☢ test - Í

v. Roberts, 263 Ga. 405, 406(1), 434 S.E.2d 450 (1993) (‘“[i]t is the tortfeasor’s responsibility to compensate for all harm that he causes, not confined to the net loss that the injured party receives”’), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A comment (b), p. 514. This rule results from the fact that ‘[t]he courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer.’ Id. And if one party is going to receive a ‘windfall’ as a result of third- party payments made to the victim, ‘it is usually considered more just that the injured person should profit, rather than let the wrongdoer be relieved of full responsibility for his wrongdoing.’ Id. at 407(1), 434 S.E.2d 450 (citation and punctuation omitted). We find that this same rationale applies in restitution proceedings, which allow a victim to recover those special damages he could otherwise recover in a civil tort action. See OCGA § 17–14–2(2).” Trial court erred, however, in awarding victim the value of his time spent attending the restitution hearing. “We are aware of no law that would permit a civil litigant to recover for the time lost from work as a result of the litigant’s prosecution of his civil lawsuit. Given this fact, we find that the trial court erred in awarding Brown the equivalent of a day’s wages for the time he spent testifying at the restitution hearing.” Vaughn v. State, 324 Ga.App. 289, 750 S.E.2d 375 (October 21, 2013). Whole court opinion. Following non-negotiated guilty plea, trial court erred in ordering victim restitution of amounts taken beyond the applicable limitations period. Overruling Beall v. State, 252 Ga.App. 138, 139(2) (555 S.E.2d 788) (2001) to the extent that it holds that “entry of a guilty plea waives statute of limitation defenses.” “At a restitution hearing, the State has the burden of demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by the victim by the preponderance of the evidence, OCGA § 17–14–7(b), and the amount of restitution ordered shall not exceed the victim's damages. OCGA § 17–14–9. [fn] OCGA § 17–14–2(2) defines ‘damages’ for purpose of the restitution statute as ‘all special damages which a victim could recover against an offender in a civil action, ... based on the same act or acts for which the offender is sentenced [.]’ (emphasis supplied). See also Mayfield v. State, 307 Ga.App. 630, 631(2)(b) (705 S.E.2d 717) (2011). The statute of limitation for a civil suit for recovery of converted funds is four years after the right of action accrues. OCGA § 9–3–32.” Callaham v. State, 317 Ga.App. 513, 732 S.E.2d 88 (August 29, 2012). Aggravated assault sentence affirmed; although sentence was increased after reversal and retrial (by requiring victim restitution), presumption of vindictiveness was overcome. Restitution may be ordered where sentence is for straight incarceration. Former law allowing restitution only “as a condition of ‘relief granted to an offender,’ OCGA § 17-14-2(8),” but this language was removed in 2005. “Under the current law, restitution may be ordered ‘in addition to any other penalty imposed by law.’ OCGA § 17–14–3. See also OCGA § 17–14–2(8) (‘“Restitution order” means any order, decree, or judgment of an ordering authority which requires an offender to make restitution.’).” Spencer v. State, 286 Ga. 483, 690 S.E.2d 823 (February 8, 2010). Defendant’s sentence for deposit account fraud affirmed. “The trial court did not err in ordering defendant to make restitution in the amount of $3,394.73. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court was not required to specify whether the payment was to be made in gold or silver coins.” Sumner v. State, 284 Ga.App. 308, 643 S.E.2d 831 (March 19, 2007). Trial court erred in ordering defendant to pay restitution while incarcerated. Based on Queen v. State , 210 Ga.App. 588, 436 S.E.2d 714 (1983) and OCGA § 17-14- 15(b). Even if defendant had agreed to the condition (he hadn’t), “‘[a] defendant’s acquiescence to an illegal sentence, either thru plea negotiations or a failure to object to the sentence, cannot render an otherwise illegal sentence valid through waiver.’ Sanders v. State, 259 Ga.App. 422, 423(1) (577 S.E.2d 94) (2003). That is because ‘[a] void sentence in law amounts to no sentence at all. It follows that if there is error, it is nonwaivable.’ State v. Baldwin, 167 Ga.App. 737, 738(2) (307 S.E.2d 679) (1983).” Reversed and remanded for resentencing. No longer good law? See Callaham (August 29, 2012), above. 13. MODIFICATION Callaham v. State, 317 Ga.App. 513, 732 S.E.2d 88 (August 29, 2012). Aggravated assault sentence affirmed; although sentence was increased after reversal and retrial (by requiring victim restitution), presumption of vindictiveness was overcome. 1. Adding victim restitution to sentence increased sentence and raised presumption of vindictiveness. “‘[R]estitution is punishment when ordered as part of a criminal sentence.’ (Citation and footnote omitted). Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 859, 861(2) (413 S.E.2d 439) (1992). Thus, an increase in restitution upon retrial is subject to this rule. See generally United States v. Feldman, 825 F.2d 124, 132 (7 th Cir., 1987); U.S. v. Haddock, 50 F.3d 835, 840(C) (10 th Cir., 1995) (raising but not deciding the same argument).” “Here, Callaham was convicted of both aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony at the first trial, but the first conviction was reversed because of judicial misconduct. Callaham was only convicted of aggravated assault at the second trial, yet he received a greater