☢ test - Í

assigning values to vehicles is part of her everyday job duties. … [W]e agree with Browning that the State failed to prove the fair market value of the vehicle. The witness did not participate in the valuation of the vehicle and no evidence was presented concerning the condition of the vehicle at the time it was stolen. Moreover, no evidence was presented that the condition of the vehicle was considered in determining the value of the vehicle, which appeared to be based totally on the vehicle identification number. … Further, no explanation was offered concerning the discrepancy between the NADA value and the amount received for the vehicle at auction. Thus we find that the State failed to carry its burden of properly establishing the value of the vehicle, and that the restitution award cannot stand. In re: C.B., 221 Ga.App. 102(1), 470 S.E.2d 493 (1996) (the fact that the victim received a check from its insurer for a certain amount is insufficient to establish that amount as the value of the property). Cf. Hodges v. State, 201 Ga.App. 729, 731(1), 411 S.E.2d 775 (1991) (restitution upheld when the trial court ordered less than the amount the insured received from his insurer where evidence showed the purchase price of the vehicle, the age of the vehicle at the time it was stolen and the depreciation of the vehicle from the time of purchase to the time it was stolen); Sutton v. State, 190 Ga.App. 56, 57(1), 378 S.E.2d 491 (1989) (insurance company employee testified that the value assigned to the truck was based on the fair market value of a truck of comparable age and condition, using a survey predicated on representative samples, and that the value received at the auction resulted from the ‘forced sale’ nature of the transaction).” McClure v. State, 295 Ga.App. 465, 673 S.E.2d 856 (January 7, 2009). Following guilty plea to theft, trial court properly based victim restitution on stolen property’s lost fair market value, not value received in sale by defendant. Victim here testified to fair market value of finished wire harnesses and copper wire stolen by defendant, which trial court used to assess restitution at $6,470. Defendant contends that she only received $198.50 for the copper, but “[i]t is the fair market value of the copper when the McClures stole it, not when they presented it for sale … that is the proper subject of the restitution order.” In re: E.W., 290 Ga.App. 95, 658 S.E.2d 854 (March 6, 2008). Following delinquency adjudication, o rder for victim restitution reversed and remanded; amount awarded was based only on incompetent hearsay evidence from victim as to cost of repair of damaged car, told to him by an unknown mechanic. “‘The amount of restitution ordered may be equal to or less than, but not more than, the victim's damages.’(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Cardwell v. State, 225 Ga.App. 337, 338, 484 S.E.2d 38 (1997). ‘Fair market value is the measure of such damages and it must be determined exactly.’ (Citation omitted.) Id. The victim may prove damages by establishing the fair market value of an item before and after it was damaged, as long as the victim’s testimony is fact-based rather than mere conjecture. In re: R.V., 283 Ga.App. 355, 356(2), 641 S.E.2d 591 (2007), overruled on other grounds, McCart v. State , 289 Ga.App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (February 29, 2008); Gray v. State, 273 Ga.App. 747, 749-750(2), 615 S.E.2d 834 (2005). Further, evidence of the cost to repair an item might be sufficient to establish the amount of damages. In re: A.F., 236 Ga.App. 60(1), 510 S.E.2d 910 (1999) (a lay witness may give his opinion as to the value of the damage as long as he states the facts on which he bases his opinion or otherwise demonstrates that he had the opportunity to form a correct opinion). Even if the State establishes the fair market value of the property at issue, however, restitution ‘is not synonymous with civil damages. The amount of the victim’s damages is only one factor for a court to consider in determining the amount of restitution. The [trial] court must also consider the offender’s present financial condition and future earning capacity, as well as the goal of rehabilitation to the offender.’(Citations omitted.) Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 859, 860(1), 413 S.E.2d 439 (1992). See OCGA § 17-14-10. In this case, the State presented no evidence of the fair market value of the car before and after the damage occurred. Further, the only witness to testify at the restitution hearing was the victim, who testified that he had gotten a repair quote from an unidentified person and that this person had told him that it would cost ‘about [$]410’ to repair the damage to the car. This testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. Cardwell v. State, 225 Ga.App. at 338, 484 S.E.2d 38.Consequently, under these circumstances, the evidence was insufficient to support the restitution order, and a new restitution hearing is required. Gray v. State, 273 Ga.App. at 751(2), 615 S.E.2d 834 (‘where we have found the restitution evidence insufficient to sustain the award, we have consistently remanded the case for a new restitution hearing’) (citations and footnotes omitted).” Accord, Johnson (March 2, 2012), above. Register v. State, 279 Ga.App. 61, 630 S.E.2d 593 (April 21, 2006). Trial court erred in ordering victim restitution for more than $500.00 property damage where defendant entered guilty plea to misdemeanor criminal trespass (damage to property less than $500.00). “[I]n the absence of any agreement on the damage to the truck, the $500 limit set forth in OCGA § 16-7-21(a) was the maximum amount that the trial court could order Register to pay as restitution for damage to the truck. [footnote: We rule only that restitution for damage to the victim’s property which was the subject of the criminal trespass was limited under the present facts to a maximum of $500. We do not limit a trial court’s authority to find under similar circumstances that a victim incurred other damages for which a defendant could be ordered to pay additional restitution. See OCGA § 17-14-2(2). Furthermore, this ruling does not limit the ability of the parties to agree on