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10. Failure to make such written findings renders the restitution order deficient. Lummus v. State, 274 Ga.App. 636, 638- 639(3) (618 S.E.2d 692) (2005) (citation and punctuation omitted); OCGA § 17-14-10 (2004); see Garrett v. State, 175 Ga.App. 400, 403(1) (333 S.E.2d 432) (1985) (holding that restitution orders must contain written findings of fact related to the factors in OCGA § 17-14-10); see also Revis v. State, 223 Ga.App. 470(1) (477 S.E.2d 880) (1996). After the June 2005 extension order was entered in this case, OCGA § 17-14-10 was amended to modify and add factors. Ga. L.2005, p. 88; see Register v. State, 279 Ga.App. 61, 630 S.E.2d 593 (April 21, 2006).” Accord, Newton v. State , 281 Ga.App. 549, 636 S.E.2d 728 (September 13, 2006). In re: C.S. and Newton both disapproved “to the extent they require written findings when ordering an offender to make restitution,” McCart v. State , 289 Ga.App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (February 29, 2008). 2. APPORTIONMENT Hettrick v. State, 334 Ga.App. 115, 778 S.E.2d 369 (October 8, 2015). Following theft convictions, trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering co-defendants to pay restitution jointly and severally. “Under OCGA § 17–14–7(c), where a court ordering restitution ‘finds that more than one offender has contributed to the loss of a victim, the court may make each offender liable for payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability among the offenders to reflect the level of contribution to the victim’s loss and economic circumstances of each offender.’ (Emphasis supplied.) The language of this Code section permitted, but did not require, the trial court to apportion liability to reflect James Hettrick’s level of contribution to the victim’s loss. See Turner v. State, 312 Ga.App. 799, 805(3), 720 S.E.2d 264 (2011). James Hettrick argues that our decision in Rice v. State, 226 Ga.App. 770, 487 S.E.2d 517 (1997), requires apportionment, but unlike here, that decision involved a criminal defendant who had been convicted of a different and lesser offense than his co-defendants. Id. at 774(3), 487 S.E.2d 517.” Elsasser v. State, 313 Ga.App. 661, 722 S.E.2d 327 (December 8, 2011). No error in ordering restitution for medical bills as part of sentence for simple battery. “Even if, as Elsasser suggests, others at the scene may have also kicked the victim, that does not negate Elsasser's liability for damages caused by his role in the attack since ‘[t]here can be more than one proximate cause of an injury[.]’ (Citation omitted.) Dorsey [ v. State, 206 Ga.App. 709, 715(8) (426 S.E.2d 224) (1992)]. Indeed, ‘[i]t is clear that the victim would be able to recover the amount of all medical treatment related to [Elsasser's simple battery].’ Crozier v. State, 233 Ga.App. 831, 832(2) (506 S.E.2d 139) (1998).” Turner v. State, 312 Ga.App. 799, 720 S.E.2d 264 (November 22, 2011). Convictions for theft by taking as a fiduciary affirmed; contrary to defendant’s argument, trial court could order her to pay entirety of victim’s damages as restitution, although another person was involved in the scheme. “OCGA § 17–14–7 provides that ‘[i]f the ordering authority finds that more than one offender has contributed to the loss of a victim, the court may make each offender liable for payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability among the offenders to reflect the level of contribution to the victim's loss and economic circumstances of each offender.’ OCGA § 17–14–7(c) (emphasis supplied). Thus, although the trial court was permitted to apportion liability, it was not required to do so.” Co-conspirator was dead at time of sentencing. Accord, Hettrick (October 8, 2015), above. 3. CALCULATION OF AMOUNT – INTANGIBLE PROPERTY DuCom v. State, 288 Ga.App. 555, 654 S.E.2d 670 (November 26, 2007). After convictions for theft by taking and theft of trade secrets, evidence supported award of restitution where business owners testified to lost value of business in excess of amount awarded by court. Hartsell v. State, 288 Ga.App. 552, 654 S.E.2d 662 (November 21, 2007). Trial court’s restitution order was supported by the record. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of theft by conversion for misappropriating certain sums paid to build houses. Amount. “Hartsell argues that the State failed to carry its burden of showing the amount of loss sustained by the victims as a result of the offenses of theft by conversion. Citing OCGA § 16-8-4(a), which requires for a theft-by-conversion conviction that the defendant converted the funds ‘to his own use,’ he claims that at the restitution hearing, the State had to show what portion of the earnest money deposits were used to pay for Hartsell’s personal expenses as opposed to expenses of his corporation. Hartsell’s arguments fail on two fronts. First, he overlooks the impact of his guilty plea. By pleading guilty, he admitted to all the allegations of the two counts ( Wright v. Hall, 281 Ga. 318, 319(1) (638 S.E.2d 270) (2006)), waiving any factual inaccuracies ( Kemp v. Simpson, 278 Ga. 439, 439-440 (603 S.E.2d 267) (2004)) and waiving all defenses other than that the accusation charged no crime ( Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 56(3) (464 S.E.2d 198) (1995)). Here, he pled guilty to Count One, which alleged that he received $16,874 from Victim No. 1 ‘under an agreement to make a specified application of such funds in that the accused was to construct a new house ... and the accused did knowingly convert the funds to the use of the accused in violation of the agreement....’