☢ test - Í

determined that these damages flowed from Wilson's false statement …. Considering the testimony from the trial and from the sentencing hearing, we conclude that the trial court's award of $350,000 was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” Overby v. State, 315 Ga.App. 735, 728 S.E.2d 278 (May 2, 2012). Upon guilty plea to arson, award of victim restitution reversed and remanded; where only damage was to the building, not the land, the proper measure of damages was the cost of repair, not the diminution in value of the whole. “Here, the victim claimed only that her house was damaged, not that the house and lot were damaged. It is well established that the ‘[c]ost of repairs is the appropriate measure of damages if the injury is to the building alone,’ [fn: Oglethorpe Realty Co. v. Hazzard, 172 Ga.App. 98, 99(4) (321 S.E.2d 820) (1984); see Johnson v. State, 314 Ga.App. 560, 724 S.E.2d 859 (March 2, 2012) (in burglary case, restitution for damage to home to be measured by cost to repair the house); City of Atlanta v. Atlantic Realty Co., 205 Ga.App. 1, 4(5) (421 S.E.2d 113) (1992) (‘The measure of damages for injury to a building is the cost of restoring the building to its original condition.’); see also Graves v. Diambrose, 243 Ga.App. 802, 803(1) (534 S.E.2d 490) (2000); Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Helton, 215 Ga. Ap. 435, 437(5) (451 S.E.2d 76) (1994) (physical precedent only); Holland Furnace Co. v. Willis, 120 Ga.App. 733, 738(5) (172 S.E.2d 149) (1969); Morrow v. Johnston, 85 Ga.App. 261, 265(4) (68 S.E.2d 906) (1952); Edelson v. Hendon, 77 Ga.App. 395, 395–96(1) (48 S.E.2d 705) (1948); City of Macon v. Hawes, 27 Ga.App. 379, 380 (108 S.E. 479) (1921). Cf. Burke County v. Renfroe, 64 Ga.App. 395, 395(3) (13 S.E.2d 194) (1941) (applying rule in context of damage to building for public purpose). ] which is a rule that dates back to an 1887 opinion by our Supreme Court. See Harrison v. Kiser, 79 Ga. 588, 595(8) (4 S.E. 320) (1887) (holding, when plaintiff's house was damaged and not the land, that if the plaintiff ‘was entitled to recover any damages[,] he would be entitled to recover whatever sum it would take to put the house in the condition in which it was before it was injured’); see also Empire Mills Co. v. Burrell Eng'g & Constr. Co., 18 Ga.App. 253, 256–57(2) (89 S.E. 530) (1916) (acknowledging the holding in Harrison v. Kiser and concluding that the proper measure of damages was the cost to repair when ‘damages [were] sought for the destruction of the building itself, and not for an injury to the freehold by reason of the destruction of the building’). And the application of this rule contrasts with situations in which injury is alleged to both a building and the property on which it stands. In such cases, ‘[t]he correct measure of damages for injury to realty is the difference in the value of the property before and after the injury.’ Oglethorpe Realty Co., 172 Ga.App. at 99(4); see also Bellsouth Telecomm. Inc., 215 Ga.App. at 437(5) (physical precedent only); Morrow, 85 Ga.App. at 266(4); Empire Mills Co., 18 Ga.App. at 256; Davis v. Hopkins, 50 Ga.App. 654, 655–56(1) (179 SE 213) (1935).” Johnson v. State, 314 Ga.App. 560, 724 S.E.2d 859 (March 2, 2012). Burglary and related convictions affirmed, but victim restitution not supported by evidence. Restitution here was “for the value of stolen personal property and damage to the house. … The measure of damages is the fair market value of the stolen personal property and the cost of repairs to the house. In re: E.W., 290 Ga.App. 95, 97–98 (658 S.E.2d 854) (2008). As to the stolen personal property, the State failed to produce evidence of fair market value at the restitution hearing; instead showing what the victim paid for the property when it was new or what the victim would have to pay for new replacement property. Hawthorne v. State, 285 Ga.App. 196, 197 (648 S.E.2d 387) (2007). As to the cost of repairing the house, the State produced only inadmissible hearsay — testimony from the victim as to repair estimates she received from third parties not available to be cross- examined. Id. Accordingly, the order of restitution to the victim in the amount of $5,000.00 is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new hearing on restitution.” Coile v. State, 311 Ga.App. 537, 716 S.E.2d 527 (August 4, 2011). In defendant’s theft prosecution, evidence supported court’s award of restitution. “Because the amount of restitution to be paid is based upon the victim's civil damages, the sufficiency of evidence to support an order of restitution is measured by the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence. Lawrenz v. State, 194 Ga.App. 724, 725(1) (391 S.E.2d 703) (1990).” Restitution here was for damage to building caused while attempting to steal copper wiring; trial court could discount defendant’s claim that someone else damaged the building before defendant’s theft attempt. Mayfield v. State, 307 Ga.App. 630, 705 S.E.2d 717 (January 26, 2011). Order for restitution as part of arson sentence affirmed; evidence supported award. Owner testified that he was a real estate investor who also had experience as a contractor, and testified to his own estimate of the costs to repair the fire damage caused by defendant. Contrary to defendant’s argument, evidence of the value of the home before and after the damage was not required. “The cases cited by Mayfield are distinguishable because they involve personalty. See, e.g., In re: E.W., 290 Ga.App. 95, 658 S.E.2d 854 (2008) (automobile); Cardwell v. State, 225 Ga.App. 337, 338, 484 S.E.2d 38 (1997) (automobile and CD player) (‘[f]air market value is the measure of such damages and it must be determined exactly.’); Lomax v. State, 200 Ga.App. 233, 407 S.E.2d 462 (1991) (automobile). Moreover, neither Cardwell nor the other cited cases can be read to