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respond.” Quoting OCGA § 17-14-7: “The burden of demonstrating the financial resources of the offender or person being ordered to pay restitution and the financial needs of his or her dependents shall be on the offender or person being ordered to pay restitution.” Miller dissents: “OCGA § 17-14-7(b) mandates that if the parties have not agreed on the amount of restitution prior to sentencing, the ‘ordering authority shall set a date for a hearing to determine restitution.’ See also McCart [ v. State, 289 Ga.App. 830, 832(1) (658 S.E.2d 465) (2008)]. In this case, the trial court did not set a date for a restitution hearing but rather proceeded to address the issue of restitution immediately after accepting Wimpey's guilty plea and entertaining the parties' joint sentencing recommendation.” Dissent would find that defendant did not “have a meaningful opportunity to present evidence regarding her financial obligations.” Accord, Tobias v. State , 319 Ga.App. 320, 735 S.E.2d 113 (November 30, 2012) (defendant failed to show she couldn’t pay restitution). Tindol v. State, 284 Ga.App. 45, 643 S.E.2d 329 (March 7, 2007). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant could pay restitution. “Pursuant to OCGA § 17-14-10(a), ‘ In determining the nature and amount of restitution, the ordering authority shall consider: (1) The financial resources and other assets of the offender or person ordered to pay restitution including whether any of the assets are jointly controlled; (2) The earnings and other income of the offender or person ordered to pay restitution; (3) Any financial obligations of the offender or person ordered to pay restitution, including obligations to dependents; (4) The amount of damages; (5) The goal of restitution to the victim and the goal of rehabilitation of the offender; (6) Any restitution previously made; (7) The period of time during which the restitution order will be in effect; and (8) Other factors which the ordering authority deems to be appropriate.’ Here, Tindol received a restitution hearing, the trial court considered all of the required factors, and the court made findings based on the evidence presented. ‘[I]t is well established that review of evidence by this Court is limited to questions of sufficiency.’ Anderson v. State, 226 Ga.App. 286, 288 (486 S.E.2d 410) (1997). The evidence showed that Tindol currently makes approximately $500 a month working through a temporary job service as a day laborer; however, before his arrest he made $1,400 a month at BMC. While, Tindol testified about his monthly expenses, including his rent, food, utilities, and child support, he did not bring check stubs or income tax returns showing how much he had earned in the previous years. The trial court found that based on the evidence presented at the hearing, ‘[Tindol] is making at least six thousand dollars per year. He’s got over six years left on probation. So he’s got the ability ... to pay any restitution found within the evidence presented.’” McMahon v. State, 284 Ga.App. 192, 643 S.E.2d 236 (February 5, 2007). Trial court’s sentence requiring victim restitution upheld despite “uncontradicted” evidence “that he is unable to pay.” “[T]he law provides that the trial court was required to consider a number of factors, including but not limited to the defendant’s financial resources, assets, income, and financial obligations and to make appropriate findings of fact, which the court did. OCGA § 17-14-10. But the law also provides that the judge ‘shall order an offender to make full restitution to any victim.’ OCGA § 17-14-3. This the trial court has now done. We find no law for the proposition that the court must determine in advance that the defendant’s net worth or financial resources projected over the intended years of repayment is mathematically sufficient to allow full payment of the amount of restitution ordered. The evidence shows that McMahon has some income and that he is not required to pay rent. McMahon failed to carry his burden of presenting information about other living expenses. And it was reasonable for the court to conclude that restitution was an appropriate condition of probation in this case. Furthermore, McMahon’s argument that he may be unable to pay the restitution is premature. See Miller v. State, 264 Ga.App. 801, 802(a) (592 S.E.2d 450) (2003) (appellate review of whether defendant is unable to pay restitution not ripe without current harm such as revocation of probation or failure to pay restitution). Should McMahon be unable to pay, the protection of his constitutional rights will be governed by the principles in Bearden v. Georgia , 461 U.S. 660 (103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221) (1983) (before revoking probation for failure to pay restitution, court must determine whether defendant had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist). See also Hunt v. State, 222 Ga.App. 66, 70(3) (473 S.E.2d 157) (1996) (where restitution is a condition of probation, Beardon hearing on ability to pay not required until probation is about to be revoked for failure to pay).” Accord, Nelson v. State , 329 Ga.App. 300, 764 S.E.2d 883 (October 16, 2014) (trial court could disbelieve defendant’s testimony that he was “80 percent disabled” and unable to pay victim restitution.). In re: C.S., 280 Ga.App. 781, 635 S.E.2d 176 (July 11, 2006). Juvenile court’s restitution order vacated and remanded for failure to make written findings regarding the appropriateness of restitution and the juvenile’s ability to pay. “‘Before ordering restitution, a trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether restitution is appropriate and, if so, the amount that should be paid. OCGA § 17-14-10 requires that the trial court consider several factors in making this determination, including the offender’s present financial status, the offender’s probable future earning capacity, the goals of the restitution order, and the amount of damages suffered by the victim. Following the restitution hearing, the court must make written findings of fact relating to each of the factors set forth in OCGA § 17-14-