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additional compensation from Taylor in a future civil proceeding. See Robinson v. Stokes, 229 Ga.App. 25, 27(1) (493 S.E.2d 5) (1997) (‘a voluntary dismissal with prejudice operates as a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata’) (citation omitted). Thus, pursuant to OCGA § 17-14-6(b), the court was not authorized to order Taylor to pay the estate restitution. The restitution order must be reversed.” Affirmed on another issue, Taylor v State , 286 Ga. 328, 687 S.E.2d 409 (November 2, 2009). Patterson v. State, 289 Ga.App. 663, 658 S.E.2d 210 (February 20, 2008). Following convictions for theft by taking, restitution awards affirme. Restitution was not set-off by civil judgments or bankruptcy plan, absent evidence of actual payment. “‘Although a restitution order is enforceable as is a civil judgment by execution, OCGA § 17-14-13(a), it does not bar a civil action against the offender. OCGA § 17-14-11. However, any payments made by an offender to a victim under an order for restitution may be a setoff against any judgment awarded to the victim in a civil action based on the same facts for which restitution was ordered.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Total Supply v. Pridgen, 267 Ga.App. 125, 126, n. 1 (598 S.E.2d 805) (2004). In other words, what is prohibited is a double recovery. We note that OCGA § 17-14-12 permits the court to modify its restitution order, which the trial court in this case would be required to do in order to set off any payments that may actually be made to the victims by the bankruptcy trustee.” See also Wright (January 26, 2010), above. 8. HEARING/WRITTEN FINDINGS REQUIREMENTS See also subheading POST-TRIAL, below In re: D.D., 335 Ga.App. 676, 782 S.E.2d 728 (February 10, 2016). Following delinquency adjudication, commitment order vacated. Juvenile court erred by ordering restitution without holding a restitution hearing. “ Pursuant to OCGA § 15–11–601(7), a juvenile court may order a delinquent child to make restitution. In doing so, however, the juvenile court must follow the procedures set forth in OCGA §§ 17–14–1 through 17–14–19. These procedures include the requirement of holding a hearing to determine restitution. See OCGA § 17–14–7(b). At that hearing, the State has the burden of proving the amount of the victim’s loss. See id. The defendant, on the other hand, has the burden of demonstrating his present financial resources, obligations and needs. See Tobias v. State, 319 Ga.App. 320, 329–330(5) (735 S.E.2d 113) (2012). Here, the State concedes that no restitution hearing was held and there was no evidence adduced at the adjudication and disposition hearings with regard to the amount of the victim’s loss or D.D.’s ability to pay restitution. Consequently, we must remand this case for a restitution hearing in accordance with the procedures set forth in OCGA §§ 17–14–1 through 17–14–19.” Graf v. State, 327 Ga.App. 598, 760 S.E.2d 613 (June 17, 2014). Following defendant’s convictions for arson and other offenses, no error in failing to hold separate restitution hearing following sentencing. “[N]othing in OCGA § 17–14–10 mandates a separate hearing on restitution.” “Although Graf cites Watts v. State, 321 Ga.App. 289, 739 S.E.2d 129 (2013), for the proposition that a trial court errs when it fails to hold a separate restitution hearing, Graf does not assert or show that she asked for such a hearing, and has thus ‘waived any error in the decision of the trial court to decide the question of restitution as a part of the sentencing hearing, rather than in a separate and distinct hearing.’ Wilson v. State, 317 Ga.App. 171, 180(2)(b), 730 S.E.2d 500 (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted).” Record shows that judge considered the factors required in OCGA § 17-14-10(a). Seems to directly contradict Parker (March 13, 2013), below. Parker v. State, 320 Ga.App. 319, 741 S.E.2d 159 (March 13, 2013). Burglary and related convictions affirmed, but victim restitution order reversed for failure to conduct hearing thereon. During sentencing, trial court sua sponte ordered victim restitution as a condition of probation without any discussion or presentation of evidence or argument. “Under the current law of restitution, Parker was not required to take any affirmative action to trigger a hearing on restitution. Given that restitution was ordered as a part of Parker's probation, both OCGA §§ 42–8–35(a)(7) and 17–14–7(b) are applicable to this case.” Pre-2005, a hearing was only required if defendant disputed the amount of restitution, based on OCGA § 42–8–35(a)(7) and Williams v. State, 180 Ga.App. 854, 856(3)(a), 350 S.E.2d 837 (1986). But effective July 1, 2005, OCGA § 17–14–7(b) requires a hearing “[i]f the parties have not agreed on the amount of restitution prior to sentencing.” “Accordingly, in the absence of a showing that the parties have ‘agreed on the amount of restitution prior to sentencing,’ a hearing to determine restitution is required. See also McCart v. State, 289 Ga.App. 830, 832(1), 658 S.E.2d 465 (2008) (‘[A] hearing on the issue of restitution is [ ] required if the parties cannot agree on an amount prior to sentencing.’ Citing OCGA § 17–14–7(b)). [fn] Decisions of this Court that require the defendant to dispute the amount of restitution—either before or after the court orders restitution—to trigger a hearing on restitution have been superceded by a change in the law and are therefore distinguishable.” Contradicted, Graf (June 17, 2014), above.