)], and Taylor v. State, [186 Ga.App. 113, 114(3), 366 S.E.2d 422 (1988)], defendant argues that his Florida convictions cannot be considered in aggravation of punishment. These cases hold that prior out-of-state convictions cannot be considered in aggravation of punishment under OCGA § 16-13-30(d). In the case sub judice, defendant was sentenced under OCGA § 17-10-7, which contemplates consideration of prior out-of-state convictions in aggravation of punishment .” 3. PRIOR CONVICTIONS, ADMISSIBILITY AS EVIDENCE See subheading AGGRAVATED SENTENCE – PRIOR CONVICTIONS, above WW. RESENTENCING See also subheadings MODIFICATION and CORRECTION, above 1. GENERALLY Smarr v. State, 317 Ga.App. 584, 732 S.E.2d 110 (September 6, 2012). Convictions for burglary and attempted burglary affirmed, but sentence vacated; trial court improperly enhanced defendant’s sentence after he had begun serving it. “The trial court's original order sentenced Smarr to a thirty-year sentence—ten years to be served in incarceration and the remaining twenty years to be served on probation—and on its face indicated that Smarr was being sentenced ‘as a repeat[ ] offender under OCGA § 17–10–7(c).’ [fn] Smarr subsequently filed a motion for correction of sentence in which he requested that the trial court omit the reference to OCGA § 17–10–7(c) on the basis that, at the time that Smarr had committed the acts at issue in this case, he was not a fourth offender, but had at most two prior felony convictions. [fn] At the hearing on Smarr's motion, counsel emphasized that he was ‘not seeking anything regarding the equities of the sentence’ or ‘seeking any other sentence modification’ at that time, but requesting only that the trial court remove the reference to OCGA § 17–10–7(c). The trial court then issued a new sentencing order deleting the reference to OCGA § 17–10–7(c) but, in so doing, increased the incarceration component of Smarr's sentence from ten years to fifteen years, such that his new sentence was thirty years, fifteen years to serve in incarceration and the remaining fifteen years to be served on probation. … Nothing in the burglary statute authorizes the manner of resentencing imposed by the trial court in this case. [fn] And we reject the State's contention that by requesting that the trial court omit the improper reference to OCGA § 17–10–7(c) on the face of the sentencing order, ‘he was seeking modification of his sentence ... [and] cannot claim that he had a reasonable expectation that his sentence was final.’ This is particularly true when counsel emphasized on more than one occasion during the hearing on his motion that Smarr was neither challenging the equity of nor seeking