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not seek parole until he served 30 years of his sentence, and the State agreed it would not seek the death penalty ... is valid and enforceable. See Allen v. Thomas, 265 Ga. 518 (458 S.E.2d 107) (1995).” Gibson v. State, 257 Ga.App. 134, 570 S.E.2d 437 (August 22, 2002). Following defendant’s guilty plea to robbery by intimidation, trial court had no duty to offer or consider first offender sentencing where not requested by defendant. “‘[W]hen a person knowingly and voluntarily enters into a negotiated plea agreement and accepts the conditions of his ... [sentence] in open court, he or she waives the right to challenge the issue on appeal.’ Furthermore, a negotiated plea agreement ‘is in the nature of a contract.’ Where the State upholds its side of the bargain, the trial court does not err in requiring the defendant to honor his obligations.” Gilbert v. State, 245 Ga.App. 544, 538 S.E.2d 104 (August 4, 2000). No error in sentencing defendant according to his plea deal with State following guilty pleas to child molestation and related charges. “[A] negotiated plea is in the nature of a contract, Powell v. State, 229 Ga.App. 52, 53(1), 494 S.E.2d 200 (1997), citing Martin v. State, 207 Ga.App. 861, 429 S.E.2d 332 (1993), and the State having honored its obligation thereunder, the superior court did not err in requiring of the defendant his end of the bargain. Powell v. State, supra at 53-54, 494 S.E.2d 200.” Brown v. State, 271 Ga. 550, 522 S.E.2d 230 (October 18, 1999). Following guilty pleas to malice murder and related offenses, trial court properly denied motion to set aside pleas. Defendant could challenge the voluntariness of his plea despite express waiver of that right in plea agreement. “The State agrees that a plea can always be challenged on grounds of voluntariness. See Allen v. Thomas, 265 Ga. 518, 458 S.E.2d 107 (1995) (right to challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea is not defeated by waiver of right to appeal).” No harm in that language here – trial court considered defendant’s motion to withdraw plea and properly denied it on its merits. Phillips v. State, 236 Ga.App. 744, 512 S.E.2d 32 (February 5, 1999). Following guilty pleas to aggravated child molestation and related offenses, trial court properly denied motion to correct “illegal” sentences. “Phillips’ sentences were imposed upon the recommendation of the State after Phillips, his attorney, and the prosecutor negotiated the plea agreements. A person may ‘validly [waive his or her constitutional] rights through the plea bargaining process.’ Allen v. State, 258 Ga. 424, 425(4), 369 S.E.2d 909 (1988). Likewise, when a person ‘knowingly and voluntarily enter[s] into [a] negotiated plea agreement and accept[s] [the conditions] of his [or her] probation in open court, he [or she waives] the right to challenge [the] issue on appeal.’ Darby v. State, 230 Ga.App. 32, 33(4), 495 S.E.2d 146 (1997). As such, Phillips, who agreed to the sentences against him as part of a negotiated plea, has waived his right to challenge the conditions of his sentence on appeal.” Accord, Johnson v. State , 282 Ga.App. 464, 638 S.E.2d 873 (November 17, 2006). 3. GENERALLY Carlisle v. State, 277 Ga. 99, 586 S.E.2d 240 (September 15, 2003). Reverses 257 Ga.App. 282, 570 S.E.2d 616 (2002). Defendant pled guilty to certain charges; as part of the plea bargain, other charges were nolle prossed. Thereafter, on habeas petition, defendant’s guilty plea was ruled not knowing and voluntary, and returned for trial. She then moved to limit the trial to the four counts to which she originally pled, contending that the statute of limitations had run on the seven nolle prossed counts. Held, trial court should have granted this motion; statute of limitation had run and court was without jurisdiction to try these seven counts, as no charging instrument was pending. Opinion notes only two ways to recommence a nolle prossed prosecution: seek to vacate the nolle pros, based on a meritorious reason to do so and no prejudice to the accused, within the term of court when the nolle pros was entered; or bring a new indictment/accusation within the statute of limitations per OCGA § 17-3-3. Carley dissents, saying grant of habeas petition returned both sides to “the same position they were prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Distinguished, Sevostiyanova v. State , 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012) (Hit and run and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly allowed amendment of accusation to withdraw nolle pros of one count after defendant withdrew guilty plea to other count, where the amendment took place before the expiration of the two year statute of limitation). United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (June 24, 2002). Reversing Ninth Circuit, trial court properly denied motion to require government to reduce plea recommendation. “In this case we primarily consider whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require federal prosecutors, before entering into a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant, to disclose ‘impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses.’ [Cit. to record.] We hold that the Constitution does not require that disclosure,” reversing Ninth Circuit. Thus, prosecutors were free to make “fast track” plea offer to defendant which would require defendant to waive the right to receive impeachment information, because the right to receive this information is one of the constitution’s “basic ‘fair trial’ guarantee[s]” which a defendant may waive by pleading guilty (but note, prosecutors here averred that they