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order. ‘A sentence or portion thereof that is unauthorized by law is a nullity and void. Thus, where no law authorizes the imposition of restitution ordered in a sentence, ... that portion of the sentence is void. A void sentence may be so held in any court where it becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it, regardless of a lack of objection in the trial court.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sumner v. State, 284 Ga.App. 308, 312-313(1), 643 S.E.2d 831 (2007) (the defendant's consent to an otherwise void restitution order did not waive the appeal of the order).” Accord, Smith (July 10, 2008), below. Smith v. State, 292 Ga.App. 689, 665 S.E.2d 399 (July 10, 2008). Trial court erred by imposing restitution not based on the offense. Defendant committed a burglary and damaged victim’s home in Tennessee, then traveled to Georgia to cash a forged check (stolen in the burglary). Charged with forgery in Georgia, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea; the agreed sentence called for restitution expressly intended “to compensate the victim and her insurer for the property damage and items stolen during the burglary but not for the forged check.” A month later, defendant moved to set aside the restitution requirement, contending that it was an illegal sentence. Court of Appeals agrees: “OCGA § 17-14-9 provides: ‘The amount of restitution ordered may be equal to or less than, but not more than, the victim's damages.’ See Robinson v. State, 169 Ga.App. 763 (315 S.E.2d 277) (1984). For purposes of restitution, damages are defined as ‘all damages which a victim could recover against an offender in a civil action ... based on the same act or acts for which the offender is sentenced ....’ (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-14-2(2).” “However, Smith was not charged with nor convicted of burglary in the State of Georgia. The act for which the trial court was authorized to impose sentence upon Smith was not the burglary, but the forgery in the first degree. See Washington v. State, 251 Ga.App. 206, 211-212(3) (553 S.E.2d 855) (2001).” Distinguishing Tindol v. State , 284 Ga.App. 45, 643 S.E.2d 277 (2007): “In Tindol, the defendant was sentenced for theft of a motor vehicle and was ordered to pay restitution for equipment that was in the stolen vehicle but was lost after he abandoned it. Supra, 284 Ga.App. at 46(2). We affirmed the trial court's restitution order because ‘the act for which Tindol was sentenced, caused the disappearance of the equipment.’ Id. … Here, however, Smith's act of forgery did not cause or give rise to the damage to the victim's home for which Smith was ordered to pay restitution.” Irrelevent that defendant agreed to the restitution as part of negotiated plea: “‘[A] defendant's acquiescence to an illegal sentence, either through plea negotiations or a failure to object to the sentence, cannot render an otherwise illegal sentence valid through waiver. That is because a void sentence in law amounts to no sentence at all.’ (Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Sumner v. State, 284 Ga.App. 308, 312(1) (643 S.E.2d 831) (2007).” Accord, Zipperer (August 20, 2009), above. McMahon v. State, 273 Ga.App. 574, 615 S.E.2d 625 (June 8, 2005). “Our Supreme Court has noted that a trial court may defer the initial decision on the amount of restitution until a later hearing and has also noted that the defendant can consent to restitution being determined, or even increased, at a later time. Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 859, 861 & n. 1 (413 S.E.2d 439) (1992). Zebley v. State, 234 Ga.App. 18, 19(2) (505 S.E.2d 562) (1998). That is what happened in this case.” However, “[w]e agree that the restitution amount should not include any amount for damages which would have been attributed to the three counts of theft by receiving for which McMahon was acquitted. See Bottoms v. State, 194 Ga.App. 862, 862-863(2) (392 S.E.2d 59) (1990); OCGA § 17-14-2(2).” Accord, Wilder (March 19, 2012), above (restitution must relate to charge to which defendant pled guilty, not those that were nolle prossed). 7. DOUBLE RECOVERY Wright v. State, 302 Ga.App. 136, 690 S.E.2d 259 (January 26, 2010). Following defendant’s conviction for rape, burglary, and related offenses, trial court erred in dismissing (as premature) defendant’s motion to modify restitution order. Dicta: Patterson (February 20, 2008), below , does not require set-off of restitution for payments made by defendant’s insurance. ““Moreover, relevant case law suggests that in situations where the victim has been fully compensated by a third-party, the defendant may be ordered to pay restitution to that third-party. See Adams v. State, 291 Ga.App. 681, 684(3) (662 S.E.2d 782) (2008) (‘the purpose of restitution is not only to make the victim whole, but also to prevent the offender from shifting the costs of his conduct to third parties. Accordingly, a court may order an offender to make restitution to any third party who has incurred or will incur expenses as a result of his illegal acts’).” Taylor v. State, 295 Ga.App. 689, 673 S.E.2d 7 (January 6, 2009). Trial court erred in imposing victim restitution where victim had settled all civil claims against defendant. “OCGA § 17-14-6(b) specifically provides that ‘[t]he ordering authority shall not order restitution to be paid to a victim or victim's estate if the victim or victim's estate has received or is to receive full compensation for that loss from the offender as a result of a civil proceeding.’ (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, because the victim's estate settled with the insurance companies and dismissed with prejudice its claims against Taylor for damages arising from the collision, the estate is estopped as a matter of law from seeking any