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applicable to guilty pleas. See Hinely v. State, 275 Ga. 777, 783(5) (573 S.E.2d 66) (2002) (holding in case involving sentencing agreement similar to Barnes' that ‘the prospect of a greater sentence is not coercion that prevents the decision to plead guilty, or to accept a certain lesser sentence, from being free and voluntary’ ); Brantley v. State, 268 Ga. 151(1) (486 S.E.2d 169) (1997) (analyzing claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with sentencing agreement under standard applicable to ineffective assistance claim in context of guilty plea).” Contrary to defendant’s contention, his sentence here was entered pursuant to his agreement with the State. Boykins v. State, 298 Ga.App. 654, 680 S.E.2d 665 (July 1, 2009). Minor defendant, sentenced pursuant to plea agreement, was not entitled to withdraw his plea after sentence merely because he was a minor. “Boykins argues that because aspects of contract law apply to plea negotiations, his guilty plea was voidable as a matter of law pursuant to OCGA § 13-3-20, which provides, in pertinent part, that ‘[g]enerally the contract of a minor is voidable.’” However, Georgia’s “appellate courts have previously recognized the validity of plea agreements involving minors. E.g., Foster v. Caldwell, 225 Ga. 1 (165 S.E.2d 724) (1969).” Bryan v. State, 296 Ga.App. 341, 674 S.E.2d 390 (March 2, 2009). Defendant’s agreement not to appeal his jury conviction was enforceable against him, notwithstanding his contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. “Bryan does not challenge the validity of the waiver of his appeal rights in this case; in fact, Bryan fails to make any mention of the negotiated waiver in his brief. Nonetheless, “[a] review of the record shows that [Bryan] indeed voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently chose to enter into the non-appeal agreement after he was fully informed of his rights to an appeal.” Rush, 276 Ga. at 542. Bryan's agreement with the state provided that if Bryan entered guilty pleas in the five drug cases pending against him and agreed to forego filing an appeal of his firearms convictions, the state would recommend a 30-year, 15 to serve, sentence in the felony drug cases that would be served concurrently with the sentence in the firearms convictions. Before accepting the pleas, the waiver, and the state's recommendation, the trial court questioned Bryan in detail about his understanding and acceptance of the agreement. Bryan had previously been informed of his appeal rights and was represented by two different attorneys who advised him on these matters. He responded affirmatively to the trial court's questions and expressed his desire to waive the right to an appeal in this case. ‘Having received the benefit of the agreement, [defendant] cannot now ignore its terms and seek relief via an appeal to this Court.’ Rush [ v. State, 276 Ga. 541, 542 (579 S.E.2d 726) (2003)].” Accord, Arrington v. State , 332 Ga.App. 481, 773 S.E.2d 430 (June 11, 2015). Hooks v. State, 284 Ga. 531, 668 S.E.2d 718 (October 27, 2008). 1. “ Regardless of whether Hooks validly waived his appellate rights, he nonetheless was entitled to challenge his sentences as void or illegal. See Baker v. State , 284 Ga. 280, 663 S.E.2d 261 (June 30, 2008); Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736 (524 S.E.2d 452) (1999); Hall v. State, 291 Ga.App. 649, 651 (662 S.E.2d 753) (2008).” 2. “‘ Georgia allows a defendant to enter into a negotiated agreement to forego the right to seek post-conviction relief as a means to serve the interests of the State and the defendant in achieving finality. [Cit.] In particular, this Court has held that a criminal defendant may waive his statutory right to appeal a conviction in exchange for the State's agreement not to seek the death penalty at sentencing, so long as the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. [Cits.] The fact that a waiver of the right to appeal is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent may be shown in two ways. First, a signed waiver may indicate that the defendant understands the right he is waiving. Second, and more important, detailed questioning of the defendant by the trial court that reveals that he was informed of his right to appeal and that he voluntarily waived that right is sufficient to show the existence of a valid, enforceable waiver. [Cit.]’ Rush v. State, 276 Ga. 541, 542 (579 S.E.2d 726) (2003).” Such waiver is not enforceable, however, unless the State is actually foregoing a potential valid sentence. “In this case, however, the murder sentences originally imposed on Hooks were void and, thus, were not ever enforceable against him. Funderburk v. State, [276 Ga. 554, 555(2) (580 S.E.2d 234) (2003)]. Moreover, Hooks did not execute any signed waiver and, at the re-sentencing hearing, was never informed that he was not required to waive his appellate rights in order to obtain relief from the void sentences. There was not ‘detailed questioning of the defendant by the trial court that reveals that he was [fully] informed of his right to appeal.... [Cit.]’ Rush v. State, supra. … Hooks purportedly waived his appellate rights in exchange for new sentences which are not void, but which nevertheless constitute the most severe punishment possible for the murder of two persons where, as here, the death penalty is not sought and sentencing as a recidivist is not available. In these circumstances, he received only that to which he was already entitled as a matter of law. Accordingly, the sentencing agreement did not have any genuine value to Hooks, was not knowingly made ‘in full apprehension of the value of the commitments made to him’ and, therefore, was the result of an illusory bargain.” See also Bryan (March 2, 2009), above. Baker v. State, 284 Ga. 280, 663 S.E.2d 261 (June 30, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s “motion to correct illegal sentence;” sentencing agreement between State and defendant “in which [defendant] agreed that he would