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any modification of the sentence itself.” Boyd v. State, 291 Ga.App. 528, 662 S.E.2d 295 (May 14, 2008). Defendant was sentenced consecutively for kidnapping with bodily injury and possession of a knife during commission of a crime, but on habeas his conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury was reversed and returned to the trial court for resentencing as kidnapping (not with bodily injury). Defendant now contends that the trial court erred on resentencing by making the knife possession sentence consecutive. “Relying on Jackson v. Jones, 254 Ga. 127, 128(1) (327 S.E.2d 206) (1985), Brown argues that the time he served under the invalidated life sentence should have been credited toward his five-year sentence so that the five-year sentence would be held to have commenced when the life sentence commenced. Jackson set forth the rule that ‘ where consecutive sentences for separate offenses are imposed at the same time, and where the underlying conviction for which the earlier sentence was imposed is reversed or set aside, the time the defendant served under the invalidated sentence will be credited toward the latter sentence so that the latter sentence will be held to have commenced at the date of commencement of the earlier, invalid sentence.’ Id.(citations omitted). Here, although consecutive sentences for separate offenses were imposed at the same time and the earlier kidnapping sentence was invalidated, the kidnapping conviction was upheld and Brown was resentenced. In that situation, the latter sentence will not begin to run until termination of the resentence. Id. at 129.” Henry v. State, 291 Ga.App. 482, 662 S.E.2d 260 (May 12, 2008). Defendant was originally convicted on vehicular homicide (Count One) and two counts of hit-and-run (Counts Two and Three). Count Two was merged for sentencing. On original appeal, the vehicular homicide conviction was reversed and remanded for resentencing on Count Two. On remand, trial court resentenced on both Counts Two and Three, changing the Count Three sentence from probation to incarceration. Held, trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence on Count Three. “‘[D]irection given by this Court to the trial court determines the appropriate procedure upon remand, and this Court directed only that the trial court [sentence Henry as to Count Two]. We did not direct the trial court to [resentence as to Count 3], and the trial court was not authorized to do so. Marsh v. Way, 255 Ga. 284, 285(2) (336 S.E.2d 795) (1985).’ Esenyie v. Udofia, 236 Ga.App. 155, 156(1) (511 S.E.2d 260) (1999).” Widner v. State, 280 Ga. 675, 631 S.E.2d 675 (June 26, 2006). Fact that sentence for defendant’s offense (aggravated child molestation based on sodomy between two teenagers) was reduced by the legislature after defendant’s trial did not entitle defendant to a reduction in sentence. “Because this revision did not become effective until after Widner was sentenced … it cannot be applied to his case. ‘It has long been the law in this State that, in general, a crime is to be construed and punished according to the provisions of the law existing at the time of its commission.’ Fleming v. State, 271 Ga. 587, 590 (523 S.E.2d 315) (1999). ‘[M]aking [a] lesser penalty applicable to offenses committed prior to the enactment of the legislation [creating the lesser penalty] is contrary to the judicial interpretation of the laws of this State under which the penalty for a criminal offense relates only to those offenses committed when and after such legislation becomes effective.’ Barton v. State, 81 Ga.App. 810, 814(3) (60 S.E.2d 173) (1950).” Diaz v. State, 279 Ga.App. 134, 630 S.E.2d 618 (April 27, 2006). When sentence on aggravated child molesting was declared void for failing to impose minimum sentence, consecutive sentence on separate count of rape was not affected. “[T]he trial court imposed a separate and distinct sentence for each of the two counts of the indictment, aggravated child molestation and rape, with the sentences to run consecutively. The trial court’s order vacating the probated sentence for aggravated child molestation specifically stated that the order did not affect the rape sentence. Diaz has not shown any basis for finding the 20 year sentence for rape was illegal or void.” Compare “ Crews v. State, 142 Ga.App. 319, 322(8) (235 S.E.2d 756) (1977) (trial court sentenced defendant in the aggregate on multiple counts; when defendant’s conviction on one count was reversed on appeal, resentencing was required on the remaining counts).” Williams v. State, 273 Ga.App. 42, 614 S.E.2d 146 (April 19, 2005). “Williams was sentenced to fifteen years with twelve to serve. After he began serving this sentence, Williams filed a motion to modify the sentence, arguing that it was too harsh. The court granted the motion in part, resentencing Williams to twenty years with nine to serve.” Held, trial court improperly increased defendant’s sentence. “The Georgia Supreme Court has held that once a defendant begins serving his sentence, that sentence can only be increased through resentencing where ‘(a) such resentencing is allowed by law, and (b) the defendant has no reasonable expectation in the finality of the original sentence.’ Wilford v. State, 278 Ga. 718, 720 (606 S.E.2d 252) (2004). Absent these circumstances, the resentencing constitutes a double punishment that runs afoul of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy. See id .” Accord, Strickland v. State , 301 Ga.App. 272, 687 S.E.2d 221 (November 20, 2009). After remand: Williams v. State , 277 Ga.App. 841, 627 S.E.2d 808 (February 10, 2006). On remand, trial court reinstated original sentence. Defendant appeals again, contending that the original sentence