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15. THIRD PARTIES See subheading INDIRECT VICTIMS/INSURORS/ THIRD PARTIES, above 16. VALUE See subheadings regarding CALCULATION OF AMOUNT, above 17. WAIVER

Williams v. State, 311 Ga.App. 152, 715 S.E.2d 440 (July 6, 2011). No error in order for restitution, entered after defendant’s sentence for criminal trespass. 1. “Williams … argues that, because the trial court failed to hold the restitution hearing within the 60–day window set forth in the sentencing order, the later-ordered restitution unlawfully expanded her sentence.” Court of Appeals disagrees: “while the trial court did direct that a restitution hearing take place within 60 days of sentencing, we decline to hold — in the absence of a statutorily imposed time limit — that the trial court created a substantive right for Williams to have the restitution hearing held within that time.” Citing “McMahon v. State, 273 Ga.App. 574, 574–75(1) (615 S.E.2d 625) (2005) (declining to hold that the trial court's failure to conduct a restitution hearing for the seven months between the sentencing and defendant's filing of a notice of appeal deprived the court of jurisdiction to specify restitution amount); Zebley v. State, 234 Ga.App. 18, 19(2) (505 S.E.2d 562) (1998) (rejecting defendant's argument that restitution determined pursuant to a later-held hearing constituted an enhancement of his sentence). Compare Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 859, 860–61(2) (413 S.E.2d 439) (1992) (holding that the trial court lacked the authority to increase the previously ordered restitution amount without the defendant's consent once the defendant had begun serving his sentence).” 2. Defendant waived appearance at restitution hearing by failing to attend. Notice of the hearing was properly served on defense counsel. Counsel appeared, but could give no explanation for defendant’s absence. “ See, e.g., Yancey v. State, 219 Ga.App. 116, 116 (464 S.E.2d 245) (1995) (‘[T]he burden of determining the cause of the defendant's absence [is] on his counsel, not on the trial judge.’).” Ezebuiro v. State, 308 Ga.App. 282, 707 S.E.2d 182 (March 8, 2011). Conviction for robbery by intimidation affirmed; trial court properly ordered victim restitution as condition of probation. “When a dispute exists about the appropriate amount of restitution, OCGA § 17-14-7(b) calls for a restitution hearing: ‘If the parties have not agreed on the amount of restitution prior to sentencing, the ordering authority shall set a date for a hearing to determine restitution. Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the ordering authority by the preponderance of the evidence. The burden of demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall be on the [S]tate. The burden of demonstrating the financial resources of the offender ... and the financial needs of his or her dependents shall be on the offender....’ OCGA § 17-14-7(b). Here, the trial court took up the issue of restitution as a part of its consideration of a proper sentence, immediately following the return of the guilty verdict. Ezebuiro was allowed to offer argument on the issue of restitution, and she did not object to the trial court proceeding to decide the issue of restitution at that time. Nor did she ask for a continuance, ask that a restitution hearing be set for a later date, or state that she had evidence to present on the question of restitution. For these reasons, she has waived any error in the decision of the trial court to decide the question of restitution as a part of the sentencing hearing, rather than in a separate and distinct hearing.” Evidence at trial was sufficient to support amount of restitution. “See Ingram v. State, 262 Ga.App. 304, 308(4)(c) (585 S.E.2d 211) (2003) (‘In determining what sentence to impose upon a defendant, a trial court may consider any evidence that was properly admitted during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial.’) (emphasis and citation omitted).” Cameron v. State, 295 Ga.App. 670, 673 S.E.2d 59 (January 26, 2009). Trial court properly ordered victim restitution with defendant’s express consent. “The record shows that, after consultation with his counsel, Cameron acquiesced in the trial court's restitution order as a means of securing a more lenient sentence than that proposed by the State. ‘A litigant cannot submit to a ruling or acquiesce in the holding, and then complain of the same on appeal. ’ (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) McCullough v. State, 268 Ga.App. 445, 446(2)(a) (602 S.E.2d 181) (2004) (defendant acquiesced in restitution order where defendant suggested payment of restitution as a means of obtaining a more lenient sentence and represented that he wanted to pay the victims back ‘for all the damages and pain that I have caused ....’); see also Westmoreland v. State, 192 Ga.App. 173, 177(2)(b) (384 S.E.2d 249) (1989).” Patterson v. State, 289 Ga.App. 663, 658 S.E.2d 210 (February 20, 2008). Defendant waived right to demand restitution hearing or challenge amount of trial court’s restitution order where he testified at sentencing, “‘I fully understand what I did was wrong.... I now feel that it’s my responsibility to pay these people back.... They will be made whole. ’ As to the amount, defense counsel stated, ‘I certainly defer to the State on that.’ Counsel also offered a payment schedule, arguing for probation so that Patterson would be able to ‘pay the money back ... as soon as possible.’”