☢ test - Í

the amount or type of restitution prior to sentencing. See OCGA § 17-14-7(b).] See Barnes v. State, 239 Ga.App. 495, 497 (521 S.E.2d 425) (1999) (recognizing the trial court’s reduction of restitution awards to $500 or less in a criminal trespass case based on the provisions of OCGA § 16-7-21(a)); Rice v. State, 226 Ga.App. 770, 774 (487 S.E.2d 517) (1997) (limiting restitution award based on the elements of the criminal offense).” Disapproved “to the extent [it requires] written findings when ordering an offender to make restitution,” McCart v. State , 289 Ga.App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (February 29, 2008). Fewox v. State , 243 Ga.App. 651, 534 S.E.2d 121 (April 18, 2000). In defendant’s prosecution for burglary, restitution order reversed and remanded. “‘Determination of the amount of damages must be based upon fair market value, which must be determined exactly. Lovell v. State, 189 Ga.App. 311, 313(3), 375 S.E.2d 658 (1988) (evidence insufficient when amount of restitution determined by approximation). The correct determination for the amount of restitution is the fair market value of the property rather than the replacement cost. See Sutton v. State, 190 Ga.App. 56, 57(1), 378 S.E.2d 491 (1989) (value assigned to the property for which restitution ordered based upon a consideration of the fair market value of a truck of comparable age and condition). See also Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga.App. 328, 333-334(2), 147 S.E.2d 782 (1966) (testimony regarding cost price must be coupled with evidence showing condition of item both at time of purchase and at time of loss).’ Gaskin v. State, 221 Ga.App. 142, 145(3)(b), 470 S.E.2d 531 (1996); Cardwell v. State, 225 Ga.App. 337, 484 S.E.2d 38 (1997). At the restitution hearing in this case, the State called the [victims] Tomlinsons to testify regarding the property that had been taken from their home and the value of that property. During their examination, the Tomlinsons stated that the values which they were giving represented the replacement cost for the stolen property …. Therefore, … the order of restitution was improperly based on replacement cost for the property. Gaskin, supra. As such, we must vacate the order of restitution and remand the case for further hearings to determine the fair market value of the stolen property. Id.” Accord, Jackson v. State , 250 Ga.App. 617, 552 S.E.2d 546 (July 16, 2001). Barnes v. State, 239 Ga.App. 495, 521 S.E.2d 425 (July 30, 1999). 1. Evidence supported court’s award of victim restitution for property damage; estimates of cost of repair of personal property were properly admitted to support victim’s opinion of value of damage. “In Maddox v. State, 157 Ga.App. 696, 697, 278 S.E.2d 480 (1981), this Court held that ‘[t]he question of value is a matter of opinion, and as to questions of opinion, the witness may swear to his opinion or belief, giving his reasons therefor. One need not be an expert or dealer in the article, but may testify as to value if he has had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion. The owner of property is considered to be qualified to state his opinion as to value. Opinion evidence as to the value of an item, in order to have probative value, must be based upon a foundation that the witness has some knowledge, experience or familiarity with the value of the property or similar property and he must give reasons for the value assessed and also must have had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion.... The victim in this case proved her knowledge and familiarity with the items, and gave reasons for the value she assessed as to each item. It is not objectionable that her opinion as to value might, in some cases, be based on hearsay. Moreover, she did not purport to represent such hearsay as truth or fact, but used it to show the foundation or basis for her opinion. ...’ (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) See also OCGA §§ 24- 9-65; 24-9-66; Vitello v. Stott, 222 Ga.App. 134, 136, 473 S.E.2d 504 (1996); Loggins v. Mitchell, 201 Ga.App. 358, 359(1), 411 S.E.2d 98 (1991); Dixon v. Williams, 177 Ga.App. 702, 704, 340 S.E.2d 286 (1986); B & L Svc. Co. v. Gerson, 167 Ga.App. 679, 681, 307 S.E.2d 262 (1983) (valuations may be based in whole or in part on hearsay, and this would go to its weight, not admissibility); Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga.App. 328, 331-332(1), 147 S.E.2d 782 (1966) (value is necessarily a matter of opinion, and such opinion is admissible as long as the witness provides the foundation underlying such opinion). … The State admitted the written estimates in order to establish part of the basis of McCrary's opinion as to such costs, not as evidence going to the truth of the matter asserted. See OCGA § 24-3-1(a); Hurston v. State, 194 Ga.App. 226, 390 S.E.2d 119 (1990).” Distinguishing In re: A.F., 236 Ga.App. 60(1), 510 S.E.2d 910 (1999) (estimate were tendered as proof of cost and not to support owner’s opinion); Galimore (May 22, 2013), above. . 2. Testimony of actual cost paid to repair an item is not hearsay. 3. “‘[T]he sufficiency of evidence to support an order of restitution should be measured by the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence. [Cit.]’ Lawrenz v. State, 194 Ga.App. 724, 725(1), 391 S.E.2d 703 (1990).” 5. CALCULATION OF AMOUNT – REAL PROPERTY Wilson v. State, 317 Ga.App. 171, 730 S.E.2d 500 (July 12, 2012). Conviction for making false statement affirmed; award of restitution was proper. Defendant here is building contractor who made false statements on application for building permit, minimizing amount of work to be done on house remodel project; as a result of the false statements, no county oversight occurred, which would have prevented the damage to the house caused by defendant’s work. Measure of restitution. Trial court properly awarded restitution representing the entire amount paid to contractor and the down payment on the house. “Here, the Aarons essentially suffered the entire loss of use of their home, and the trial court