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limit the type of damages available in all restitution cases. As has been previously stated regarding Cardwell, ‘[T]o hold that such measure is appropriate in all restitution cases would be to ignore the statutory scheme established and the myriad measure of damages possible, depending upon the acts of the offender, how the property was disposed, any recovery, the condition of property recovered, and the type of property involved.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Barnes v. State, 239 Ga.App. 495, 500(2) n. 4, 521 S.E.2d 425 (1999).[fn] In short, sufficient evidence was presented to show the cost of repairs and that repairs were not an absurd undertaking under the circumstance.” Hawthorne v. State, 285 Ga.App. 196, 648 S.E.2d 387 (April 27, 2007). Sufficient evidence supported finding that restitution was appropriate, but insufficient evidence supported finding of amount of restitution for property damage to sawmill. As to appropriateness: “‘ The sufficiency of evidence to support an order of restitution is measured by the preponderance of the evidence. Evans v. State, 204 Ga.App. 458 (419 S.E.2d 532) (1992); Lawrenz v. State, 194 Ga.App. 724, 725(1) (391 S.E.2d 703) (1990).’ Crozier v. State, 233 Ga.App. 831(1) (506 S.E.2d 139) (1998).” As to amount: “‘Determination of the amount of damages must be based upon fair market value, which must be determined exactly. Lovell v. State [, 189 Ga.App. 311, 313(3) (375 S.E.2d 658) (1988) (evidence insufficient when amount of restitution determined by approximation). The correct determination for the amount of restitution is the fair market value of the property rather than the replacement cost. See Sutton v. State [, 190 Ga.App. 56, 57(1) (378 S.E.2d 491) (1989) (value assigned to the property for which restitution ordered based upon a consideration of the fair market value of a truck of comparable age and condition). See also Hoard v. Wiley [, 113 Ga.App. 328, 333-334(2) (147 S.E.2d 782) (1966)] (testimony regarding cost price must be coupled with evidence showing condition of item both at time of purchase and at time of loss). Gaskin v. State [, 221 Ga.App. 142, 145(3)(b) (470 S.E.2d 531) (1996)]; Cardwell v. State [, 225 Ga.App. 337 (484 S.E.2d 38) (1997)].’ Jackson v. State, 250 Ga.App. 617, 618 (552 S.E.2d 546) (2001). … Since the State’s evidence as to the amount of damages was limited to the cost of replacement, such evidence was speculative and insufficient to sustain the award for no consideration of the fair market value of a sawmill of comparable age and condition in addition to the cost of replacing the stolen wire. Id. at 751. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s restitution order and remand the case for a new hearing on restitution.” Accord, Coile (August 4, 2011) (amount of restitution is based on victim’s civil damages, by preponderance of evidence). 6. CAUSATION Nelson v. State, 329 Ga.App. 300, 764 S.E.2d 883 (October 16, 2014). Following RICO plea, trial court’s award of victim restitution was proper. Where defendant pled guilty to RICO count incorporating other counts, trial court could order restitution paid to victim named in nolle prossed counts. Wilder v. State, 314 Ga.App. 905, 726 S.E.2d 154 (March 19, 2012). Following forgery conviction, restitution award vacated and remanded. Defendant was charged with forgery of a car title and alteration of an odometer; he was allowed to plead guilty to forgery, with the odometer tampering charge being dismissed. On sentencing, the trial court ordered victim restitution representing the purchase price and repair costs of the car. Defendant contends that the restitution relates to the odometer tampering which was nolle prossed, not the forgery. “Pursuant to OCGA § 17–14–2(2), damages recoverable through an order of restitution are ‘all damages which a victim could recover against an offender in a civil action based on the same act or acts for which the offender is sentenced.... The statute does not require that the damage be a direct result of the crime committed, but only that it be based on the same act or acts.’ (Punctuation and citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Burke v. State, 201 Ga.App. 50(1) (410 S.E.2d 164) (1991). Moreover, ‘a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution for a count on which he was acquitted or not charged.’ McMahon v. State, 284 Ga.App. 192, 195(3) (643 S.E.2d 236) (2007). ‘Although the trial court was thorough in making written findings as to the calculation of the restitution award, it is nevertheless difficult to ascertain whether the court improperly included amounts based on’ the nolle prossed charges in light of the trial court's emphasis on the odometer readings. McMahon v. State, 273 Ga.App. 574, 576(4) (615 S.E.2d 625) (2005).” Zipperer v. State, 299 Ga.App. 792, 683 S.E.2d 865 (August 20, 2009). Restitution order was improper where defendant was convicted of leaving scene of accident but acquitted of failure to maintain a lane. “OCGA § 17-14-9 provides that ‘[t]he amount of restitution ordered shall not exceed the victim's damages.’ For purposes of restitution, OCGA § 17-14-2(2) defines damages as ‘all ... damages which a victim could recover against an offender in a civil action ... based on the same act or acts for which the offender is sentenced ....’ (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the uncontradicted evidence showed the damage to the other vehicle was solely attributable to the collision between the cars. It follows that Zipperer's failure to stop after the collision neither caused nor contributed to the damage to the other vehicle.” “ Further, even though Zipperer's counsel waived a restitution hearing and stipulated to the amount of damage to the other driver's car, such actions do not waive appellate review of the legality of the restitution