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Hartsell v. State, 288 Ga.App. 552, 654 S.E.2d 662 (November 21, 2007). Trial court’s restitution order was supported by the record. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of theft by conversion for misappropriating certain sums paid to build houses. Amount. “Hartsell argues that the State failed to carry its burden of showing the amount of loss sustained by the victims as a result of the offenses of theft by conversion. Citing OCGA § 16-8-4(a), which requires for a theft-by-conversion conviction that the defendant converted the funds ‘to his own use,’ he claims that at the restitution hearing, the State had to show what portion of the earnest money deposits were used to pay for Hartsell’s personal expenses as opposed to expenses of his corporation. Hartsell’s arguments fail on two fronts. First, he overlooks the impact of his guilty plea. By pleading guilty, he admitted to all the allegations of the two counts ( Wright v. Hall, 281 Ga. 318, 319(1) (638 S.E.2d 270) (2006)), waiving any factual inaccuracies ( Kemp v. Simpson, 278 Ga. 439, 439-440 (603 S.E.2d 267) (2004)) and waiving all defenses other than that the accusation charged no crime ( Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 56(3) (464 S.E.2d 198) (1995)). Here, he pled guilty to Count One, which alleged that he received $16,874 from Victim No. 1 ‘under an agreement to make a specified application of such funds in that the accused was to construct a new house ... and the accused did knowingly convert the funds to the use of the accused in violation of the agreement....’ (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, he had already admitted to the court that he had converted $16,874 to his own use.” The amount stolen in Count Two was similarly admitted. Gorham v. State, 287 Ga.App. 404, 651 S.E.2d 520 (September 4, 2007). Defendant couldn’t challenge imposition of restitution as part of sentence, although trial court failed to make necessary findings, where defense counsel asked trial court to use the figure provided by State and didn’t object to sentence. Disapproved “to the extent [it requires] written findings when ordering an offender to make restitution,” McCart v. State , 289 Ga.App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (February 29, 2008). Accord, Tindol (March 7, 2007), below. Tindol v. State, 284 Ga.App. 45, 643 S.E.2d 329 (March 7, 2007). Award of restitution following guilty plea to motor vehicle theft affirmed. “Any argument related to the legitimacy of the victim entitled to restitution was waived by Tindol’s failure to argue it at the restitution hearing.” Accord, Gorham (September 4, 2007), above. Steele v. State, 270 Ga.App. 488, 606 S.E.2d 664 (November 16, 2004). Guilty plea to aggravated assault; award of victim restitution remanded for entry of written findings of fact in support thereof. “[A] defendant who fails to object to a restitution order when it is imposed does not waive the right to contest that order on appeal.” Defendant here didn’t affirmatively agree or acquiesce to restitution award. Fuller v. State, 244 Ga.App. 618, 536 S.E.2d 296 (June 26, 2000). Following no contest pleas to theft by conversion, defendant’s sentence reversed and remanded; trial court erred in allowing State to compel defendant to testify at restitution hearing. Based on Mitchell v. United States , 526 U.S. 314, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999): a plea of guilty or no contest waives all rights attendant to trial, but privilege against self-incrimination exists beyond the confines of the trial. The incrimination is not complete until a sentence is fixed and the judgment becomes final. “‘Treating a guilty plea as a waiver of the privilege at sentencing would be a grave encroachment on the rights of defendants,’” Mitchell at 324. The fact that the defendant in Fuller entered a nolo contendere plea rather than a guilty one does not change the analysis. Likewise, rejects State’s argument that a restitution hearing “is akin to civil damages … though a restitution hearing is analogous in some ways to a civil proceeding, it is fundamental that restitution is punishment when ordered as part of a criminal sentence.” YY. SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT WITH STATE 1. AGREEMENT VIOLATED BY DEFENDANT Humphrey v. State, 297 Ga. 349, 773 S.E.2d 760 (June 15, 2015). Following negotiated plea and sentence of guilty but mentally ill to murder, trial court erred by denying motion to vacate void sentence. 1. When defendant was by law eligible for parole after 14 years, superior court had no power to prohibit parole sooner than 25 years, even with defendant’s consent. “It is true that Humphrey consented to his sentence, including the provision that he would be ineligible for parole for the first 25 years of that sentence. But when a court imposes a criminal punishment that the law does not allow, the sentence is not just an error, it is void. See Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610, 611(1) (409 S.E.2d 517) (1991) (‘A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.’ (Citation omitted.)). And as we have indicated in a number of cases, the consent of the parties cannot validate a void sentence. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 293 Ga. 705, 706(1) (749 S.E.2d 660) (2013) (‘[A] defendant who knowingly enters into a plea agreement and accepts the benefit of that bargain does not waive or ‘bargain away’ the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence.’ (Citations omitted.)); Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 5, 8(2) (749 S.E.2d 672) (2013) (‘A defendant who knowingly enters into a plea agreement does not waive the right to challenge an illegal and void sentence.’ (Citation omitted.)); von Thomas v.