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sentence as a result of the restitution order. We conclude that the [ North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656) (1969)] presumption [of vindictiveness] applies.” 2. Presumption was rebutted. “It is apparent from the evidence presented that some of the information about the victim's damages came from a time after the sentencing following the first trial. Given that, together with the evidence presented regarding the victim's damages and compensation from the State, we conclude that there is objective information in the record justifying the restitution order thereby rebutting the Pearce presumption.” Williams v. State, 311 Ga.App. 152, 715 S.E.2d 440 (July 6, 2011). No error in order for restitution, entered after defendant’s sentence for criminal trespass. 1. “Williams … argues that, because the trial court failed to hold the restitution hearing within the 60–day window set forth in the sentencing order, the later-ordered restitution unlawfully expanded her sentence.” Court of Appeals disagrees: “while the trial court did direct that a restitution hearing take place within 60 days of sentencing, we decline to hold — in the absence of a statutorily imposed time limit — that the trial court created a substantive right for Williams to have the restitution hearing held within that time.” Citing “McMahon v. State, 273 Ga.App. 574, 574–75(1) (615 S.E.2d 625) (2005) (declining to hold that the trial court's failure to conduct a restitution hearing for the seven months between the sentencing and defendant's filing of a notice of appeal deprived the court of jurisdiction to specify restitution amount); Zebley v. State, 234 Ga.App. 18, 19(2) (505 S.E.2d 562) (1998) (rejecting defendant's argument that restitution determined pursuant to a later-held hearing constituted an enhancement of his sentence). Compare Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 859, 860–61(2) (413 S.E.2d 439) (1992) (holding that the trial court lacked the authority to increase the previously ordered restitution amount without the defendant's consent once the defendant had begun serving his sentence).” 2. Defendant waived appearance at restitution hearing by failing to attend. Notice of the hearing was properly served on defense counsel. Counsel appeared, but could give no explanation for defendant’s absence. “ See, e.g., Yancey v. State, 219 Ga.App. 116, 116 (464 S.E.2d 245) (1995) (‘[T]he burden of determining the cause of the defendant's absence [is] on his counsel, not on the trial judge.’).” Accord, Gibson v. State , 319 Ga.App. 627, 737 S.E.2d 728 (January 31, 2013). Wright v. State, 302 Ga.App. 136, 690 S.E.2d 259 (January 26, 2010). Following defendant’s conviction for rape, burglary, and related offenses, trial court erred by dismissing defendant’s motion to modify restitution order rather than addressing its merits. “Although it did not say so explicitly, the trial court's order dismissing Wright's motion implied that it was untimely – i.e, that a motion seeking modification of the restitution order could not be made until Wright was released on probation and paying restitution. … [T]his Court has previously held that ‘[t]he law does not require that corresponding prison terms or probated sentences expire before restitution orders may be appealed.’ The Limited, Inc. v. Learning Childbirth Center, 255 Ga.App. 688, 690(1) (566 S.E.2d 411) (2002). Logically, therefore, the law does not require the expiration of a defendant's prison term or the actual commencement of restitution payments before a defendant can move for modification of a restitution order. See OCGA § 17-14-12 (‘[t]he ordering authority shall retain jurisdiction to modify a restitution order at any time before the expiration of the relief ordered’) (emphasis supplied).” 14. POST-TRIAL Williams v. State, 311 Ga.App. 152, 715 S.E.2d 440 (July 6, 2011). No error in order for restitution, entered after defendant’s sentence for criminal trespass. 1. “Williams … argues that, because the trial court failed to hold the restitution hearing within the 60–day window set forth in the sentencing order, the later-ordered restitution unlawfully expanded her sentence.” Court of Appeals disagrees: “while the trial court did direct that a restitution hearing take place within 60 days of sentencing, we decline to hold — in the absence of a statutorily imposed time limit — that the trial court created a substantive right for Williams to have the restitution hearing held within that time.” Citing “McMahon v. State, 273 Ga.App. 574, 574–75(1) (615 S.E.2d 625) (2005) (declining to hold that the trial court's failure to conduct a restitution hearing for the seven months between the sentencing and defendant's filing of a notice of appeal deprived the court of jurisdiction to specify restitution amount); Zebley v. State, 234 Ga.App. 18, 19(2) (505 S.E.2d 562) (1998) (rejecting defendant's argument that restitution determined pursuant to a later-held hearing constituted an enhancement of his sentence). Compare Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 859, 860–61(2) (413 S.E.2d 439) (1992) (holding that the trial court lacked the authority to increase the previously ordered restitution amount without the defendant's consent once the defendant had begun serving his sentence).” 2. Defendant waived appearance at restitution hearing by failing to attend. Notice of the hearing was properly served on defense counsel. Counsel appeared, but could give no explanation for defendant’s absence. “ See, e.g., Yancey v. State, 219 Ga.App. 116, 116 (464 S.E.2d 245) (1995) (‘[T]he burden of determining the cause of the defendant's absence [is] on his counsel, not on the trial judge.’).”